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Malware3 associated actors

SunSeed

Tracked since Jan 17, 2026 · Updated 15 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs25Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistenceReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingMalvertising
Platforms
Windows

SunSeed is a Windows downloader associated with Asylum Ambuscade and tracked by CERT-UA in activity attributed to UAC-0064. Originally implemented in Lua, it serves as a first-stage implant that retrieves additional scripts and deploys follow-on tooling. Functionally equivalent implementations in Tcl and VBS have also been observed.

SunSeed collects the system drive’s volume serial number and incorporates it into HTTP requests to identify infected hosts. The Lua implementation uses LuaSocket to periodically contact a hardcoded command-and-control server and retrieve additional Lua code. Follow-on scripts can install AHKBOT and its legitimate AutoHotkey interpreter or facilitate reassignment of victim management to another server. AHKBOT supplies separate surveillance and credential-theft functionality; those capabilities are not intrinsic to SunSeed.

Observed installation chains use malicious Excel macros to invoke Windows Installer and silently retrieve an MSI package containing SunSeed, a legitimate Lua interpreter, and supporting dependencies. The installer establishes persistence through a Windows Startup shortcut. An accompanying interpreter was modified to suppress console output and reduce visible signs of execution. Asylum Ambuscade has also distributed its first-stage downloaders through malicious advertising and traffic-redirection chains leading to JavaScript installers.

SunSeed was used in February 2022 spearphishing against European government personnel coordinating assistance for refugees fleeing Ukraine. Its associated operator conducts both financially motivated intrusions and cyberespionage, including operations against government entities in Europe and Central Asia.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UNC1151

Within this tactic are scenarios that download and save the MicroBackdoor, HALFSHELL, and SunSeed malware families.

via attackiq blogattackiq.com
UAC-0064

UAC-0064 (SunSeed)

via cip gov uacip.gov.ua
TA445

The email included a malicious macro attachment which attempted to download a Lua-based malware dubbed SunSeed.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

“Proofpoint has identified a likely nation-state sponsored phishing campaign… The email included a malicious macro attachment…”; “sent to a European government entity… included a macro enabled XLS file…”

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“campaign… using a possibly compromised Ukrainian armed service member’s email account to target European government personnel…”

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence1

“When enabled, it executes a VB macro named ‘Module1’… invoking Windows Installer to call out… and download a malicious MSI package.”

T1059.006PythonEvidence1

“installed… a Windows Lua interpreter… executed a malicious Lua script… dubbed SunSeed… consistently pings the C2 server for additional Lua code, and executes the code upon receiving it…”

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“established persistence via an LNK file installed for autorun at Windows Startup… saved to… Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Software Protection Service.lnk”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

“established persistence via an LNK file installed for autorun at Windows Startup… saved to… Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Software Protection Service.lnk”

Stealth

2 techniques
T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1

“creates a Windows Installer (msiexec.exe) object… call out to an actor-controlled staging IP and download a malicious MSI package… ‘completely silent installation.’”

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

“UILevel… ‘completely silent installation.’ This hides all macro actions… Notably… interpreter… modified so it does not print any output… conceal the malware installation…”

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

“obtains the C Drive partition serial number from the host, appends to a URL request…”

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

“issues GET requests over HTTP via port 80 using a Lua Socket… every three seconds… user agent ‘LuaSocket 2.0.2’… to http://84.32.188[.]96/”

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

The MicroBackdoor sample used in this attack is downloaded and written to disk.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching25Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.