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Malware2 associated actors

Powerratankba

Tracked since Jan 16, 2026 · Updated 21 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs95Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
ReconnaissanceScanningPersistenceProcess injectionDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingFake updateLure
Platforms
Windows

PowerRatankba is a PowerShell-based reconnaissance implant and downloader for Windows associated with the North Korean Lazarus Group and its financially motivated BlueNoroff operations. Closely related to Ratankba, it was documented in campaigns beginning in 2017 against cryptocurrency users and organizations. It serves as a first-stage implant that profiles infected systems and deploys additional malware to selected victims.

PowerRatankba collects computer and network identifiers, operating-system information, process lists, and the accessibility of selected network ports. It supports remote command execution and downloading and executing additional payloads; PowerRatankba.B also supports payload injection. Persistence mechanisms include startup scripts and scheduled tasks, depending on the variant and available privileges. PowerRatankba.A uses plaintext command-and-control traffic, whereas PowerRatankba.B encrypts most command parameters with DES and identifies hosts using an encoded MAC address.

Delivery mechanisms include spearphishing links presented as Skype or Telegram updates, malicious shortcuts and compiled help files, JavaScript downloaders, macro-enabled Office documents, and backdoored cryptocurrency applications distributed through phishing sites impersonating legitimate projects. Selected cryptocurrency-related victims received a customized Gh0st RAT capable of remote control and supporting credential theft; those follow-on capabilities are distinct from PowerRatankba’s reconnaissance and staging functions. PowerRatankba has also been observed in the TrickBot-associated Anchor framework.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT38

Malware associated with BlueNorOff include: "...Electricfish, Powerratankba, and Powerspritz".

via wikipedia enen.wikipedia.org
Lazarus

Lazarus Campaign Targeting Cryptocurrencies Reveals Remote Controller Tool, an Evolved RATANKBA, and More PowerRatankba

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Several large email phishing campaigns attempted to trick unsuspecting victims into visiting fake webpages to download or update cryptocurrency applications. The copycat websites were mirror images of legitimate websites... The only exception was the link to download the Windows version of the application, which was hosted on the copycat websites.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Most recently, several large email phishing campaigns attempted to trick unsuspecting victims into visiting fake webpages to download or update cryptocurrency applications.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Threat vectors for this new toolset, dubbed PowerRatankba, include highly targeted spearphishing campaigns using links and attachments... The campaigns discussed in this research began on or around June 30th, 2017. According to our data those campaigns were highly targeted spearphishing attacks targeting at least one executive at a cryptocurrency organization

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

PowerSpritz has been observed being delivered via spearphishing attacks using the TinyCC link shortener service to redirect to likely attacker-controlled servers hosting the malicious PowerSpritz payload.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The attackers delivered the malware, according to Flashpoint a trusted Redbanc IT professional clicked to apply to a job opening found on social media... The person that published the job opening then contacted the employee via linkedin Skype, etc for an interview and tricked him into installing the malicious code.

Execution

9 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

If the user account does have administrator privileges then PowerRatankba will download a PowerShell script... and finally create a scheduled task to execute the downloaded PowerShell script on system startup.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

When a command is received, it is executed using the PowerShell command in Windows. The output of the command is captured and sent back to the C2 server.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence3

PowerSpritz... decrypts a PowerShell command that downloads the first stage of PowerRatankba... The second method downloads a similar VBScript-based PowerRatankba downloader using PowerShell directly in the CHM

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The command cmd executes command using 'cmd.exe /c $cmdInst'.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file... Once the downloaded VBScript is executed, it will attempt to download PowerRatankba

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Throughout November several compressed ZIP files containing a JavaScript (JS) downloader were observed... First, an obfuscated PowerRatankba.B PowerShell script is downloaded from a fake image URL

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

All you need to do is install a certain application and enter your personal information into it. But in reality, that application runs in the background and silently downloads a backdoor, giving the attackers unauthorized access to your device.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The installer is then executed to trick the potential victim into thinking they downloaded a legitimate, working application installer or update... Once clicked, the button on the malicious BTG page would have directed a victim to download a payload

Persistence

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

If the user account does have administrator privileges then PowerRatankba will download a PowerShell script... and finally create a scheduled task to execute the downloaded PowerShell script on system startup.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

This latter code is registered as a service through the “sc create” command as, the malware gain persistence by setting an autostart.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

PowerRatankba.A saves a JS file to the victim’s Startup folder as appView.js... If the user account does not have administrator privileges then a VBScript file is downloaded... and saved to the executing user’s Startup folder... RatankbaPOS... sets up persistence by creating a registry key in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\igfxgpttray.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

All of the CHM files use a well-known technique to create a shortcut object capable of executing malicious code and then causing that shortcut object to be automatically clicked via the 'x.Click();' function.

Privilege Escalation

5 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

If the user account does have administrator privileges then PowerRatankba will download a PowerShell script... and finally create a scheduled task to execute the downloaded PowerShell script on system startup.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Download payload from provided URL and execute via memory injection... inject into process memory using Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection... RatankbaPOS will be written to disk as c:\windows\temp\hkp.dll and the PID of xplatform.exe process will be used to inject hkp.dll into xplatform.exe using LoadLibraryA and CreateRemoteThread

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence1

This latter code is registered as a service through the “sc create” command as, the malware gain persistence by setting an autostart.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

PowerRatankba.A saves a JS file to the victim’s Startup folder as appView.js... If the user account does not have administrator privileges then a VBScript file is downloaded... and saved to the executing user’s Startup folder... RatankbaPOS... sets up persistence by creating a registry key in HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run\igfxgpttray.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence1

All of the CHM files use a well-known technique to create a shortcut object capable of executing malicious code and then causing that shortcut object to be automatically clicked via the 'x.Click();' function.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The dropper downloads and executes PowerRatankba in the background by useing (Base64)... The program contains Base64-encoded data, which is often used to hide malicious commands from antivirus and security software.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

A LNK masquerading as a PDF document was discovered... The malicious 'Scanned Document Part 1.pdf.lnk' LNK file, along with a corrupted PDF named 'Scanned Document Part 2.pdf,' were compressed in a ZIP file named 'Scanned Documents.zip'.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

Download payload from provided URL and execute via memory injection... inject into process memory using Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection... RatankbaPOS will be written to disk as c:\windows\temp\hkp.dll and the PID of xplatform.exe process will be used to inject hkp.dll into xplatform.exe using LoadLibraryA and CreateRemoteThread

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

The first method uses a VBScript Execute command and BITSAdmin tool to download a malicious VBScript file.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

exe or inj... Download payload from provided URL, inject into process memory using Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection

Discovery

3 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

PowerRatankba first sends detailed information about the infected device... including the computer name, IP address(es)... if ports 139, 3389, and/or 445 are open/closed/filtered

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

PowerRatankba first sends detailed information... including... a process list... RatankbaPOS... begins by taking a snapshot of the process list using CreateToolhelp32Snapshot.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

PowerRatankba first sends detailed information about the infected device to its C&C server... including the computer name, IP address(es), OS boot time and installation date, language

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

enabling the Lazarus Group to conduct lucrative operations stealing Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies... targeting a point-of-sale related framework for the theft of credit card data

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

PowerRatankba utilizes HTTP for its C&C communication... RatankbaPOS... makes an HTTP request to a hardcoded URL... Once the stolen data has been obfuscated, it is sent in a POST HTTP request

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

Anchor consists of several segments each with a specific function: anchorInstaller anchorDeInstaller AnchorBot Bin2hex psExecutor memoryScraper. This structure is designed to secretly upload the malware and clean up all the evidence of the attack.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

95 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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IOC matching95Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.