DynoWiper
- Type
- Wiper
- Capabilities
- Post exploitation
- Platforms
- Windows
DynoWiper is a destructive Windows malware family identified during coordinated attacks against Poland’s energy sector on December 29, 2025. It was deployed against compromised systems, including human–machine interface workstations, in a campaign targeting renewable-energy facilities and a combined heat and power plant. The broader operation was formally attributed by the United Kingdom and European Union to Russia’s Federal Security Service Centre 16.
DynoWiper is a standalone 32-bit Windows executable that enumerates fixed and removable drives and recursively traverses their contents. It clears file-protection attributes, corrupts files with pseudorandom data generated using the MT19937 Mersenne Twister algorithm, and subsequently deletes targeted files. The analyzed implementation writes a 16-byte buffer at the beginning of each file and, for larger files, at pseudorandom offsets, with up to 4,096 additional overwrite locations per file. It excludes selected system and application directories to preserve host stability during destruction.
Two documented variants differ in their final execution stages. Version A enables the shutdown privilege and forces a reboot after corruption and deletion. Version B omits the reboot function and introduces a five-second delay between corruption and deletion. The analyzed malware has no identified persistence mechanism or command-and-control communications. Its purpose is data destruction rather than ransom-driven encryption.
Attackers distributed destructive payloads within already compromised networks using administrative infrastructure, including Group Policy and network shares. Endpoint behavioral protection blocked DynoWiper activity at the targeted combined heat and power plant, and the wider campaign did not cause widespread power disruption.
Associated threat actors
5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
A custom wiper malware dubbed DYNOWIPER was used to irreversibly destroy data across compromised networks targeting Poland's energy infrastructure.
In this post I’m going over my analysis of DynoWiper, a wiper family that was discovered during attacks against Polish energy companies in late December of 2025.
Although ultimately unsuccessful in causing widespread disruption, the attackers attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a tactic associated with Russian state-backed operations.
Although ultimately unsuccessful in causing widespread disruption, the attackers attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a tactic associated with Russian state-backed operations.
Attackers tried to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a move typically associated with Russian state-backed operations.
Techniques & procedures
27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
5 techniques
Initial Access
VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.
The threat actor reportedly gained initial access through Fortinet FortiGate devices exposed to the internet.
Attackers gained initial access through Fortinet FortiGate devices exposed to the internet ... exploiting ... Historical vulnerabilities in unpatched devices.
A compromised update to Apple’s operating system (iOS-32) for iPhones and iPads reaches users on the European continent and in the United Kingdom... iOS-32 unwittingly includes a new version of the malware DynoWiper
“Initial Access T1566 Phishing” (DynoWiper section).
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Execution Technique Scheduled Task/Job T1053.005 ... Monitor for ... GPO modifications creating scheduled tasks with SYSTEM privileges.
“Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter” (Sicarii section) and “Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter” (DynoWiper section).
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used multiple native Windows functions, such as `GetLogicalDrives` and `FindNextFile` for discovery and file deletion.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)
“Execution T1204 User Execution” (DynoWiper section).
Persistence
3 techniques
Persistence
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Execution Technique Scheduled Task/Job T1053.005 ... Monitor for ... GPO modifications creating scheduled tasks with SYSTEM privileges.
VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.
The threat actor reportedly gained initial access through Fortinet FortiGate devices exposed to the internet.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Execution Technique Scheduled Task/Job T1053.005 ... Monitor for ... GPO modifications creating scheduled tasks with SYSTEM privileges.
VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.
the wiper obtains its own process token using OpenProcessToken() , enables SeShutdownPrivilege through AdjustTokenPrivileges()
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification T1484.001 Distribution of the wiper within the domain via modification of the “Default Domain Policy” GPO
Stealth
7 techniques
Stealth
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has been named after well-known files schtask.exe, schtask2.exe, and <redacted>_update.exe.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)
“Defense Evasion T1070 Indicator Removal” (Sicarii) and “Defense Evasion T1070 Indicator Removal on Host” (DynoWiper).
“removes the files ‘C:\Windows\Temp\manifest.xml’, ‘C:\Windows\Temp\{$backupId}\*’.”
VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.
the wiper obtains its own process token using OpenProcessToken() , enables SeShutdownPrivilege through AdjustTokenPrivileges()
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has utilized a five-second delay using `Sleep(5000)` between two of the three phases of the attack that involves file overwriting, file deletion, and system reboot.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has recursively enumerated directories with the exception of the following: System32, Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), Temp, Recycle.Bin, $Recycle.Bin, Boot, PerfLogs, AppData, Documents and Settings.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)
Defense Impairment
4 techniques
Defense Impairment
Removing file protection attributes via SetFileAttributesW(FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL).
For each applicable file, attributes are cleared with SetFileAttributesW()
Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification T1484.001 Distribution of the wiper within the domain via modification of the “Default Domain Policy” GPO
The incident was later attributed to the Russian state-backed hacking group Sandworm, which attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper data-wiping malware and disable compromised devices.
Discovery
3 techniques
Discovery
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used the Microsoft Windows native `FindFirstFile()` and `FindNextFile()` to recursively enumerate directories and files on the system.(Citation: CERT Polska)
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has enumerated and overwritten files on all removeable and fixed drives.(Citation: ESET DynoWiper JAN 2026)
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used the Microsoft Windows native `GetLogicalDrives()` and `GetDriveType()` functions to enumerate all the drives visible to the system.(Citation: CERT Polska)
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
“Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol” (Sicarii) and “Command and control T1071 Application Layer Protocol” (DynoWiper).
Impact
4 techniques
Impact
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has overwritten files with 16-byte sequences of random data generated by the Mersenne Twister algorithm using the Microsoft Windows native `CreateFileW()` function to open the file and the `SetFilePointerEx()` and `WriteFile()` functions to overwrite the file.(Citation: CERT Polska) Additionally, versions of [DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) can also delete files using the `DeleteFileW` API.(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)
The references include multiple wiper campaigns and destructive malware operations such as NotPetya, SwiftSlicer, AcidRain, AcidPour, and DynoWiper associated with Sandworm/APT44.
[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used the Microsoft Windows native `ExitWindowsEx()` function to log off the interactive user and shutdown the system.(Citation: CERT Polska)
Although ultimately unsuccessful in causing widespread disruption, the attackers attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a tactic associated with Russian state-backed operations.
Observables
13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
54 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.