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Malware2 associated actors

FYAnti

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Defense evasion
Platforms
Windows
Also known asDILLJUICE stage2

FYAnti, also known as DILLJUICE Stage 2, is a Windows malware loader used by Earth Tengshe and observed in the A41APT espionage campaign attributed to APT10, also known as menuPass. It forms part of a multistage execution chain in which SigLoader loads FYAnti into memory, and FYAnti subsequently loads QuasarRAT.

FYAnti decrypts an embedded .NET module and reflectively loads and executes it using the CppHostCLR technique. This hosts the .NET Common Language Runtime within a native process, allowing the module to execute without being extracted to disk. FYAnti has also used ConfuserEx to pack its .NET module, hindering analysis and detection. The A41APT campaign used exploitation of SSL-VPN vulnerabilities for initial access; this campaign-level access method is distinct from FYAnti's role as an in-memory payload loader.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Earth Tengshe

Earth Tengshe used custom malware, such as SigLoader, SodaMaster, P8RAT, FYAnti, and Jackpot.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
menuPass

Eventually, SigLoader will load the first payload, FYAnti, in memory. FYAnti decrypts the first embedded .NET module and reflectively loads executing the module using the CppHostCLR technique to avoid dropping additional files to disk.

via medium mitre engenuitymedium.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

Execute-assembly runs .NET executable within memory of sacrificial process by loading the CLR.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The malware makes use of CppHostCLR due its ability to inject and execute the .NET loader assembly without extraction to disk.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027.002Software PackingEvidence4

[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) has used ConfuserEx to pack its .NET module.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The malware makes use of CppHostCLR due its ability to inject and execute the .NET loader assembly without extraction to disk.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence8

[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) has the ability to decrypt an embedded .NET module.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

In this blog post, we’ll delve into one such technique employed by these threat groups: Reflective Code Loading (T1620).

Discovery

1 technique
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence7

[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) can search the <code>C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\</code> directory for files of a specified size.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

[FYAnti](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0628) can download additional payloads to a compromised host.(Citation: Securelist APT10 March 2021)

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.