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Mallory
Malware10 associated actors2 associated CVEs

Pony

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 14 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns2Associated
Actors10Associated
ATT&CK44Techniques
IOCs329Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftBrute forceDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingMalspamLure
Platforms
Windows

Pony, also known as Fareit, is a Windows information-stealing malware family associated with cybercriminal malware-distribution campaigns. It targets credentials and has used a small dictionary of common passwords against an enumerated list of local accounts to guess account passwords.

Pony is distributed through phishing and spearphishing emails containing malicious links or attachments. Delivery lures include executables packaged in ZIP, RAR, or CAB archives and malicious PDF or Microsoft Office documents. Campaigns have exploited CVE-2017-11882 in Microsoft Office’s Equation Editor to install Pony. It has also been delivered as a secondary payload by Hancitor.

Observed defense-evasion behaviors include using an Adobe Reader icon to disguise malicious executables, employing scripts to delete itself after execution, and using third-party packing services such as Rex3Packer. Pony has also used the Heaven’s Gate technique to execute native 64-bit code from a 32-bit process on 64-bit Windows, complicating security monitoring.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

2 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2017-11882via trendmicro comRemote Code Execution in Microsoft Office Equation EditorTrend Micro’s initial and ongoing analysis also found that a spammer group is also actively exploiting CVE-2017-11882 to infect systems with information stealers Pony/FAREIT and FormBook.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2015-0311via malware dontneedcoffeeExploited in the wildRemote code execution in Adobe Flash PlayerCVE-2015-0311 (Flash up to 16.0.0.287) integrating Exploit Kits Patched with Flash 16.0.0.296 ... first seen exploited by Angler EK ... soon after used in standalone mode in huge malvert campaign ... integrated today in RIG ... Fiesta ... Nuclear Pack ... Sweet Orange ... Neutrino ... Magnitude | ...Bedep (doing adfraud and grabbing malware : Pony mostly from what I saw)... CVE-2015-0311 used in standalone mode to drop Bedep grab Pony and perform adfraud...View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

10 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Carbanak

Début 2013, avant que le code malveillant Carbanak (alias Anunak, Sekur) ne soit développé, le groupe cybercriminel aurait souscrit à des Malware-as-a-Service, tels qu’Andromeda (alias Gamarue) et Pony.

via cert ssicert.ssi.gouv.fr
CL0P

Pony (also known as Fareit or Siplog) is a malware categorized as a loader and stealer, although it is also used as a botnet... involved in information theft or used to launch other malwares during attacks on victim infrastructures.

via rexorvc0 blogrexorvc0.com
TA544

Pony (also known as Fareit or Siplog) is a malware categorized as a loader and stealer, although it is also used as a botnet... involved in information theft or used to launch other malwares during attacks on victim infrastructures.

via rexorvc0 blogrexorvc0.com
GOLD EVERGREEN

Pony (also known as Fareit or Siplog) is a malware categorized as a loader and stealer, although it is also used as a botnet... involved in information theft or used to launch other malwares during attacks on victim infrastructures.

via rexorvc0 blogrexorvc0.com
Cobalt Group

Pony (also known as Fareit or Siplog) is a malware categorized as a loader and stealer, although it is also used as a botnet... involved in information theft or used to launch other malwares during attacks on victim infrastructures.

via rexorvc0 blogrexorvc0.com
GOLD ESSEX

Pony (also known as Fareit or Siplog) is a malware categorized as a loader and stealer, although it is also used as a botnet... involved in information theft or used to launch other malwares during attacks on victim infrastructures.

via rexorvc0 blogrexorvc0.com

+4 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

44 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence4

...les aurait distribués par point d’eau via le kit d’exploitation Neutrino.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

successfully used the infamous Microsoft MDAC RDS.Dataspace ActiveX vulnerability to exploit the browser and drop the payload.

T1566PhishingEvidence7

The delivery method for these documents remained consistent to other common malicious e-mail campaigns. Lures contained subjects related to recent invoices, or other matters requiring the victim’s attention, such as an overdue bill.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence12

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has been delivered via spearphishing attachments.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence6

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has been delivered via spearphishing emails which contained malicious links.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

Execution

7 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence6

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has used batch scripts to delete itself after execution.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

When users open one of these documents, the macros download and install Nymaim.

T1106Native APIEvidence4

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has used several Windows functions for various purposes.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence2

...les aurait distribués par point d’eau via le kit d’exploitation Neutrino.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence4

has attempted to get victims to launch malicious Microsoft Word attachments delivered via spearphishing emails... has required user execution of a malicious MSI installer... has been executed through user installation of an executable disguised as a flash installer.

T1204.001Malicious LinkEvidence3

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has attempted to lure targets into clicking links in spoofed emails from legitimate banks.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence8

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has attempted to lure targets into downloading an attached executable (ZIP, RAR, or CAB archives) or document (PDF or other MS Office format).(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence [TA0003][T1547.001] Persistence using dropped files in temporary folders in diferent registry keys

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The DLL is downloaded to heap memory, written directly into the Hancitor process (using VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory) and executed from there using the CreateThread Windows API.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

As we suspected earlier, it performs Process Hollowing since it has the ability to remove data from the target process, reserve space in it, and insert code

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence [TA0003][T1547.001] Persistence using dropped files in temporary folders in diferent registry keys

Stealth

11 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

To keep them under the antivirus radar, Nigerian actors techniques use "crypters" - software tools designed to encrypt, obfuscate, and modify malware.

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence1

"Bumblebee has been delivered as password-protected zipped ISO files" / "Flagpro has been delivered within ZIP or RAR password-protected archived files." / "TA505 has password-protected malicious Word documents."

T1027.015CompressionEvidence3

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) attachments have been delivered via compressed archive files.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1027.016Junk Code InsertionEvidence3

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) obfuscates memory flow by adding junk instructions when executing to make analysis more difficult.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has used the Adobe Reader icon for the downloaded file to look more trustworthy.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The DLL is downloaded to heap memory, written directly into the Hancitor process (using VirtualAllocEx and WriteProcessMemory) and executed from there using the CreateThread Windows API.

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence1

As we suspected earlier, it performs Process Hollowing since it has the ability to remove data from the target process, reserve space in it, and insert code

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence13

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has used scripts to delete itself after execution.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it has various basic Anti-Sandbox and Anti-VM techniques, which ultimately involve making requests to know the video controller we have. If we are emulating a machine, they will typically have strings from VirtualBox or VMWARE

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence3

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has delayed execution using a built-in function to avoid detection and analysis.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

Thus, the module is not written to the disk, and no files or persistence mechanisms are created for it.

Credential Access

6 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

H1N1 ... has now evolved into an information stealing variant.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

T1110Brute ForceEvidence1

ID: T1110.001 Sub-technique of: T1110

T1110.001Password GuessingEvidence4

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has used a small dictionary of common passwords against a collected list of local accounts.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

The second reason is because of the data it tries to collect and steal: ... Mozilla\Firefox\Profiles\abcdefgh.default\signons.sqlite ... key3.db

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence3

pony Module that steals saved passwords

Discovery

7 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

it involves capturing running processes and seeing if any of them are related to tools it doesn’t like

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence12

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has collected the Service Pack, language, and region information to send to the C2.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1087Account DiscoveryEvidence1

“actors used the following commands… to enumerate user accounts: net user >> %temp%\download; net user /domain >> %temp%\download … APT1 used the commands net localgroup, net user, and net group to find accounts… APT32 enumerated administrative users using the commands net localgroup administrators … OilRig has run net user, net user /domain, net group "domain admins" /domain …”

T1087.001Local AccountEvidence3

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has used the <code>NetUserEnum</code> function to enumerate local accounts.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

it has various basic Anti-Sandbox and Anti-VM techniques, which ultimately involve making requests to know the video controller we have. If we are emulating a machine, they will typically have strings from VirtualBox or VMWARE

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence3

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has delayed execution using a built-in function to avoid detection and analysis.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1614.001System Language DiscoveryEvidence2

Examples include 'Bazar can also check if the Russian language is installed,' 'DropBook has checked for the presence of Arabic language,' 'Maze has checked the language of the infected system,' and 'SynAck ... checks installed keyboard layouts to estimate if it has been launched from a certain list of countries.'

Collection

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

H1N1 ... has now evolved into an information stealing variant.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The info stealers most popular with SilverTerrier last year were LokiBot (446 unique samples/month), Pony (330 unique samples/month), and Agent Tesla .NET keylogger (95 unique samples/month).

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

Blockchain-based C&C is the next step in a long evaluation of criminal TTPs, but it will be very difficult to mitigate this technique in the future

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

Advertising C&C Information via the Blockchain ... Fetch the last two payments from a specific bitcoin wallet ... Three Main Angles for Yesterday’s Mitigation ... Nobody can remove transactions from the blockchain.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence9

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) has sent collected information to the C2 via HTTP POST request.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence18

[Pony](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0453) can download additional files onto the infected system.(Citation: Malwarebytes Pony April 2016)

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Option 1: Predict the domain names and stop them ... There is nothing to predict anymore. Nobody can remove transactions from the blockchain. No DNS lookups to unusual sites. Never any NXDomains

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence7

The content states 'APT29 has used HTTP for C2 and data exfiltration,' 'FIN4 has used HTTP POST requests to transmit data,' 'Pony has sent collected information to the C2 via HTTP POST request,' and 'ThiefQuest uploads files via unencrypted HTTP.'

T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

The stolen credentials were then sent to predefined email addresses controlled by the attackers, enabling unauthorized access to victims’ accounts and systems.

Impact

2 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

After achieving the privilege level needed, encryption usually occurs on the individual machine without lateral movement

T1657Financial TheftEvidence1

Scammers running business email compromise (BEC) fraud have grown in number, attack more often, and turn to remote access trojans as the preferred malware type to accompany their raids.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

329 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching329Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors10Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities2CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping44Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.