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Malware2 associated actors

PrimeCache

Tracked since Dec 2, 2025 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

PrimeCache is a malicious 64-bit native IIS module backdoor implemented as a DLL named cachehttp.dll with an internal name of HttpModule.dll. It functions as a passive backdoor by monitoring incoming HTTP requests for attacker commands, specifically requests matching a predefined cookie header structure such as F=<command_ID>,<param>;. Reported capabilities include command execution, file creation, and file exfiltration. Its command-and-control communications use RSA and AES-CBC encryption. PrimeCache has been associated with the Iran-aligned threat group BladedFeline and was observed in campaigns targeting Kurdish and Iraqi government officials, Kurdistan Regional Government environments, and a regional telecommunications provider in Uzbekistan as part of long-term cyberespionage activity. ESET assessed with medium confidence that BladedFeline is a subgroup of OilRig, and PrimeCache reportedly shares code similarities with OilRig’s RDAT backdoor, including use of Crypto++ and a shared shell-command execution function.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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BladedFeline

PrimeCache also serves as a backdoor: it is a malicious IIS module related to what we referred to as Group 2 in our 2021 paper Anatomy of native IIS malware.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
OilRig

PrimeCache also serves as a backdoor: it is a malicious IIS module related to what we referred to as Group 2 in our 2021 paper Anatomy of native IIS malware.

via eset welivesecurity blogwelivesecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

Possible commands include... Execute a PowerShell script... Slippery Snakelet is a small Python-based backdoor with limited capabilities: 1. executes a command via cmd.exe ... Once received, Hawking executes the value in cmd.exe and returns the output.

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence1

r3 (Presumably) runs the specified command by sending it to another (unknown) process via the named pipe \\.\pipe\iis , then reads (presumably) the command output from the same pipe.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1505Server Software ComponentEvidence1

The security firm also observed BladedFeline deploying PrimeCache, an internet information services module that bore code similarities with the RDAT backdoor.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

PrimeCache is loaded by an IIS Worker Process ( w3wp.exe ) when the IIS server receives an inbound HTTP request.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Eset first observed it in 2023, when it planted a backdoor into systems used by government diplomats from the Kurdistan Regional Government.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

PrimeCache is loaded by an IIS Worker Process ( w3wp.exe ) when the IIS server receives an inbound HTTP request.

Stealth

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Eset first observed it in 2023, when it planted a backdoor into systems used by government diplomats from the Kurdistan Regional Government.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

PrimeCache uses standard web protocols for communication with the C&C server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

PrimeCache action... u AES-encrypted file content Local filename Creates a local file with the specified name and content... In the case where we do not have a location on disk for Laret... Laret was downloaded from http://178.209.51[.]61:8000/wincapsrv.exe via PowerShell.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence1

PrimeCache uses standard encoding for communication with the C&C server.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence1

PrimeCache uses both RSA and AES-CBC for its C&C communication... The session key is RSA encrypted; the backdoor has a hardcoded private and public RSA key...

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

PrimeCache exfiltrates data to a C&C server.

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.