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Malware4 associated CVEs

BootKitty

Tracked since Jan 9, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns4Associated
Actors0Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Bootkit
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionPost exploitation
Platforms
Linux

Bootkitty is a Linux-targeting UEFI bootkit and the first publicly described UEFI bootkit built for Linux, with observed focus on several Ubuntu versions. It operates in the pre-OS boot chain, where it can replace the boot loader, patch the Linux kernel before execution, disable kernel signature verification, and modify integrity-checking routines in memory. It is also designed to preload additional ELF payloads during startup, giving an attacker control before the operating system fully initializes.

Bootkitty has been assessed as a proof of concept rather than a mature in-the-wild threat. Researchers reported development artifacts, limited platform compatibility, and no confirmed real-world deployment at the time of analysis. The known sample was self-signed, which means it cannot execute on systems where UEFI Secure Boot is properly enforced through trusted signing and current revocation controls.

The malware is associated with UEFI-level persistence and early-boot compromise rather than conventional user-space infection. Reporting also links Bootkitty conceptually to Secure Boot bypass chains involving vulnerable or outdated trusted boot components, including exploitation paths based on LogoFAIL and legacy Microsoft-signed shim abuse, both of which can enable deployment of UEFI bootkits on systems that would otherwise trust only signed boot code. In that context, Bootkitty illustrates the expansion of bootkit tradecraft beyond Windows into Linux environments.

A potentially related component known as BCDropper has been described as an unsigned kernel module that deploys an ELF program used to load another kernel module, suggesting a broader experimental toolset around the same development effort. Bootkitty has also been tracked under the name IranuKit in some reporting.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

4 CVEs Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2023-40238via github webExploited in the wildLogoFAIL out-of-bounds write in Insyde InsydeH2O BmpDecoderDxeBootkitty, exploited LogoFAIL (CVE-2023-40238) ... Vulnerability Target ... LogoFAIL (CVE-2023-40238) UEFI | Bootkitty, exploited LogoFAIL (CVE-2023-40238) ... Bootkitty 2024 2024 ESP Linux N/AView vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2026-8863via infosecurity magazine newsUEFI Secure Boot Bypass in Microsoft-Signed Legacy Shim BootloadersTwo CVE IDs, CVE-2026-8863 and CVE-2026-10797, cover the reported shims, and Microsoft revoked the vulnerable binaries in the dbx update shipped with its June 9 Patch Tuesday.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2026-10797via infosecurity magazine newsUEFI Secure Boot revocation bypass in legacy shimTwo CVE IDs, CVE-2026-8863 and CVE-2026-10797, cover the reported shims, and Microsoft revoked the vulnerable binaries in the dbx update shipped with its June 9 Patch Tuesday.View vulnerability →Source ↗
CVE-2024-7344via codebyUEFI Secure Boot bypass in Howyar ReloaderЧерез такой вектор можно развернуть полноценные UEFI-буткиты - BlackLotus или Bootkitty - даже при включённом Secure Boot. | CVE-2024-7344, обнаруженная исследователем ESET Martin Smolár, затрагивает UEFI-приложение Reloader - компонент нескольких утилит восстановления: Howyar SysReturn, Greenware GreenGuard, Radix SmartRecovery, Sanfong EZ-back System, CES NeoImpact. По данным ESET, также затронуты WASAY eRecoveryRX и SignalComputer HDD King.View vulnerability →Source ↗
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The flaw lies in the BmpDecoderDxe module within UEFI firmware, where improper handling of BMP image parsing allows attackers to execute malicious shellcode.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The necessary functions responsible for integrity verification are patched within memory... The bootkit’s main goal is to disable the kernel’s signature verification feature and to preload two as yet unknown ELF binaries via the Linux “init” process.

Persistence

6 techniques
T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence5

Bootkits are a type of malware that infects the boot process of a computer, allowing attackers to gain persistent access and control over the system.

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence6

Attackers could bypass UEFI Secure Boot on a wide range of systems thanks to 11 Microsoft-signed UEFI shim bootloaders carrying vulnerabilities that have remained buried for more than a decade... Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits ... even with Secure Boot switched on.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence5

Bootkits usually targeted MBR/ESP in the early 2010s, but as the cost of firmware attack decreased rapidly, the modern bootkits started to target DXE or even PEI.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It’ll then try to preload two unknown executables during the system startup process.

T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

This rogue MokList enables the bootkit to be trusted by the system’s Secure Boot components, allowing it to load during the early boot process.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

The bootkit’s main goal is to disable the kernel’s signature verification feature... Another way to tell whether the bootkit is present on the system with UEFI Secure Boot enabled is by attempting to load an unsigned dummy kernel module during runtime. If it’s present, the module will be loaded.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence2

If security protections are set properly, malicious firmware might achieve the persistent by utilizing exploits (e.g. CVE-2014-8273).

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

It’ll then try to preload two unknown executables during the system startup process.

T1547.006Kernel Modules and ExtensionsEvidence1

This rogue MokList enables the bootkit to be trusted by the system’s Secure Boot components, allowing it to load during the early boot process.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1014RootkitEvidence1

The bootkit is an advanced rootkit that is capable of replacing the boot loader and of patching the kernel ahead of its execution.

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

the shellcode restores the original instructions, hiding the exploit activity and effectively clearing all traces of the bootkit.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence5

Bootkits are a type of malware that infects the boot process of a computer, allowing attackers to gain persistent access and control over the system.

T1542.001System FirmwareEvidence6

Attackers could bypass UEFI Secure Boot on a wide range of systems thanks to 11 Microsoft-signed UEFI shim bootloaders carrying vulnerabilities that have remained buried for more than a decade... Exploitation allows untrusted code to run during boot, opening the door to UEFI bootkits ... even with Secure Boot switched on.

T1542.003BootkitEvidence5

Bootkits usually targeted MBR/ESP in the early 2010s, but as the cost of firmware attack decreased rapidly, the modern bootkits started to target DXE or even PEI.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

The necessary functions responsible for integrity verification are patched within memory... The bootkit’s main goal is to disable the kernel’s signature verification feature and to preload two as yet unknown ELF binaries via the Linux “init” process.

Defense Impairment

4 techniques
T1553.001Gatekeeper BypassEvidence1

The exploit uses embedded shellcode within a BMP image to bypass Secure Boot protections by injecting rogue certificates into the MokList variable.

T1553.006Code Signing Policy ModificationEvidence1

По MITRE ATT&CK это одновременно Bootkit (T1542.003) для persistence и Code Signing Policy Modification (T1553.006) для defense evasion - Secure Boot формально включён, но фактически удалось его обойти.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

The bootkit’s main goal is to disable the kernel’s signature verification feature... Another way to tell whether the bootkit is present on the system with UEFI Secure Boot enabled is by attempting to load an unsigned dummy kernel module during runtime. If it’s present, the module will be loaded.

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The attack, dubbed “Bootkitty,” has been programmed to disable a security feature in Linux that ensures the software hasn’t been tampered with.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

The bootkit’s main goal is to disable the kernel’s signature verification feature... Another way to tell whether the bootkit is present on the system with UEFI Secure Boot enabled is by attempting to load an unsigned dummy kernel module during runtime. If it’s present, the module will be loaded.

Mallory platform

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IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actorsGroups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities4CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.