PCPcat
- Type
- Infostealer
- Capabilities
- Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanning
- Platforms
- LinuxCloud
PCPcat is a large-scale credential-harvesting malware campaign targeting internet-exposed Next.js deployments, with reporting also linking it to React-related exploitation. It has been associated with TeamPCP activity and appears within a broader operational ecosystem previously linked by researchers to TA-NATALSTATUS and ShadowRay 2.0-era infrastructure abuse. The campaign has been described as highly automated and capable of compromising large numbers of servers in a short period through exploitation of unauthenticated remote code execution conditions in web application stacks, including CVE-2025-29927 and CVE-2025-66478 as reported.
Operationally, PCPcat conducts broad scanning of public-facing applications, validates exploitable targets, and then executes attacker-supplied commands through a Node.js execution chain using prototype-pollution and command-injection techniques. Following initial access, it harvests sensitive data from compromised hosts, including environment configuration, cloud credentials, SSH material, Docker-related configuration, Git credentials, and shell history. Stolen data is then exfiltrated to attacker-controlled infrastructure.
PCPcat also establishes durable post-compromise access by deploying tunneling and proxy tooling, including GOST and FRP, and by creating auto-restarting services to preserve persistence across reboots or service interruption. Reporting further places PCPcat in a progression of TeamPCP operations that moved from exploitation of exposed infrastructure and Docker APIs toward broader supply-chain and developer-tool compromises. The malware primarily targets Linux-hosted Node.js web infrastructure and cloud-connected server environments where exposed application services can yield credentials and downstream access.
Associated vulnerabilities
3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
That progression ran through PCPcat, which peaked around Christmas 2025 against React2Shell targets and exposed Docker APIs, and into the March 2026 compromises of Trivy, Checkmarx's KICS and LiteLLM.
That progression ran through PCPcat, which peaked around Christmas 2025 against React2Shell targets and exposed Docker APIs, and into the March 2026 compromises of Trivy, Checkmarx's KICS and LiteLLM.
That progression ran through PCPcat, which peaked around Christmas 2025 against React2Shell targets and exposed Docker APIs, and into the March 2026 compromises of Trivy, Checkmarx's KICS and LiteLLM.
Techniques & procedures
12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
1 technique
Reconnaissance
“PCPcat scans public-facing Next.js applications at scale, testing 2,000 targets in each batch and running these scans every 30 to 60 minutes.”
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
The operators exploited internet-facing infrastructure across platforms including Ray, Docker, Redis, and React... often using automated and wormable exploitation techniques.
By March 2026, TeamPCP had expanded beyond exploiting exposed infrastructure and into the software supply chain attacks... with downstream victims impacted through compromised development workflows.
Execution
1 technique
Execution
“This payload forces the server to run any command the attacker wants… require('child_process').execSync('COMMAND_HERE')…”
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
“To maintain persistence, the malware creates multiple system services that restart automatically if stopped or if the server reboots.”
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
“To maintain persistence, the malware creates multiple system services that restart automatically if stopped or if the server reboots.”
Stealth
1 technique
Stealth
Find and remove processes or artifacts that match naming conventions referencing TeamPCP or PCPcat process list, services, paths, or containers ... the PCPJack operator even collects success metrics on whether TeamPCP has been evicted from targeted environments in a “PCP replaced” field sent to the C2.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
“it extracts environment files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and command history files… searches for valuable files like AWS credentials in the .aws folder, Docker configuration files, Git credentials…”
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
“port 888 handles reverse tunnel connections… sets up… FRP reverse tunneling tools… allow attackers to maintain access even after the initial vulnerability is patched.”
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
“The stolen information gets sent back to the control server through simple HTTP requests that require no authentication.”
“downloads a script that sets up GOST proxy software… These tools create hidden channels that allow attackers to maintain access…”
“It downloads a script that sets up GOST proxy software and FRP reverse tunneling tools on the compromised server.”
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
“Once a vulnerable server is found, it extracts environment files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and command history files. The stolen information gets sent back to the control server…”
Observables
61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.