Volgmer
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- PersistenceReconnaissancePost exploitationExfiltrationDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
Volgmer is a Windows backdoor used by the North Korean state-sponsored Lazarus Group and associated with activity tracked as HIDDEN COBRA. It has been used since at least 2014, including against South Korean enterprises and organizations in the defense, manufacturing, information and communications technology, and financial sectors. Targeted spearphishing emails are a documented delivery mechanism.
Volgmer provides covert remote access through commands for system discovery, file upload and download, payload execution, file deletion, reverse-shell access, and modification of command-and-control settings and communication intervals. Its reconnaissance capabilities include enumerating running processes and services, collecting network and hardware information, and identifying installed software, security products, system locale, and virtualization status. It can launch additional payloads through native Windows process-creation APIs.
The malware commonly operates as a service DLL and maintains persistence by registering a service or modifying an existing service to load its malicious DLL. It stores encoded or encrypted configuration data in the Windows Registry. Volgmer uses HTTP-based command-and-control communications, with variants distinguished by malformed browser User-Agent strings. Observed versions use XOR to protect traffic and files, while later versions use RC4 to decrypt stored configuration data. Defense-evasion and anti-forensic behaviors include runtime deobfuscation of strings and API names, legitimate-looking service names, timestamp manipulation, file deletion, and self-removal. Some early variants and deployment components restrict execution based on Korean operating-system locale or environment checks.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The software table lists Volgmer and cites 'HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Trojan: Volgmer.'
“The family is easily recognized by the peculiar UserAgent strings used, which all start with ‘Mozillar/’ instead of ‘Mozilla/.’”
Techniques & procedures
43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
For the last few years, the group launched watering hole attacks to attack multiple Korean enterprises and organizations in the fields of defense, satellite, software, and media.
Their method for initial access involved the exploitation of a security vulnerability of a Korean financial security certification software.
The Lazarus group usually employed spear phishing and supply chain attacks, usually disguising the malware as legitimate programs in their attack process.
Volgmer ... is delivered via targeted spear phishing emails.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can execute commands on the victim's machine.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) executes payloads using the Windows API call CreateProcessW().(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
Andariel 위협 그룹이 취약한 버전의 Innorix Agent 사용자를 대상으로 악성코드를 유포한 정황을 공개하였다.
GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.
They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security</code>.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) installs a copy of itself in a randomly selected service, then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the service's Registry entry. Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants also install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
Privilege Escalation
3 techniques
Privilege Escalation
the created DLL is injected into the lsass.exe process.
There has also been a case of BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver), where the threat actor leveraged a vulnerable driver module of a hardware supplier to disable security products.
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) installs a copy of itself in a randomly selected service, then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the service's Registry entry. Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants also install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
Stealth
13 techniques
Stealth
The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) stores an encoded configuration file in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security</code>.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
A [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variant is encoded using a simple XOR cipher.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
Volgmer, which usually runs by being registered as a service, is installed with a name that disguises it as a legitimate file.
Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
the created DLL is injected into the lsass.exe process.
Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can delete files and itself after infection to avoid analysis.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
After creating the Volgmer DLL in the path %SystemDirectory%, the dropper sets the time configuration information to be the same as the Notepad (notepad.exe) file. This timestomping is one of the major anti-forensic techniques employed for the purpose of evading timeline analysis.
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) deobfuscates its strings and APIs once its executed.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
The dropper also checks the number of arguments, recognizes Korean operating environments, and even checks the version of Windows operating environments, and if these do not match pre-configured conditions, it either displays a message box or deletes itself.
GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.
They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security</code>.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
Discovery
9 techniques
Discovery
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) queries the system to identify existing services.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) checks the system for certain Registry keys.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather the IP address from the victim's machine.(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather information about TCP connection state.(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather a list of processes.(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather system information, the computer name, OS version, drive and serial information from the victim's machine.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can list directories on a victim.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)
Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'
The dropper also checks the number of arguments, recognizes Korean operating environments, and even checks the version of Windows operating environments, and if these do not match pre-configured conditions, it either displays a message box or deletes itself.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Even after initial access, the threat actor exploited vulnerabilities in web security software or enterprise asset management programs during lateral movement.
Command and Control
8 techniques
Command and Control
Many entries describe XOR, XOR/ADD, bitwise NOT and XOR, ROR plus XOR, hexadecimal encoding after encryption, and custom encoding/obfuscation of HTTP traffic or beacons.
Volgmer는 ... C&C 서버와의 통신에 HTTP 프로토콜을 사용한다.
Volgmer selects one of the C&C server addresses from the configuration data and connects to it... It then transmits an HTTP packet... The later version of Volgmer and the Scout downloader to be covered later use the HTTP protocol to communicate with the C&C server.
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can download remote files and additional payloads to the victim's machine.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)
HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Remote Administration Tool: FALLCHILL
The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.
[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) uses a simple XOR cipher to encrypt traffic and files.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)
Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants use SSL to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)
Exfiltration
2 techniques
Exfiltration
0x60D49DB4 Sleep
Next, it collects a variety of information such as the computer name, network information, hardware information, language, installed antivirus software, and running services, before sending them to the C&C server.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads ... QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information ... Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file ...
Observables
37 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
48 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.