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Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

PITSTOP

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

PITSTOP is malware observed in exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure appliances by UNC5325, a suspected Chinese espionage operator. Mandiant reported UNC5325 deploying PITSTOP alongside LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA, PITDOG, PITJET, and PITHOOK during activity involving exploitation of Ivanti vulnerabilities including CVE-2024-21893, often chained with CVE-2024-21887. High-confidence behavior described for PITSTOP includes communication over TLS and listening on a Unix domain socket at /data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd, indicating use of encrypted communications and local inter-process communication on compromised appliances. The broader UNC5325 activity targeted Ivanti appliances across multiple industry verticals, including the U.S. defense industrial base, and involved attempts to establish persistence and evade detection using custom malware and living-off-the-land techniques.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-21893via mandiant threat intelligenceExploited in the wildUnauthenticated SAML SSRF in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTAMandiant observed ... development of a mitigation bypass exploit targeting CVE-2024-21893 ... The mitigation bypass is now tracked as CVE-2024-21893. It is a server-side request forgery (SSRF) vulnerability in the SAML component of Ivanti Connect Secure (CS), Policy Secure (PS), and Neurons for Zero Trust Access (NZTA) appliances... Mandiant identified active exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 by UNC5325 as early as Jan. 19, 2024... threat actors chaining the SSRF vulnerability with ... CVE-2024-21887...View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC5325

UNC5325 has been observed deploying LITTLELAMB.WOOLTEA, PITSTOP, PITDOG, PITJET, and PITHOOK.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

"Mandiant identified active exploitation of CVE-2024-21893 by UNC5325... targeting... Ivanti Connect Secure appliances."

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence3

[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) has the ability to receive shell commands over a Unix domain socket.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1559Inter-Process CommunicationEvidence3

[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can listen over the Unix domain socket located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd`.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Persistence

1 technique
T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence3

[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can listen and evaluate incoming commands on the domain socket, created by PITHOOK malware, located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd` for a predefined magic byte sequence. [PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can then duplicate the socket for further communication over TLS.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Stealth

2 techniques
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence6

[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can deobfuscate base64 encoded and AES encrypted commands.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence3

[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can listen and evaluate incoming commands on the domain socket, created by PITHOOK malware, located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd` for a predefined magic byte sequence. [PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can then duplicate the socket for further communication over TLS.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

"...modified the appliance's settings in order to evade detection and attempt to maintain persistence."

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1205.002Socket FiltersEvidence3

[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can listen and evaluate incoming commands on the domain socket, created by PITHOOK malware, located at `/data/runtime/cockpit/wd.fd` for a predefined magic byte sequence. [PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) can then duplicate the socket for further communication over TLS.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

The content repeatedly describes malware and threat actors using SSL, TLS, HTTPS, RSA, AES, Blowfish, RC4, ECIES, Diffie-Hellman, OpenSSL, WolfSSL, and mutual TLS to protect command and control traffic.

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[PITSTOP](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1123) has the ability to communicate over TLS.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge Part 3 February 2024)

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.