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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

Volgmer

Tracked since Dec 5, 2025 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs37Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistenceReconnaissancePost exploitationExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

Volgmer is a Windows backdoor used by the North Korean state-sponsored Lazarus Group and associated with activity tracked as HIDDEN COBRA. It has been used since at least 2014, including against South Korean enterprises and organizations in the defense, manufacturing, information and communications technology, and financial sectors. Targeted spearphishing emails are a documented delivery mechanism.

Volgmer provides covert remote access through commands for system discovery, file upload and download, payload execution, file deletion, reverse-shell access, and modification of command-and-control settings and communication intervals. Its reconnaissance capabilities include enumerating running processes and services, collecting network and hardware information, and identifying installed software, security products, system locale, and virtualization status. It can launch additional payloads through native Windows process-creation APIs.

The malware commonly operates as a service DLL and maintains persistence by registering a service or modifying an existing service to load its malicious DLL. It stores encoded or encrypted configuration data in the Windows Registry. Volgmer uses HTTP-based command-and-control communications, with variants distinguished by malformed browser User-Agent strings. Observed versions use XOR to protect traffic and files, while later versions use RC4 to decrypt stored configuration data. Defense-evasion and anti-forensic behaviors include runtime deobfuscation of strings and API names, legitimate-looking service names, timestamp manipulation, file deletion, and self-removal. Some early variants and deployment components restrict execution based on Korean operating-system locale or environment checks.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

The software table lists Volgmer and cites 'HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Trojan: Volgmer.'

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
Andariel

“The family is easily recognized by the peculiar UserAgent strings used, which all start with ‘Mozillar/’ instead of ‘Mozilla/.’”

via github webgithub.com
Contagious Interview

Listed in the Wiz “TraderTraitor: Deep Dive” entry.

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

For the last few years, the group launched watering hole attacks to attack multiple Korean enterprises and organizations in the fields of defense, satellite, software, and media.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Their method for initial access involved the exploitation of a security vulnerability of a Korean financial security certification software.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

The Lazarus group usually employed spear phishing and supply chain attacks, usually disguising the malware as legitimate programs in their attack process.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Volgmer ... is delivered via targeted spear phishing emails.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence7

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can execute commands on the victim's machine.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)

T1106Native APIEvidence5

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) executes payloads using the Windows API call CreateProcessW().(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

Andariel 위협 그룹이 취약한 버전의 Innorix Agent 사용자를 대상으로 악성코드를 유포한 정황을 공개하였다.

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence12

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security</code>.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) installs a copy of itself in a randomly selected service, then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the service's Registry entry. Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants also install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the created DLL is injected into the lsass.exe process.

T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

There has also been a case of BYOVD (Bring Your Own Vulnerable Driver), where the threat actor leveraged a vulnerable driver module of a hardware supplier to disable security products.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence6

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) installs a copy of itself in a randomly selected service, then overwrites the ServiceDLL entry in the service's Registry entry. Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants also install .dll files as services with names generated by a list of hard-coded strings.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence5

The content repeatedly describes payloads, strings, configuration files, scripts, URLs, and binaries being obfuscated or encoded using Base64, XOR, RC4, AES, RSA, hex encoding, custom algorithms, and other methods across many malware families and threat actors.

T1027.011Fileless StorageEvidence4

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) stores an encoded configuration file in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security</code>.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1027.013Encrypted/Encoded FileEvidence3

A [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variant is encoded using a simple XOR cipher.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Volgmer, which usually runs by being registered as a service, is installed with a name that disguises it as a legitimate file.

T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence3

Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants add new services with display names generated by a list of hard-coded strings such as Application, Background, Security, and Windows, presumably as a way to masquerade as a legitimate service.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

the created DLL is injected into the lsass.exe process.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence2

Examples throughout the content include deleting tools, logs, malware-related files, staged archives, screenshots, temporary files, and exfiltrated data 'to cover their tracks,' 'reduce their footprint,' 'remove traces of activity,' or as part of 'post-intrusion cleanup.'

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence11

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can delete files and itself after infection to avoid analysis.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

After creating the Volgmer DLL in the path %SystemDirectory%, the dropper sets the time configuration information to be the same as the Notepad (notepad.exe) file. This timestomping is one of the major anti-forensic techniques employed for the purpose of evading timeline analysis.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence10

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) deobfuscates its strings and APIs once its executed.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The dropper also checks the number of arguments, recognizes Korean operating environments, and even checks the version of Windows operating environments, and if these do not match pre-configured conditions, it either displays a message box or deletes itself.

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

GreyEnergy chooses a service, drops a DLL file, and writes it to that serviceDLL Registry key.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

They also replaced the ImagePath registry value of a Windows service with a new backdoor binary.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence12

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file in <code>HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\CurrentControlSet\Control\WMI\Security</code>.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

Discovery

9 techniques
T1007System Service DiscoveryEvidence5

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) queries the system to identify existing services.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)

T1012Query RegistryEvidence7

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) checks the system for certain Registry keys.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence8

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather the IP address from the victim's machine.(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence3

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather information about TCP connection state.(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence8

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather a list of processes.(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence12

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can gather system information, the computer name, OS version, drive and serial information from the victim's machine.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence8

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can list directories on a victim.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence1

Numerous entries mention enumerating drives, logical disks, disk type, free space, or volume information; examples include 'Babuk can enumerate disk volumes,' 'Cuba can enumerate local drives,' and 'TAINTEDSCRIBE can use DriveList to retrieve drive information.'

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

The dropper also checks the number of arguments, recognizes Korean operating environments, and even checks the version of Windows operating environments, and if these do not match pre-configured conditions, it either displays a message box or deletes itself.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1210Exploitation of Remote ServicesEvidence1

Even after initial access, the threat actor exploited vulnerabilities in web security software or enterprise asset management programs during lateral movement.

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

Many entries describe XOR, XOR/ADD, bitwise NOT and XOR, ROR plus XOR, hexadecimal encoding after encryption, and custom encoding/obfuscation of HTTP traffic or beacons.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Volgmer는 ... C&C 서버와의 통신에 HTTP 프로토콜을 사용한다.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

Volgmer selects one of the C&C server addresses from the configuration data and connects to it... It then transmits an HTTP packet... The later version of Volgmer and the Scout downloader to be covered later use the HTTP protocol to communicate with the C&C server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) can download remote files and additional payloads to the victim's machine.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)(Citation: Symantec Volgmer Aug 2014)

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

HIDDEN COBRA – North Korean Remote Administration Tool: FALLCHILL

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The content is a catalog of malware and threat groups that encrypt command-and-control communications using algorithms such as DES, AES, RC4, XOR, Blowfish, RSA, Camellia, RC2, RC6, and custom ciphers.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence4

[Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) uses a simple XOR cipher to encrypt traffic and files.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer 2 Nov 2017)

T1573.002Asymmetric CryptographyEvidence4

Some [Volgmer](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0180) variants use SSL to encrypt C2 communications.(Citation: US-CERT Volgmer Nov 2017)

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1029Scheduled TransferEvidence1

0x60D49DB4 Sleep

T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Next, it collects a variety of information such as the computer name, network information, hardware information, language, installed antivirus software, and running services, before sending them to the C&C server.

Impact

1 technique
T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

ComRAT has modified Registry values to store encrypted orchestrator code and payloads ... QakBot can modify the Registry to store its configuration information ... Volgmer modifies the Registry to store an encoded configuration file ...

Indicators of compromise

Observables

37 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

48 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching37Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.