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Malware1 associated actor3 associated CVEs

GIFTEDVISITOR

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 14 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns3Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs2Tracked
Type
Webshell
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
LinuxNetwork device
Also known asWIREFIRE

GIFTEDVISITOR, also known as WIREFIRE, is a Python web shell deployed on Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It is embedded into an existing Python application component, providing persistent HTTP-based access to compromised devices. Its capabilities include file upload, file download, and arbitrary command execution, with process output returned to the operator using Base64 encoding. By modifying legitimate appliance software, it integrates malicious functionality into the existing web application rather than operating as a separate service.

GIFTEDVISITOR is associated with the China-nexus espionage activity tracked as UNC5221 and UTA0178. Attackers deployed it after chaining the authentication bypass vulnerability CVE-2023-46805 with the command injection vulnerability CVE-2024-21887. In January 2024, it was identified on more than 2,100 compromised Ivanti appliances worldwide. Affected organizations ranged from small businesses to Fortune 500 companies across government, military, telecommunications, defense, technology, financial services, aerospace, and other sectors. It was also deployed during the intrusion into MITRE's research and virtualization environment, where it supported continued access and command execution on a compromised Ivanti appliance.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2024-21887via bleeping computerExploited in the wildCommand Injection in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureUNC5221 had backdoored more than 2,100 Ivanti appliances using the GiftedVisitor webshell in attacks chaining the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 zero-days. | Threat intelligence company Volexity also said in January 2024 that UNC5221 had backdoored more than 2,100 Ivanti appliances using the GiftedVisitor webshell in attacks chaining the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 zero-days.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2023-46805via bleeping computerExploited in the wildAuthentication Bypass in Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy SecureUNC5221 had backdoored more than 2,100 Ivanti appliances using the GiftedVisitor webshell in attacks chaining the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 zero-days. | Threat intelligence company Volexity also said in January 2024 that UNC5221 had backdoored more than 2,100 Ivanti appliances using the GiftedVisitor webshell in attacks chaining the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 zero-days.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-21893via imda singaporeExploited in the wildUnauthenticated SAML SSRF in Ivanti Connect Secure, Policy Secure, and Neurons for ZTAThreat actors are exploiting previously identified vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways, including CVE-2023-46805 (CVSS 8.2), CVE-2024-21887 (CVSS 9.1) and CVE-2024-21893 (CVSS 8.1).View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
UNC5221

Threat intelligence company Volexity also said in January 2024 that UNC5221 had backdoored more than 2,100 Ivanti appliances using the GiftedVisitor webshell in attacks chaining the CVE-2023-46805 and CVE-2024-21887 zero-days.

via bleeping computerbleepingcomputer.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

Threat actors use custom web shells planted on public facing applications which allows persistence in victims’ environment.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

They function as dormant backdoors, activated only when attackers submit specific HTTP requests containing commands or credentials.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

the adversary executed suspicious Python scripts and /bin/sh commands from the /tmp directory

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

the adversary executed suspicious Python scripts... from the /tmp directory

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

“Cyber actors will exploit software vulnerabilities such as command-injection and achieve unauthenticated remote code execution (RCE).”

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence9

[WIREFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1115) is a web shell that can download files to and execute arbitrary commands from compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)

T1554Compromise Host Software BinaryEvidence3

[WIREFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1115) can modify the `visits.py` component of Ivanti Connect Secure VPNs for file download and arbitrary command execution.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)(Citation: Volexity Ivanti Zero-Day Exploitation January 2024)

Stealth

2 techniques
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence6

[WIREFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1115) can decode, decrypt, and decompress data received in C2 HTTP `POST` requests.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

During the 2016 Ukraine Electric Power Attack, Sandworm Team used a trojanized version of Windows Notepad to add a layer of persistence for Industroyer.

Collection

1 technique
T1560Archive Collected DataEvidence2

a base64 encoded logo.gif file was an exact copy of a log file on the system which the adversary exfiltrated

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

BEEFLUSH ... communicated with several internal IP addresses making POST requests.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

[WIREFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1115) can respond to specific HTTP `POST` requests to `/api/v1/cav/client/visits`.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)(Citation: Volexity Ivanti Zero-Day Exploitation January 2024)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

[WIREFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1115) has the ability to download files to compromised devices.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)

T1132Data EncodingEvidence2

C2 traffic from ADVSTORESHELL is encrypted, then encoded with Base64 encoding... APT19 HTTP malware variant used Base64 to encode communications to the C2 server... APT33 has used base64 to encode command and control traffic.

T1132.001Standard EncodingEvidence3

[WIREFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1115) can Base64 encode process output sent to C2.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence3

[WIREFIRE](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S1115) can AES encrypt process output sent from compromised devices to C2.(Citation: Mandiant Cutting Edge January 2024)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

The adversary exfiltrated data from the NERVE using command-and-control infrastructure.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.