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Mallory
Malware3 associated actors

3proxy

Tracked since Jan 21, 2026 · Updated 23 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs7Tracked
Type
Proxyware
Capabilities
Post exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
WindowsAndroid

3proxy is a lightweight, open-source proxy server used legitimately for network connectivity and abused as a dual-use tool in malicious operations. Attackers deploy it to relay traffic through compromised systems, provide SOCKS proxy access, and support reverse-tunneled connections into victim networks. It is not inherently malicious, and its presence alone does not establish compromise.

Observed deployments include Windows intrusions and integration as a native library in the Netway SDK on Android streaming devices. In malicious Android deployments, it provides reverse-proxy connectivity that traverses NAT and firewalls, allowing residential connections to serve as proxy endpoints without user consent. In Windows environments, operators have disguised deployed copies as legitimate software components and combined 3proxy with utilities such as GOST and PuTTY plink to maintain alternative access channels.

3proxy has been used by Andariel and Lazarus operators, including in campaigns involving energy providers and environments subsequently affected by DTrack and Maui ransomware. Partisan Zmiy, associated with Cyber Partisans, also used a GOST–3proxy chain during a prolonged healthcare intrusion. These associations reflect independent abuse of a publicly available tool rather than exclusive attribution. Its proxy functionality should not be conflated with credential theft, ransomware, or other capabilities of accompanying malware.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cyber Partisans

“A GOST–3proxy chain provided alternative connectivity.”

via gbhackersgbhackers.com
Partisan Zmiy

“A GOST–3proxy chain provided alternative connectivity.”

via gbhackersgbhackers.com
Andariel

Suspicious 3proxy tool... The “3Proxy” tool... was compiled on 2020-09-09 and deployed to the victim on 2020-12-25... used... to maintain access.

via securelistsecurelist.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

We have no evidence to suggest that the LaiXi developers deliberately embedded the malicious file into their product, or that a threat actor conducted a supply chain attack...

Stealth

1 technique
T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

<local_path>\rar.exe e <local_path>\m.tmp <local_path>\ -p<password> Extract files [T1140]

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1553.002Code SigningEvidence1

Sophos said it discovered in December 2023 a malicious executable ("Catalog.exe" ... ) that's signed by a valid Microsoft Windows Hardware Compatibility Publisher (WHCP) certificate.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

Present within the purported authentication service is a component called 3proxy that's designed to monitor and intercept network traffic on an infected system, effectively acting as a backdoor.

Collection

1 technique
T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

Present within the purported authentication service is a component called 3proxy that's designed to monitor and intercept network traffic on an infected system, effectively acting as a backdoor.

Command and Control

7 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Netway registers with backend C2 applinked5.ukturks.store via HTTPS GET and has a second HTML C2 channel allowing the server to order authenticated HTTP requests from the residential IP.

T1090ProxyEvidence5

These two tools working together create a proxy on the victim system which has its listening port 'exported' to a port on a remote host.

T1090.001Internal ProxyEvidence1

"Utilities such as 3Proxy... tunnel command-and-control traffic..."

T1090.002External ProxyEvidence1

"...preceded by 3proxy months earlier." and "Using legitimate proxy and tunneling tools after initial infection or deploying them to maintain access"

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

Netway integrates 3proxy and uses a reverse 3proxy tunnel (-r 79.127.248.199:10975) to traverse NAT and firewalls; the infrastructure mapped more than 60,000 unique residential IPs.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Successful post-exploitation led to the download of their toolkit from web servers.

T1572Protocol TunnelingEvidence1

"C2 tunneling: Utilities such as 3Proxy, PLINK, and Stunnel tunnel command-and-control traffic over legitimate protocols, masking data transfer activity."

Indicators of compromise

Observables

7 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching7Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.