Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

POWERSOURCE

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK29Techniques
IOCs136Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceExfiltration
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows
Also known asDNSMessengerTEXTMATE

POWERSOURCE is a PowerShell backdoor associated with targeted intrusion activity linked by multiple vendors to FIN7, with some historical overlap and confusion involving DNSMessenger-related activity and later reporting that similar infrastructure also appeared in MuddyWater operations. It is described as a heavily obfuscated and modified derivative of the public DNS_TXT_Pwnage tool and is designed to operate largely in memory while using DNS TXT records as a covert command-and-control channel.

POWERSOURCE is typically delivered through malicious Microsoft Office documents in spearphishing campaigns. Reported infection chains include documents that abuse Dynamic Data Exchange to execute PowerShell without relying on macros, as well as documents that drop a VBS script which installs the backdoor. After execution, POWERSOURCE decodes and launches PowerShell payloads, can store components in the Windows Registry, and on systems with newer PowerShell versions can hide a decoded payload in an NTFS alternate data stream for defense evasion.

The malware establishes persistence through Registry Run keys and has also been reported in broader DNSMessenger-style chains that use scheduled tasks and WMI event subscriptions depending on privilege level and host configuration. POWERSOURCE queries Registry locations as part of preparing persistence. Its command-and-control traffic uses DNS TXT queries and responses to exchange attacker tasking and results, allowing remote execution while blending into commonly permitted DNS traffic.

POWERSOURCE has been used to deliver additional payloads, notably the memory-resident PowerShell backdoor TEXTMATE, which provides an interactive reverse shell over DNS, and in some cases Cobalt Strike Beacon. Observed targeting linked to POWERSOURCE activity included U.S.-based organizations in financial services, transportation, retail, education, IT services, and electronics. The malware is best characterized as a PowerShell-based backdoor used for covert post-compromise access, persistence, and staged delivery of follow-on tooling.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
FIN7

(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MuddyWater

Palo Alto Networks believe that the recent wave of attacks might have been mistakenly associated with the FIN7 group, it also reported that a C&C server delivering the FIN7-linked DNSMessenger tool was in MuddyWater attacks as well.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.co
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

29 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Le vecteur d’infection principalement employé par FIN7 est le courriel d’hameçonnage. Il contient une pièce jointe malveillante et plus rarement une URL pointant vers des sites compromis ou des services légitimes tels que Google Docs.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence4

The eSentire Security Operations Center has observed a spear phishing campaign targeting customers in the financial industry. The email claims to originate from the Securities and Exchange Commission and arrives bundled with a malicious Microsoft Word Document.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

...plus rarement une URL pointant vers des sites compromis ou des services légitimes tels que Google Docs.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The emails associated with this malware campaign were spoofed to make them appear as if they had originated from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Electronic Data Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval (EDGAR) system.

Execution

9 techniques
T1047Windows Management InstrumentationEvidence1

The command is then executed using the Windows Management Interface (WMI) Win32_Process object using the Create method.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

the malware also creates a Scheduled Task on the infected system named "kernel32"

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

Using this channel, the attackers were able to directly interact with the Windows Command Processor using the contents of DNS TXT record queries and the associated responses generated on the attacker-controlled DNS server.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence14

[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) is a PowerShell backdoor.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[TEXTMATE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0146) executes cmd.exe to provide a reverse shell to adversaries.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

The document uses the Document_Open() function to call another VBA function.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

DDE presents the end-user with a message prompt and requires interaction to execute correctly. Clicking Yes on the pop up will initiate the download of DNSMessenger malware.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The document informs the user that it is secured and instructs the user to enable content.

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence2

This document contains a malicious Dynamic Data Exchange (DDE) command which attempts to spawn a PowerShell process. Unlike similar spear phishing campaigns, DDE does not use VBA Macros to execute commands.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

the malware also creates a Scheduled Task on the infected system named "kernel32"

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

If the system is running an earlier version of Powershell, the Stage 3 payload is encoded and written to the registry location dictated by the assignment of $reg_win_path earlier with the key name of 'kernel32'.

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence2

If the user has administrative privileges on the infected system, it will set up a WMI event consumer and filter as an additional WMI-based persistence mechanism. The filter name is "kernel32_filter" and the consumer name is "kernel32_consumer".

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence13

[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

the malware also creates a Scheduled Task on the infected system named "kernel32"

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence2

If the user has administrative privileges on the infected system, it will set up a WMI event consumer and filter as an additional WMI-based persistence mechanism. The filter name is "kernel32_filter" and the consumer name is "kernel32_consumer".

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence13

[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) achieves persistence by setting a Registry Run key, with the path depending on whether the victim account has user or administrator access.(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The code in Stage 2 has been obfuscated... Base64 string encoding was also present throughout the script.

T1480.002Mutual ExclusionEvidence1

A second block of code present in the Powershell is called $stagerCode and is responsible for extracting and decoding the code that was previously stored in the registry, then executing this code, first checking for the presence of the mutex '1823821749'. If this mutex does not exist, execution continues.

T1564.004NTFS File AttributesEvidence7

If the victim is using PowerShell 3.0 or later, [POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) writes its decoded payload to an alternate data stream (ADS) named kernel32.dll that is saved in <code>%PROGRAMDATA%\Windows\</code>.(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

TEXTMATE is “memory resident” – often described as “fileless” malware.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence3

If the system is running an earlier version of Powershell, the Stage 3 payload is encoded and written to the registry location dictated by the assignment of $reg_win_path earlier with the key name of 'kernel32'.

Discovery

2 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) queries Registry keys in preparation for setting Run keys to achieve persistence.(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

The malware then queries the system to determine the characteristics of the environment in which it is operating... It specifically checks the version of Powershell that is installed on the system... The malware also obtains the serial number of the system from the BIOS.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071.004DNSEvidence8

[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) uses DNS TXT records for C2.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)(Citation: Cisco DNSMessenger March 2017) | [TEXTMATE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0146) uses DNS TXT records for C2.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

[POWERSOURCE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0145) has been observed being used to download [TEXTMATE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0146) and the Cobalt Strike Beacon payload onto victims.(Citation: FireEye FIN7 March 2017)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

The 'MSG' queries which are used to send commands to execute and return the output of the executed commands are hex-encoded and use a dot separator after every 30 bytes.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

4H RAT has the capability to create a remote shell. AuditCred can open a reverse shell on the system to execute commands. PlugX allows actors to spawn a reverse shell on a victim. QuasarRAT can launch a remote shell to execute commands on the victim’s machine.

Exfiltration

3 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

This allows the attacker to send commands to be executed directly by the Command Processor and receive the output of those commands all using DNS TXT requests and responses.

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

They can use very simple techniques for stealing and transferring data from an internal network to an attacker domain such as HTTP/HTTPS, SMTP, DNS, SMTP, P2P, VPN or even the ARP method for data exfiltration.

T1048.003Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 ProtocolEvidence1

Several malware programs exfiltrate the stolen information to an attacker-controlled SMTP server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

136 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching136Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping29Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.