FYAnti
- Type
- Loader
- Capabilities
- Defense evasion
- Platforms
- Windows
FYAnti, also known as DILLJUICE Stage 2, is a Windows malware loader used by Earth Tengshe and observed in the A41APT espionage campaign attributed to APT10, also known as menuPass. It forms part of a multistage execution chain in which SigLoader loads FYAnti into memory, and FYAnti subsequently loads QuasarRAT.
FYAnti decrypts an embedded .NET module and reflectively loads and executes it using the CppHostCLR technique. This hosts the .NET Common Language Runtime within a native process, allowing the module to execute without being extracted to disk. FYAnti has also used ConfuserEx to pack its .NET module, hindering analysis and detection. The A41APT campaign used exploitation of SSL-VPN vulnerabilities for initial access; this campaign-level access method is distinct from FYAnti's role as an in-memory payload loader.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Earth Tengshe used custom malware, such as SigLoader, SodaMaster, P8RAT, FYAnti, and Jackpot.
Eventually, SigLoader will load the first payload, FYAnti, in memory. FYAnti decrypts the first embedded .NET module and reflectively loads executing the module using the CppHostCLR technique to avoid dropping additional files to disk.
Techniques & procedures
7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
Execute-assembly runs .NET executable within memory of sacrificial process by loading the CLR.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The malware makes use of CppHostCLR due its ability to inject and execute the .NET loader assembly without extraction to disk.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) has used ConfuserEx to pack its .NET module.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
The malware makes use of CppHostCLR due its ability to inject and execute the .NET loader assembly without extraction to disk.
[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) has the ability to decrypt an embedded .NET module.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
In this blog post, we’ll delve into one such technique employed by these threat groups: Reflective Code Loading (T1620).
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) can search the <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\</code> directory for files of a specified size.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) can download additional payloads to a compromised host.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.