GLASSTOKEN is a custom web shell deployed following exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateway vulnerabilities, including chained authentication-bypass and command-injection flaws exploited from late 2023 through 2024. It has been associated with activity tracked as UTA0178 and was observed on both internet-facing and internal systems. Based on the Neo-reGeorg tunneling tool, GLASSTOKEN provides HTTP-based command-and-control tunneling and arbitrary .NET code execution on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN appliances. It can execute commands through PowerShell and uses hexadecimal and Base64 encoding in its command-and-control content. The web shell enables persistent remote access and post-compromise command execution on affected network-edge devices.
Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each row links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Threat actors are exploiting previously identified vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways, including CVE-2023-46805 (CVSS 8.2), CVE-2024-21887 (CVSS 9.1) and CVE-2024-21893 (CVSS 8.1).
Threat actors are exploiting previously identified vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways, including CVE-2023-46805 (CVSS 8.2), CVE-2024-21887 (CVSS 9.1) and CVE-2024-21893 (CVSS 8.1).
Threat actors are exploiting previously identified vulnerabilities in Ivanti Connect Secure and Ivanti Policy Secure gateways, including CVE-2023-46805 (CVSS 8.2), CVE-2024-21887 (CVSS 9.1) and CVE-2024-21893 (CVSS 8.1).
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The rule "apt_webshell_aspx_glasstoken" detects a custom web shell that can act as a tunnel and execute arbitrary .NET code.
8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
In observed attacks, threat actors exploited the vulnerabilities to gain initial access into victim organizations. | CVE-2023-46805 (CVSS: 8.2) – Authentication Bypass in the web component of Ivanti ICS 9.x, 22.x and Ivanti Policy Secure... If exploited together, these vulnerabilities would allow a remote and unauthenticated threat actor to craft malicious requests and execute arbitrary commands on the system. | CVE-2024-21887 (CVSS: 9.1) – Command Injection vulnerability in web components of Ivanti Connect Secure (9.x, 22.x) and Ivanti Policy Secure... If exploited together, these vulnerabilities would allow a remote and unauthenticated threat actor to craft malicious requests and execute arbitrary commands on the system.
Webshells, tracked under the name GLASSTOKEN, were then deployed to enable command execution and long-term persistence in victim environments.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
A webshell used to maintain persistent access on compromised Ivanti Connect Secure VPN devices.
A custom webshell previously observed in Ivanti Connect Secure VPN intrusions; mentioned here as a related example because it was based on Neo-reGeorg.
A webshell used in exploitation of Ivanti Connect Secure and Policy Secure zero-days to maintain persistence on compromised systems.
Backdoor that can use PowerShell for command execution.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.