SunSeed
- Type
- Downloader
- Capabilities
- PersistenceReconnaissanceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- SpearphishingMalvertising
- Platforms
- Windows
SunSeed is a Windows downloader associated with Asylum Ambuscade and tracked by CERT-UA in activity attributed to UAC-0064. Originally implemented in Lua, it serves as a first-stage implant that retrieves additional scripts and deploys follow-on tooling. Functionally equivalent implementations in Tcl and VBS have also been observed.
SunSeed collects the system drive’s volume serial number and incorporates it into HTTP requests to identify infected hosts. The Lua implementation uses LuaSocket to periodically contact a hardcoded command-and-control server and retrieve additional Lua code. Follow-on scripts can install AHKBOT and its legitimate AutoHotkey interpreter or facilitate reassignment of victim management to another server. AHKBOT supplies separate surveillance and credential-theft functionality; those capabilities are not intrinsic to SunSeed.
Observed installation chains use malicious Excel macros to invoke Windows Installer and silently retrieve an MSI package containing SunSeed, a legitimate Lua interpreter, and supporting dependencies. The installer establishes persistence through a Windows Startup shortcut. An accompanying interpreter was modified to suppress console output and reduce visible signs of execution. Asylum Ambuscade has also distributed its first-stage downloaders through malicious advertising and traffic-redirection chains leading to JavaScript installers.
SunSeed was used in February 2022 spearphishing against European government personnel coordinating assistance for refugees fleeing Ukraine. Its associated operator conducts both financially motivated intrusions and cyberespionage, including operations against government entities in Europe and Central Asia.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Within this tactic are scenarios that download and save the MicroBackdoor, HALFSHELL, and SunSeed malware families.
The email included a malicious macro attachment which attempted to download a Lua-based malware dubbed SunSeed.
Techniques & procedures
10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
“Proofpoint has identified a likely nation-state sponsored phishing campaign… The email included a malicious macro attachment…”; “sent to a European government entity… included a macro enabled XLS file…”
“campaign… using a possibly compromised Ukrainian armed service member’s email account to target European government personnel…”
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
“When enabled, it executes a VB macro named ‘Module1’… invoking Windows Installer to call out… and download a malicious MSI package.”
“installed… a Windows Lua interpreter… executed a malicious Lua script… dubbed SunSeed… consistently pings the C2 server for additional Lua code, and executes the code upon receiving it…”
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
“established persistence via an LNK file installed for autorun at Windows Startup… saved to… Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Software Protection Service.lnk”
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
“established persistence via an LNK file installed for autorun at Windows Startup… saved to… Start Menu\Programs\Startup\Software Protection Service.lnk”
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
“creates a Windows Installer (msiexec.exe) object… call out to an actor-controlled staging IP and download a malicious MSI package… ‘completely silent installation.’”
“UILevel… ‘completely silent installation.’ This hides all macro actions… Notably… interpreter… modified so it does not print any output… conceal the malware installation…”
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
“obtains the C Drive partition serial number from the host, appends to a URL request…”
Command and Control
2 techniques
Command and Control
“issues GET requests over HTTP via port 80 using a Lua Socket… every three seconds… user agent ‘LuaSocket 2.0.2’… to http://84.32.188[.]96/”
The MicroBackdoor sample used in this attack is downloaded and written to disk.
Observables
25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.