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Malware3 associated actors3 associated CVEs

PCPcat

Tracked since Dec 21, 2025 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns3Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs61Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistenceInitial accessPost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceScanning
Platforms
LinuxCloud

PCPcat is a large-scale credential-harvesting malware campaign targeting internet-exposed Next.js deployments, with reporting also linking it to React-related exploitation. It has been associated with TeamPCP activity and appears within a broader operational ecosystem previously linked by researchers to TA-NATALSTATUS and ShadowRay 2.0-era infrastructure abuse. The campaign has been described as highly automated and capable of compromising large numbers of servers in a short period through exploitation of unauthenticated remote code execution conditions in web application stacks, including CVE-2025-29927 and CVE-2025-66478 as reported.

Operationally, PCPcat conducts broad scanning of public-facing applications, validates exploitable targets, and then executes attacker-supplied commands through a Node.js execution chain using prototype-pollution and command-injection techniques. Following initial access, it harvests sensitive data from compromised hosts, including environment configuration, cloud credentials, SSH material, Docker-related configuration, Git credentials, and shell history. Stolen data is then exfiltrated to attacker-controlled infrastructure.

PCPcat also establishes durable post-compromise access by deploying tunneling and proxy tooling, including GOST and FRP, and by creating auto-restarting services to preserve persistence across reboots or service interruption. Reporting further places PCPcat in a progression of TeamPCP operations that moved from exploitation of exposed infrastructure and Docker APIs toward broader supply-chain and developer-tool compromises. The malware primarily targets Linux-hosted Node.js web infrastructure and cloud-connected server environments where exposed application services can yield credentials and downstream access.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

3 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-55182via oligo security blogExploited in the wildReact2ShellDuring February, the group expanded its exploitation to include CVE-2025-29927 and CVE-2025-55182. In December 2025, TeamPCP's PCPcat operation targeted React2Shell-vulnerable applications and exposed Docker APIs with ransomware.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-29927via cyber security newsExploited in the wildNext.js Middleware Authorization BypassA new malware campaign called PCPcat has successfully compromised more than 59,000 servers in under 48 hours through targeted exploitation of critical vulnerabilities in Next.js and React frameworks.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2025-66478via cyber security newsExploited in the wildReact2Shell in Next.js (rejected duplicate of CVE-2025-55182)A new malware campaign called PCPcat has successfully compromised more than 59,000 servers in under 48 hours through targeted exploitation of critical vulnerabilities in Next.js and React frameworks.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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IronErn440

That progression ran through PCPcat, which peaked around Christmas 2025 against React2Shell targets and exposed Docker APIs, and into the March 2026 compromises of Trivy, Checkmarx's KICS and LiteLLM.

via infosecurity magazine newsinfosecurity-magazine.com
TeamPCP

That progression ran through PCPcat, which peaked around Christmas 2025 against React2Shell targets and exposed Docker APIs, and into the March 2026 compromises of Trivy, Checkmarx's KICS and LiteLLM.

via infosecurity magazine newsinfosecurity-magazine.com
TA-NATALSTATUS

That progression ran through PCPcat, which peaked around Christmas 2025 against React2Shell targets and exposed Docker APIs, and into the March 2026 compromises of Trivy, Checkmarx's KICS and LiteLLM.

via infosecurity magazine newsinfosecurity-magazine.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

1 technique
T1595Active ScanningEvidence1

“PCPcat scans public-facing Next.js applications at scale, testing 2,000 targets in each batch and running these scans every 30 to 60 minutes.”

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence3

The operators exploited internet-facing infrastructure across platforms including Ray, Docker, Redis, and React... often using automated and wormable exploitation techniques.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

By March 2026, TeamPCP had expanded beyond exploiting exposed infrastructure and into the software supply chain attacks... with downstream victims impacted through compromised development workflows.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

“This payload forces the server to run any command the attacker wants… require('child_process').execSync('COMMAND_HERE')…”

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

“To maintain persistence, the malware creates multiple system services that restart automatically if stopped or if the server reboots.”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.002Systemd ServiceEvidence1

“To maintain persistence, the malware creates multiple system services that restart automatically if stopped or if the server reboots.”

Stealth

1 technique
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Find and remove processes or artifacts that match naming conventions referencing TeamPCP or PCPcat process list, services, paths, or containers ... the PCPJack operator even collects success metrics on whether TeamPCP has been evicted from targeted environments in a “PCP replaced” field sent to the C2.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

“it extracts environment files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and command history files… searches for valuable files like AWS credentials in the .aws folder, Docker configuration files, Git credentials…”

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

“port 888 handles reverse tunnel connections… sets up… FRP reverse tunneling tools… allow attackers to maintain access even after the initial vulnerability is patched.”

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“The stolen information gets sent back to the control server through simple HTTP requests that require no authentication.”

T1090ProxyEvidence1

“downloads a script that sets up GOST proxy software… These tools create hidden channels that allow attackers to maintain access…”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

“It downloads a script that sets up GOST proxy software and FRP reverse tunneling tools on the compromised server.”

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“Once a vulnerable server is found, it extracts environment files, cloud credentials, SSH keys, and command history files. The stolen information gets sent back to the control server…”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

61 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching61Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities3CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.