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Malware2 associated actors

TeamsClutch

Tracked since Jan 17, 2026 · Updated 7 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK9Techniques
IOCs9Tracked

TeamsClutch is a Swift-based implant associated with the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group sub-cluster BlueNoroff (also tracked as APT38, Sapphire Sleet, CryptoCore, and CageyChameleon). It has been reported in Kaspersky’s coverage of the GhostCall and broader SnatchCrypto activity targeting the Web3 and blockchain ecosystem, as well as executives at technology companies and venture capital firms. TeamsClutch is deployed in GhostCall infection chains on macOS after Telegram-based social engineering lures direct victims to fake Zoom or Microsoft Teams meeting pages that prompt a malicious SDK update download. The malware masquerades as Microsoft Teams, prompts the user to enter their system password, and exfiltrates that password to an external server. The content states that the actor recently shifted lures from Zoom to Microsoft Teams, and that DownTroy can install fake applications disguised as Zoom or Teams and deploy TeamsClutch or ZoomClutch as follow-on payloads. High-confidence related context includes targeting of macOS users in multiple countries including Japan, Italy, France, Singapore, Turkey, Spain, Sweden, India, and Hong Kong.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT38

"...deploys CosmicDoor, ZoomClutch or TeamsClutch..."

via scworldscworld.com
Lazarus

ZoomClutch or TeamsClutch, which uses a Swift-based implant that masquerades as Zoom or Teams while harboring functionality to prompt the user to enter their system password ... and exfiltrate the details to an external server

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

9 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Upon accessing the fake site, the target is presented with a page carefully designed to mirror the appearance of Zoom in a browser... Approximately three to five seconds later, an error message appears... prompting them to download a Zoom SDK update file through a link labeled 'Update Now'.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Once contact is established with the target, they use Calendly to schedule a meeting and then share a meeting link through domains that mimic Zoom... In September 2025, we discovered that the group is shifting from cloning the Zoom UI in their attacks to Microsoft Teams.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The actor reaches out to targets on Telegram by impersonating venture capitalists and, in some cases, using compromised accounts of real entrepreneurs and startup founders... In the GhostHire campaign, BlueNoroff approaches Web3 developers and tricks them into downloading and executing a GitHub repository containing malware under the guise of a skill assessment during a recruitment process.

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

"...urging them to download a Zoom software development kit (SDK)..." / "...download of a malicious AppleScript file..." / "...luring them into downloading and executing a booby-trapped GitHub repository..."

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The victim would join a fake call... then encourage the user to update the Zoom client with a script... In the GhostHire campaign... the bot sends either a ZIP file or a GitHub link... putting pressure on the victim to quickly run the malicious project.

Stealth

1 technique
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

The script is disguised as an update for the Zoom Meeting SDK... installs a fake application disguised as Zoom or Microsoft Teams... The app is ad-hoc signed, and its bundle identifier is hard-coded to us.zoom.com to mimic the legitimate client.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

"...prompt the user to enter their system password in order to complete the app update and exfiltrate the details..."

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

The downloader script includes a harvesting function that searches for files associated with password management applications... ZoomClutch steals macOS passwords by displaying a fake Zoom dialog... ubd.sh is the browser credentials and macOS Keychains stealer module.

Collection

1 technique
T1056.004Credential API HookingEvidence1

"...prompt the user to enter their system password in order to complete the app update and exfiltrate the details..."

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence2

ZoomClutch... the validated credentials are covertly sent to the C2 server... These scripts were used to collect and exfiltrate data to the actor’s C2 servers... The results of these commands are then sent to the specified C2 server inside a POST request.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

9 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching9Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping9Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.