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Malware5 associated actors

BLOODALCHEMY

Tracked since Dec 16, 2025 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days36 mentions · peak 6 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK40Techniques
IOCs22Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
Post exploitationDLL sideloadingDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
Windows

BLOODALCHEMY is a Windows backdoor used to maintain malicious access to compromised systems during cyberespionage operations. First publicly documented in October 2023, it has been deployed by the China-nexus espionage actor VAPOR PANDA following initial compromise. Its execution chain uses DLL side-loading through a legitimate, signed GameHook executable renamed to impersonate a Windows system process. The executable loads a malicious DLL that decrypts and loads an encrypted backdoor payload. The implant communicates with attacker-controlled command-and-control infrastructure.

BLOODALCHEMY deployments include a Middle Eastern interior ministry and a Latin American foreign ministry. In October 2026, VAPOR PANDA deployed the backdoor during an ARTEX-assisted campaign in which post-exploitation activity was confirmed at nine organizations. ARTEX supported the surrounding intrusion activity; BLOODALCHEMY served as a follow-on backdoor rather than the initial-access mechanism.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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VAPOR PANDA

BLOODALCHEMY is the backdoor VAPOR PANDA deployed after gaining access, and CrowdStrike confirmed post-exploitation activity with it at nine organizations (it names the backdoor at a Middle East interior ministry and a Latin America foreign ministry).

via safebreach blogsafebreach.com
Salt Typhoon

Once perimeter footholds were established, human operators intervened to deploy BLOODALCHEMY, an advanced C/C++ modular implant derived from the legacy ShadowPad codebase, securing long-term espionage access across foreign ministries, defense contractors, and critical infrastructure backbones.

via sh3llc0d3 blogsh3llc0d3.com
REF5961

Part of this intrusion set includes a new x86-based backdoor called BLOODALCHEMY.

via elastic security labselastic.co
SilkParasite

BloodAlchemy IOCs include a C2 URL, an encryption key, fl_bridge scheduled-task persistence, malicious DLL/binary samples, and decrypted shellcode.

via github webgithub.com
speccom

...phishing emails to deliver a variant of BLOODALCHEMY and custom backdoors such as kidsRAT and RustVoralix.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

40 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence1

“The different hosts across the clusters mentioned above resolve to domains impersonating Central Asian government bodies and state enterprises.”

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

攻撃者は BloodAlchemy の感染経路として、VPN 機器にある保守ベンダー専用アカウントを乗っ取った上で BloodAlchemy に感染させるためのファイルセットを使用していました。

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

persistence_flag の値(1~4)に応じて永続化に向けた設定を作成します。 1: service + startup + taskschd (COM obj) ... 4: taskschd (COM obj)

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

As a scheduled task, running with SYSTEM privilege via schtasks.exe: schtasks.exe /CREATE ... /RU "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM".

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

読み込んだデータから Shellcode を復号し、メモリ内でこの Shellcode を実行します。

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.

T1106Native APIEvidence1

The payload then executes through EnumTimeFormatsEx, a legitimate Windows function that accepts a callback, which is far quieter than spawning a thread.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Targets typically receive messages that include regionally tailored Office documents — sometimes inside password-protected RAR archives — which, when opened, trigger a macro that launches a malware delivery chain to deploy a RAT.

T1559.001Component Object ModelEvidence1

When using a named pipe, the name is randomly generated using the current PID as seed. | Persistence is achieved via different methods depending on the configuration: ... Using COM interfaces ... Using the TaskScheduler::ITaskService COM interface.

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

The loader is classic DLL side-loading (T1574.001

Persistence

7 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

persistence_flag の値(1~4)に応じて永続化に向けた設定を作成します。 1: service + startup + taskschd (COM obj) ... 4: taskschd (COM obj)

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

As a scheduled task, running with SYSTEM privilege via schtasks.exe: schtasks.exe /CREATE ... /RU "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM".

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

攻撃者は BloodAlchemy の感染経路として、VPN 機器にある保守ベンダー専用アカウントを乗っ取った上で BloodAlchemy に感染させるためのファイルセットを使用していました。

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

0x1302 load received payload and store it into registry value 0x1303 delete registry value

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

run_mode が0または4かつ、malware configuration の0x68の値が1の場合、0x6cから0x74に設定されている以下のプロセスを作成した上で、shellcode をそのプロセスへ注入しようとします。

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Persistence is achieved via different methods depending on the configuration: As a service... [with] service name and description... Test and Digital Imaging System.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

As a registry key at CurrentVersion\Run.

Privilege Escalation

9 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

persistence_flag の値(1~4)に応じて永続化に向けた設定を作成します。 1: service + startup + taskschd (COM obj) ... 4: taskschd (COM obj)

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence4

As a scheduled task, running with SYSTEM privilege via schtasks.exe: schtasks.exe /CREATE ... /RU "NT AUTHORITY\\SYSTEM".

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

BloodAlchemy included capabilities for clipboard logging, keystroke capture, and running processes under another user’s session.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence2

[It can] create a Windows process from a hardcoded list and inject a shellcode... using the WriteProcessMemory+QueueUserAPC+ResumeThread method.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

攻撃者は BloodAlchemy の感染経路として、VPN 機器にある保守ベンダー専用アカウントを乗っ取った上で BloodAlchemy に感染させるためのファイルセットを使用していました。

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

impapi (user-session impersonation and process execution under another user’s context)

T1543Create or Modify System ProcessEvidence1

run_mode が0または4かつ、malware configuration の0x68の値が1の場合、0x6cから0x74に設定されている以下のプロセスを作成した上で、shellcode をそのプロセスへ注入しようとします。

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence3

Persistence is achieved via different methods depending on the configuration: As a service... [with] service name and description... Test and Digital Imaging System.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence3

As a registry key at CurrentVersion\Run.

Stealth

13 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

To hide its strings the BLOODALCHEMY malware uses a classic technique where each string is encrypted, preceded by a single-byte decryption key...

T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

“A TLS certificate issued by a Chinese state-affiliated certificate authority associated with the infrastructure impersonates Uzbekistan's state railway authority.”

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence4

a signed GameHook executable renamed to svchost.exe

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

BloodAlchemy included capabilities for clipboard logging, keystroke capture, and running processes under another user’s session.

T1055.004Asynchronous Procedure CallEvidence2

[It can] create a Windows process from a hardcoded list and inject a shellcode... using the WriteProcessMemory+QueueUserAPC+ResumeThread method.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

The malware supports basic commands to gather host information, overwrite the malware binary, the loader, or the main trusted binary that's vulnerable to DLL sideloading, and terminate and uninstall itself.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

攻撃者は BloodAlchemy の感染経路として、VPN 機器にある保守ベンダー専用アカウントを乗っ取った上で BloodAlchemy に感染させるためのファイルセットを使用していました。

T1134.002Create Process with TokenEvidence1

impapi (user-session impersonation and process execution under another user’s context)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

この悪性 DLL は同じフォルダ内の DIFX を読み込み、読み込んだデータから Shellcode を復号し、メモリ内でこの Shellcode を実行します。Shellcode の復号に使われているアルゴリズムは AES128(CBC モード)

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Payload にはサンドボックスへの耐解析機能(Anti Sandbox)も含まれています。... process_name やファイル、DNS の結果を確認します。

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

The loader is classic DLL side-loading (T1574.001

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

run mode に対応する挙動 ... 0 ... 耐 debug、耐 Sandbox、永続化 ... 3 ... 耐 Debug、耐 Sandbox、永続化

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

0x1302 load received payload and store it into registry value 0x1303 delete registry value

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The loader uses HalosGate together with hardware breakpoints and vectored exception handlers to invoke system calls without passing through the monitored function entry points, sidestepping the userland hooks that endpoint tools rely on.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

The most useful analytical prize was three embedded plugins recovered from the sample: impapi ... a cliplogger (clipboard logger), and a keylogger.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

BLOODALCHEMY will try to use any proxy server found in the registry key SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

While waiting for a client to connect to this named pipe the malware scans the running processes and checks that its parent process is still running.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

One host information gathering command: CPU, OS, display, network, etc.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Payload にはサンドボックスへの耐解析機能(Anti Sandbox)も含まれています。... process_name やファイル、DNS の結果を確認します。

T1622Debugger EvasionEvidence1

run mode に対応する挙動 ... 0 ... 耐 debug、耐 Sandbox、永続化 ... 3 ... 耐 Debug、耐 Sandbox、永続化

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

The most useful analytical prize was three embedded plugins recovered from the sample: impapi ... a cliplogger (clipboard logger), and a keylogger.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence2

The most useful analytical prize was three embedded plugins recovered from the sample: impapi ... a cliplogger (clipboard logger), and a keylogger.

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Rather than using one noisy implant, the actors maintained several tools, changed their supporting files between builds, and used cloud services and normal-looking traffic to make investigation harder.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

BLOODALCHEMY communicated with C2 domains.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

In this scenario, BLOODALCHEMY will try to use any proxy server found in the registry key SOFTWARE\\Microsoft\\Windows\\CurrentVersion\\Internet Settings.

T1095Non-Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

From the malware strings and imports we know that the malware can also operate using TCP/UDP sockets... DNS:// ... UDP:// ... SMB:// ... TCP://.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence3

Nearly every family in SilkParasite is built around plugin architecture: the implant loads additional capabilities on demand from its command-and-control server rather than shipping them all at once.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

For all protocols the data can be encrypted, LZNT1 compressed, and/or Base64-encoded.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

For all protocols the data can be encrypted, LZNT1 compressed, and/or Base64-encoded.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

22 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

54 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching22Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping40Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.