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Malware1 associated actor23 associated CVEs

Enemybot

Tracked since Dec 3, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns23Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs36Tracked
Type
Botnet
Capabilities
DDOSScanningBrute forceInitial accessPersistenceDefense evasionReconnaissancePost exploitation
Delivery
USB
Platforms
LinuxAndroidmacOSNetwork deviceIOT

EnemyBot is a multi-architecture DDoS botnet first identified in 2022 and attributed to the Keksec cybercrime group, also known as Kek Security. It primarily targets Linux servers, routers, and other IoT devices, with additional infection functionality for Android devices. Its codebase draws extensively from Gafgyt and Mirai, incorporates components from other botnets, and includes custom functionality. Its publicly released source code enables reuse by other operators.

EnemyBot self-propagates by scanning pseudorandom IP addresses, attempting hardcoded default credentials, and exploiting vulnerabilities in internet-facing services. Targets include routers, web servers, content management systems, and enterprise applications. Its exploit repertoire includes Log4Shell, Spring Cloud Gateway CVE-2022-22947, VMware Workspace ONE CVE-2022-22954, and D-Link CVE-2015-2051. EnemyBot has been deployed through exploitation of CVE-2022-22954 and embeds that exploit for subsequent propagation. It also attempts infection through exposed Android Debug Bridge services and USB-connected Android devices. Successful compromise typically triggers a shell-based downloader that retrieves and executes an architecture-specific payload.

EnemyBot supports multiple DDoS methods, including TCP, UDP, HTTP, TLS, DNS, SSDP, and ICMP flooding. Operators can execute shell commands, establish reverse shells, control scanning and packet-sniffing functions, and download additional payloads. Infected systems continue scanning while awaiting commands. Observed variants establish persistence through cron scheduling, randomize process names, remove downloaded installation artifacts, and use string encoding or XOR obfuscation to hinder analysis. Tor-based command-and-control conceals operator infrastructure. Development during 2022 included frequent revisions and rapid incorporation of newly disclosed exploits, expanding its reach beyond embedded devices to vulnerable server applications.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

23 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2015-2051via fortiguard otherExploited in the wildHNAP SOAPAction Header Command Injection in D-Link DIR-645In particular, MooBot and Enemybot Malware targeting D-Link routers (CVE-2015-2051).View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2016-6277via cujo blogRemote OS command injection in NETGEAR routersHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-22947via cujo blogSpring Cloud Gateway Actuator SpEL Injection RCEHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2018-10823via cujo blogAuthenticated command injection in D-Link DWR routersHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2017-18368via cujo blogUnauthenticated command injection in ZyXEL P660HN-T1AHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-4039via cujo blogOS Command Injection in Zyxel NWA-1100-NHHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2014-9118via cujo blogRemote command injection in Zhone zNID GPON 2426AHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2020-17456via cujo blogRemote Code Execution in SEOWON INTECH SLC-130 and SLR-120SHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-25075via cujo blogCommand Injection in TOTOLINK A3000RUHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2022-29013via cujo blogCommand Injection in Razer Sila Gaming RouterHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-44228via cujo blogLog4ShellHere is a list of those four exploit sets and malware that uses them ... Enemybot.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2021-45046via cyfirma blogExploited in the wildApache Log4j Thread Context JNDI Injection via Incomplete Log4Shell FixEnemy Botx64 Observed Exploits: CVE-2021-45046, CVE-2021-44228: Log4j – Remote Code Execution. | EnemyBot is mainly built on Gafgyt’s source code, with several modules from the original Mirai source code, and other botnets.View vulnerability →Source ↗

11 more CVEs associated with this family tracked in Mallory.

Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Keksec

EnemyBot is mainly built on Gafgyt’s source code, with several modules from the original Mirai source code, and other botnets.

via cyfirma blogcyfirma.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It uses a list of hardcoded username/password combinations to login into devices in the attempt to access systems using weak or default credentials.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The bot also tries to run shell commands to infect misconfigured Android devices that expose Android Debug Bridge port (5555).

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence4

EnemyBot is selfpropagating by scanning pseudo-random IP ranges for known vulnerabilities.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence2

Once exploited one of the above flaws, the bot runs a shell command to download a shell script from a URL that is dynamically updated by the C2 using the command LDSERVER.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

CVE-2022-22954, a remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability due to server-side template injection in VMware Workspace ONE Access and Identity Manager, is trivial to exploit with a single HTTP request to a vulnerable device.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It uses a list of hardcoded username/password combinations to login into devices in the attempt to access systems using weak or default credentials.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The bot also tries to run shell commands to infect misconfigured Android devices that expose Android Debug Bridge port (5555).

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It uses a list of hardcoded username/password combinations to login into devices in the attempt to access systems using weak or default credentials.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The message was stored as cleartext in earlier samples, new samples were released with the message encoded with an XOR operation using a multiple-byte key.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

Each line of the script attempts to download (again using various methods), set permissions to execute (777), execute from /tmp/ and then delete the original ELF binary.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

It uses a list of hardcoded username/password combinations to login into devices in the attempt to access systems using weak or default credentials.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Dynamic Analysis of the EnemyBot malware did not provide anything useful as the malware seems to have killed itself soon after execution. There appear to be some baked-in counter forensics that kill the application based on certain detected process names.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware also initiates system checks to determine whether or not the malware is already running. After the instance starts there are two possible outputs: “Determined we already have a instance running…” “Binded and listen on address %d.%d.%d.%d.\n”

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

At the same time, Mirai killed other processes running at TCP ports 23 and 2323 together with any possible competing Mirai variants.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

Mirai attempted a brute-force attack with a pre-configured list of known factory defaults and most commonly used credentials.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence2

“Stateless” TCP SYN probes to pseudorandom IPs on Telnet ports 23 and 2323 Once targets were identified, Mirai attempted a brute-force attack...

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

Scrubbing the file in a decompile, it appears to feature a host of networking options such as port scanners, TCP/UDP flood options and general system enumeration.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Dynamic Analysis of the EnemyBot malware did not provide anything useful as the malware seems to have killed itself soon after execution. There appear to be some baked-in counter forensics that kill the application based on certain detected process names.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

The malware also initiates system checks to determine whether or not the malware is already running. After the instance starts there are two possible outputs: “Determined we already have a instance running…” “Binded and listen on address %d.%d.%d.%d.\n”

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK The findings of this report are mapped to the following MITRE ATT&CK Matrix techniques: TA0008: Lateral Movement: T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services T1021: Remote Services

T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK The findings of this report are mapped to the following MITRE ATT&CK Matrix techniques: TA0008: Lateral Movement: T1210: Exploitation of Remote Services

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK The findings of this report are mapped to the following MITRE ATT&CK Matrix techniques: TA0011: Command and Control T1132: Data Encoding T1001: Data Obfuscation

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Once the bot has been installed on a device, it connects to its C2 server and waits for further commands

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

it connects to a command-and-control (C2) server that is hidden in the Tor network, making its takedown more complicated.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Then the script downloads the actual Enemybot binary which is compiled for the target device’s architecture.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

Mapped to MITRE ATT&CK The findings of this report are mapped to the following MITRE ATT&CK Matrix techniques: TA0011: Command and Control T1132: Data Encoding

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Once established and having removed all possible interference, it was ready to wait for C2 commands, while constantly scanning for new victims...

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1030Data Transfer Size LimitsEvidence2

T1030: Proxy: 003: Multi-hop Proxy

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

The EnemyBot malware also appears to have the ability to steal data via HTTP POST, which in our case, the malware was sending the data back to the original IP address.

Impact

1 technique
T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence3

Mirai managed to keep 200,000 – 300,000 enslaved devices and peaked at an unbelievable 600,000... FBI special agents compared Mirai’s 1+ Tbps (1,000 Gbps)... The first Mirai incident was reported after the 18th Sep 2016 attack against popular Minecraft servers hosted on French service OVH.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

36 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching36Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities23CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.