Powerratankba
- Type
- Downloader
- Capabilities
- ReconnaissanceScanningPersistenceProcess injectionDefense evasion
- Delivery
- PhishingSpearphishingFake updateLure
- Platforms
- Windows
PowerRatankba is a PowerShell-based reconnaissance implant and downloader for Windows associated with the North Korean Lazarus Group and its financially motivated BlueNoroff operations. Closely related to Ratankba, it was documented in campaigns beginning in 2017 against cryptocurrency users and organizations. It serves as a first-stage implant that profiles infected systems and deploys additional malware to selected victims.
PowerRatankba collects computer and network identifiers, operating-system information, process lists, and the accessibility of selected network ports. It supports remote command execution and downloading and executing additional payloads; PowerRatankba.B also supports payload injection. Persistence mechanisms include startup scripts and scheduled tasks, depending on the variant and available privileges. PowerRatankba.A uses plaintext command-and-control traffic, whereas PowerRatankba.B encrypts most command parameters with DES and identifies hosts using an encoded MAC address.
Delivery mechanisms include spearphishing links presented as Skype or Telegram updates, malicious shortcuts and compiled help files, JavaScript downloaders, macro-enabled Office documents, and backdoored cryptocurrency applications distributed through phishing sites impersonating legitimate projects. Selected cryptocurrency-related victims received a customized Gh0st RAT capable of remote control and supporting credential theft; those follow-on capabilities are distinct from PowerRatankba’s reconnaissance and staging functions. PowerRatankba has also been observed in the TrickBot-associated Anchor framework.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Malware associated with BlueNorOff include: "...Electricfish, Powerratankba, and Powerspritz".
Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More PowerRatankba
Techniques & procedures
27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
5 techniques
Initial Access
Several large email phishing campaigns attempted to trick unsuspecting victims into visiting fake webpages to download or update cryptocurrency applications. The copycat websites were mirror images of legitimate websites... The only exception was the link to download the Windows version of the application, which was hosted on the copycat websites.
Most recently, several large email phishing campaigns attempted to trick unsuspecting victims into visiting fake webpages to download or update cryptocurrency applications.
Threat vectors for this new toolset, dubbed PowerRatankba, include highly targeted spearphishing campaigns using links and attachments... The campaigns discussed in this research began on or around June 30th, 2017. According to our data those campaigns were highly targeted spearphishing attacks targeting at least one executive at a cryptocurrency organization
PowerSpritz has been observed being delivered via spearphishing attacks using the TinyCC link shortener service to redirect to likely attacker-controlled servers hosting the malicious PowerSpritz payload.
The attackers delivered the malware, according to Flashpoint a trusted Redbanc IT professional clicked to apply to a job opening found on social media... The person that published the job opening then contacted the employee via linkedin Skype, etc for an interview and tricked him into installing the malicious code.
Execution
9 techniques
Execution
If the user account does have administrator privileges then PowerRatankba will download a PowerShell script... and finally create a scheduled task to execute the downloaded PowerShell script on system startup.
When a command is received, it is executed using the PowerShell command in Windows. The output of the command is captured and sent back to the C2 server.
PowerSpritz... decrypts a PowerShell command that downloads the first stage of PowerRatankba... The second method downloads a similar VBScript-based PowerRatankba downloader using PowerShell directly in the CHM
The command cmd executes command using 'cmd.exe /c $cmdInst'.
The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file... Once the downloaded VBScript is executed, it will attempt to download PowerRatankba
Throughout November several compressed ZIP files containing a JavaScript (JS) downloader were observed... First, an obfuscated PowerRatankba.B PowerShell script is downloaded from a fake image URL
The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file.
All you need to do is install a certain application and enter your personal information into it. But in reality, that application runs in the background and silently downloads a backdoor, giving the attackers unauthorized access to your device.
The installer is then executed to trick the potential victim into thinking they downloaded a legitimate, working application installer or update... Once clicked, the button on the malicious BTG page would have directed a victim to download a payload
Persistence
5 techniques
Persistence
If the user account does have administrator privileges then PowerRatankba will download a PowerShell script... and finally create a scheduled task to execute the downloaded PowerShell script on system startup.
The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file.
This latter code is registered as a service through the “sc create” command as, the malware gain persistence by setting an autostart.
PowerRatankba.A saves a JS file to the victim’s Startup folder as appView.js... If the user account does not have administrator privileges then a VBScript file is downloaded... and saved to the executing user’s Startup folder... RatankbaPOS... sets up persistence by creating a registry key in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\igfxgpttray.
All of the CHM files use a well-known technique to create a shortcut object capable of executing malicious code and then causing that shortcut object to be automatically clicked via the 'x.Click();' function.
Privilege Escalation
5 techniques
Privilege Escalation
If the user account does have administrator privileges then PowerRatankba will download a PowerShell script... and finally create a scheduled task to execute the downloaded PowerShell script on system startup.
Download payload from provided URL and execute via memory injection... inject into process memory using Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection... RatankbaPOS will be written to disk as c:\windows\temp\hkp.dll and the PID of xplatform.exe process will be used to inject hkp.dll into xplatform.exe using LoadLibraryA and CreateRemoteThread
This latter code is registered as a service through the “sc create” command as, the malware gain persistence by setting an autostart.
PowerRatankba.A saves a JS file to the victim’s Startup folder as appView.js... If the user account does not have administrator privileges then a VBScript file is downloaded... and saved to the executing user’s Startup folder... RatankbaPOS... sets up persistence by creating a registry key in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\igfxgpttray.
All of the CHM files use a well-known technique to create a shortcut object capable of executing malicious code and then causing that shortcut object to be automatically clicked via the 'x.Click();' function.
Stealth
5 techniques
Stealth
The dropper downloads and executes PowerRatankba in the background by useing (Base64)... The program contains Base64-encoded data, which is often used to hide malicious commands from antivirus and security software.
A LNK masquerading as a PDF document was discovered... The malicious 'Scanned Document Part 1.pdf.lnk' LNK file, along with a corrupted PDF named 'Scanned Document Part 2.pdf,' were compressed in a ZIP file named 'Scanned Documents.zip'.
Download payload from provided URL and execute via memory injection... inject into process memory using Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection... RatankbaPOS will be written to disk as c:\windows\temp\hkp.dll and the PID of xplatform.exe process will be used to inject hkp.dll into xplatform.exe using LoadLibraryA and CreateRemoteThread
The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file.
exe or inj... Download payload from provided URL, inject into process memory using Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
PowerRatankba first sends detailed information about the infected device... including the computer name, IP address(es)... if ports 139, 3389, and/or 445 are open/closed/filtered
PowerRatankba first sends detailed information... including... a process list... RatankbaPOS... begins by taking a snapshot of the process list using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot.
PowerRatankba first sends detailed information about the infected device to its C&C server... including the computer name, IP address(es), OS boot time and installation date, language
Collection
1 technique
Collection
enabling the Lazarus Group to conduct lucrative operations stealing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies... targeting a point-of-sale related framework for the theft of credit card data
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
PowerRatankba utilizes HTTP for its C&C communication... RatankbaPOS... makes an HTTP request to a hardcoded URL... Once the stolen data has been obfuscated, it is sent in a POST HTTP request
Anchor consists of several segments each with a specific function: anchorInstaller anchorDeInstaller AnchorBot Bin2hex psExecutor memoryScraper. This structure is designed to secretly upload the malware and clean up all the evidence of the attack.
Observables
95 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.