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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Saitama

Tracked since Dec 31, 2025 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs5Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationReconnaissancePost exploitationDefense evasion
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

Saitama is a Windows backdoor implemented in .NET and used by the Iranian-linked cyberespionage group APT34, also known as OilRig. It was deployed in a March 2022 spear-phishing campaign against Jordan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and was detected in other Middle Eastern entities during the same period. Its delivery chain used malicious Excel attachments containing VBA macros that dropped the backdoor.

Saitama uses DNS tunneling for bidirectional command-and-control communication, concealing commands and outbound data within DNS traffic. Rather than relying on TXT records for incoming instructions, it encodes commands in the octets of IPv4 addresses returned through DNS responses, using a control value followed by ASCII-encoded command characters. It supports remote command execution and transmits command results and host information through DNS queries. Responses can be split across multiple queries and reconstructed by the operator. This covert channel supports reconnaissance and data exfiltration while making malicious communications less conspicuous.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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OilRig

APT34 targeted Jordan's foreign ministry in a spear-phishing campaign, utilizing a new backdoor named Saitama.

via trustwave othertrustwave.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Saitama was used in a phishing e-mail targeted to a government official from Jordan’s foreign ministry on an attack attributed to the Iranian group APT34.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

the group used macros inside Excel files as part of the first stage ... Despite the dated Saitama operation’s first stage dropper, a VBA macro that drops the actual .Net backdoor Saitama malware

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Saitama is a backdoor that uses the DNS protocol to encapsulate its command and control (C2) messages.

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

Saitama is a backdoor that uses the DNS protocol to encapsulate its command and control (C2) messages - a technique known as DNS Tunneling (MITRE ATT&CK T1071).

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

the new attack implemented in the group’s latest deployment is a .Net dropper that drops the actual malware.

T1132Data EncodingEvidence1

data can be exfiltrated or answered from the victim to a C2 encoded in the hostname portion of the FQDN

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

from the heavy use of DNS-based command and control (C&C) communication

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence1

data can be exfiltrated or answered from the victim to a C2 encoded in the hostname portion of the FQDN

Indicators of compromise

Observables

5 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching5Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.