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3 malware families

TA445

Also known asta445

TA445 is a threat actor tracked by Proofpoint and associated in the provided content with UNC1151 and Ghostwriter. Proofpoint explicitly states it tracks UNC1151 as part of TA445, and the content references reported campaigns as TA445/UNC1151/Ghostwriter. The actor is linked in the content to widespread phishing campaigns targeting private email accounts of Ukrainian armed service members. Related activity described in the source material includes phishing operations using compromised or possibly compromised Ukrainian email accounts, macro-enabled Excel attachments, Windows Installer (msiexec.exe) for silent MSI installation, and delivery of a Lua-based downloader dubbed SunSeed. The malware established persistence via a Startup LNK, installed components under C:\ProgramData.security-soft, and beaconed over HTTP using the victim’s C: drive serial number in requests. Victimology in the described campaign included European government personnel involved in refugee logistics related to Ukraine, and a related July 2021 campaign targeted senior cybersecurity practitioners and decisionmakers at US-based private companies including the defense sector. The content characterizes the activity as likely nation-state sponsored, but attribution for the specific February 2022 operation remained unclear and was tracked separately by Proofpoint as Asylum Ambuscade pending technical linkage. No stronger attribution than the TA445/UNC1151/Ghostwriter association stated in the content is supported.

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OPERATIONAL PROFILE

Targeting

Who, where, and (when attributed) which flag flies behind the operation. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • government
  • defense
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

23 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt; click through for MITRE's full description.

10 of 15 tactics36 techniques×N= number of intelligence reports citing this technique
MITRE ATT&CK
TA0042
Resource Development
3 techniques
T1583
Acquire Infrastructure
T1588
Obtain Capabilities
T1588.002
Tool
T1608
Stage Capabilities
TA0001
Initial Access
1 technique
T1566×2
Phishing
T1566.001×2
Spearphishing Attachment
T1566.002
Spearphishing Link
TA0002
Execution
3 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1059
Command and Scripting Interpreter
T1059.005
Visual Basic
T1059.006
Python
T1204
User Execution
T1204.002
Malicious File
TA0003
Persistence
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0004
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
T1053
Scheduled Task/Job
T1053.005
Scheduled Task
T1547
Boot or Logon Autostart Execution
T1547.001
Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder
TA0005
Stealth
4 techniques
T1027
Obfuscated Files or Information
T1027.009
Embedded Payloads
T1036
Masquerading
T1036.005
Match Legitimate Resource Name or Location
T1218
System Binary Proxy Execution
T1218.007
Msiexec
T1564
Hide Artifacts
TA0006
Credential Access
1 technique
T1212
Exploitation for Credential Access
TA0007
Discovery
2 techniques
T1057
Process Discovery
T1082×2
System Information Discovery
TA0011
Command and Control
2 techniques
T1071
Application Layer Protocol
T1071.001×2
Web Protocols
T1105
Ingress Tool Transfer
TA0010
Exfiltration
1 technique
T1041
Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
ARSENAL

Associated malware families

3 malware families attributed to this actor across reporting.

FamilyContextEvidenceLast seen
Cobalt StrikeThe name comes from the fact that it retrieves a Cobalt Strike beacon, from an attacker-controlled environment, disguised as a renderable image or hidden in a web-associated file type, like CSS, JS, or SVG.1May 15, 2026
PicassoLoaderKey developments include the deployment of multiple variants of the group’s main payload downloader, named PicassoLoader by CERT-UA. Variants of this downloader are written in .NET, PowerShell, JavaScript, and C++.1May 15, 2026
SunSeedThe email included a malicious macro attachment which attempted to download a Lua-based malware dubbed SunSeed.1Mar 18, 2026
IOCS

Observables

34 indicators attributed to this actor: domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts pulled from reporting. View more in app.

34 IOCsView more in app

IOC values are gated. View more in Mallory for domains, IPs, hashes, and other artifacts, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app
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Target overlap

Match sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.

Tradecraft mapping23

Every observed MITRE ATT&CK technique, grouped by tactic.

Malware arsenal3

Families this actor is known to deploy, with IOCs and behavior.

Exploited CVEs

CVEs this actor has used in known campaigns.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

Observables34

Domains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.

TA445 | Mallory