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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

LimeRAT

Tracked since Jan 17, 2026 · Updated 24 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK39Techniques
IOCs181Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftKeyloggingExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasionProcess injectionDDOSExtortionCrypto theft
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingLureUSB
Platforms
Windows

LimeRAT is an open-source remote access trojan for Windows written in Visual Basic .NET. Its modular plugin architecture supports remote desktop access, file management, downloading additional payloads, password theft, keylogging, and cryptocurrency theft. Additional functionality includes distributed denial-of-service attacks, Monero mining, screen locking, and ransomware capable of encrypting files on local drives and USB devices. It supports AES-encrypted client-server communications and can retrieve command-and-control connection information through Pastebin.

LimeRAT includes persistence, USB propagation, and anti-virtual-machine functionality. Observed deployment chains use obfuscated VBScript and PowerShell, staged .NET loaders, reflective loading, and process injection or process hollowing into legitimate Windows utilities. Campaigns have established persistence through Startup-folder scripts, scheduled tasks, and registry modifications. These delivery components frequently execute payloads in memory and abuse legitimate hosting services to stage malware.

Distribution includes phishing and spearphishing emails, malicious Office documents with VBA macros, compressed archives, ISO disk images containing scripts, and phishing websites. Lures have impersonated judicial authorities and used financial, geopolitical, and COVID-related themes. LimeRAT has been deployed by Blind Eagle, also tracked as APT-C-36 and TAG-144, in campaigns targeting Colombia and other South American organizations. It has also appeared in spearphishing campaigns targeting government agencies in Afghanistan, India, Italy, Poland, and the United States. Its availability and use across multiple delivery frameworks make it a commodity tool rather than malware exclusive to one threat actor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Hagga / Aggah

By the end of February was observed the use of LimeRAT, but with a very similar operation in the deployment used during the rest of the campaigns, from the first ones whose objective was the execution of NjRAT.

via lab52 bloglab52.io
APT-C-36

By the end of February was observed the use of LimeRAT, but with a very similar operation in the deployment used during the rest of the campaigns, from the first ones whose objective was the execution of NjRAT.

via lab52 bloglab52.io
Water Basilisk

In some cases, the final stage PowerShell script contained up to seven various RATs. These are typically NjRat, BitRat, Nanocore RAT, QuasarRat, LimeRat, and Warzone.

via trend micro researchtrendmicro.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

39 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Spreading Infecting all files and folders on USB drivers

T1566PhishingEvidence6

This actor is starting the infection via email with very generic topics such as subpoenas or bank payments, with a crafted html view where the icon pretending to be an attachment is in fact an image with a link to download a compressed file from One Drive.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The next PowerShell script attempts to achieve persistence by creating a new Scheduled Task called "Office" that is executed immediately and then repeated every two minutes

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

The .rar file contains a Visual Basic Script ... to download and execute a new Powershell script

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence4

will create a Windows Script Host Shell Object to download and execute a new Powershell script by executing the following command

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

The .rar file contains a Visual Basic Script with same name “citacion juzgado.vbs”

T1204User ExecutionEvidence2

T1204 User Execution Opening malicious xls to execute macro

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The .rar file contains a Visual Basic Script with same name “citacion juzgado.vbs” which, poorly obfuscated, will create a Windows Script Host Shell Object to download and execute a new Powershell script

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The next PowerShell script attempts to achieve persistence by creating a new Scheduled Task called "Office" that is executed immediately and then repeated every two minutes

T1137Office Application StartupEvidence1

T1137 Office Template Macros Execute malicious code upon macro execution

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Adds a “Run” registry entry for persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

and establish persistence using the Registry Key “HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders”.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

The next PowerShell script attempts to achieve persistence by creating a new Scheduled Task called "Office" that is executed immediately and then repeated every two minutes

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

loading them using a puppet process injection within the memory of process “C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe” ... or in “C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe”

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

Adds a “Run” registry entry for persistence.

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

and establish persistence using the Registry Key “HKCU:\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\User Shell Folders”.

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence3

The intrusion set embedded Unicode icons into Base64-encoded PowerShell strings, replaced those icons with ASCII characters at runtime, and used reversed Base64-encoded URLs and payloads.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

T1036 Masquerading The registered task/service pretends to be benign by name

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

loading them using a puppet process injection within the memory of process “C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\cvtres.exe” ... or in “C:\Windows\Microsoft.NET\Framework\v4.0.30319\MSBuild.exe”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

This script deobfuscates a PowerShell command... The Powershell decodes the blob... it decrypts the blob

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

This is accomplished by invoking aspnet_compiler.exe, injecting the final payload, and executing it.

T1218.004InstallUtilEvidence1

"The YIPPHB dropper is executed using the Installutil.exe command-line utility to start the RAT phase."

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti Virtual Machines Uninstall itself if the machine is virtual to avoid scanning or analyzing

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

known as Reflection Assembly, and consisting of the creation of binary payloads as byte arrays in Powershell and then loading them

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

Among these different scripts, most of them trying to disable typical AntiVirus solutions

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

T1056 Input Capture Keylogging capabilities

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Keylogger

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

Passowrds stealer

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Crypto Stealer Stealing Cryptocurrency sensitive data ... Bitcoin grabber

Discovery

2 techniques
T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

T1049 System Network Connections Discovery Performs network discover for lateral movement into network

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

Anti Virtual Machines Uninstall itself if the machine is virtual to avoid scanning or analyzing

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Auto Task Force enable Windows RDP

T1091Replication Through Removable MediaEvidence1

Spreading Infecting all files and folders on USB drivers

Collection

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

T1056 Input Capture Keylogging capabilities

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

Keylogger

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

T1113 Screen Capture Can capture the screen of the victim

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

T1115 Clipboard Data Collect data stored in the clipboard from users copying information within or between applications.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

T1071 Application Layer Protocol HTTP/DNS requests are used in the C&C traffic

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The loader and subsequent stages use WebClient and HTTPS/HTTP URLs to retrieve encoded payloads; the RAT connects to a configured command-and-control server.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

The loader is downloaded from a TinyURL-resolved Discord CDN location; the loader subsequently downloads the YIPPHB dropper and the RAT implant from remote URLs.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

Remote Administration Tool For Windows ... Auto Task Force enable Windows RDP ... File manager ... Remote desktop ... Downloader Keylogger

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence1

Connection Using pastebin.com as ip:port , Instead of noip.com DNS. And Also using multi-ports

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

Encryption The communication between server & client is encrypted with AES

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel Send stolen data using CNC channel

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

Ransomware Encrypting files on all HHD and USB with .Lime extension

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence1

Screen-Locker Prevents user from accessing their Windows GUI

T1496Resource HijackingEvidence1

XMR Miner High performance Monero CPU miner with user idle\active optimizations

T1498Network Denial of ServiceEvidence1

DDoS Creating a powerful DDOS attack to make an online service unavailable

Indicators of compromise

Observables

181 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching181Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping39Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.