Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware5 associated actors

DynoWiper

Tracked since Jan 23, 2026 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK27Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
Type
Wiper
Capabilities
Post exploitation
Platforms
Windows

DynoWiper is a destructive Windows malware family identified during coordinated attacks against Poland’s energy sector on December 29, 2025. It was deployed against compromised systems, including human–machine interface workstations, in a campaign targeting renewable-energy facilities and a combined heat and power plant. The broader operation was formally attributed by the United Kingdom and European Union to Russia’s Federal Security Service Centre 16.

DynoWiper is a standalone 32-bit Windows executable that enumerates fixed and removable drives and recursively traverses their contents. It clears file-protection attributes, corrupts files with pseudorandom data generated using the MT19937 Mersenne Twister algorithm, and subsequently deletes targeted files. The analyzed implementation writes a 16-byte buffer at the beginning of each file and, for larger files, at pseudorandom offsets, with up to 4,096 additional overwrite locations per file. It excludes selected system and application directories to preserve host stability during destruction.

Two documented variants differ in their final execution stages. Version A enables the shutdown privilege and forces a reboot after corruption and deletion. Version B omits the reboot function and introduces a five-second delay between corruption and deletion. The analyzed malware has no identified persistence mechanism or command-and-control communications. Its purpose is data destruction rather than ransom-driven encryption.

Attackers distributed destructive payloads within already compromised networks using administrative infrastructure, including Group Policy and network shares. Endpoint behavioral protection blocked DynoWiper activity at the targeted combined heat and power plant, and the wider campaign did not cause widespread power disruption.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Dragonfly

A custom wiper malware dubbed DYNOWIPER was used to irreversibly destroy data across compromised networks targeting Poland's energy infrastructure.

via elastic security labselastic.co
Sandworm

In this post I’m going over my analysis of DynoWiper, a wiper family that was discovered during attacks against Polish energy companies in late December of 2025.

via t0asts blogt0asts.com
FSB

Although ultimately unsuccessful in causing widespread disruption, the attackers attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a tactic associated with Russian state-backed operations.

via scworldscworld.com
Centre 16

Although ultimately unsuccessful in causing widespread disruption, the attackers attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a tactic associated with Russian state-backed operations.

via scworldscworld.com
FSB Centre 16

Attackers tried to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a move typically associated with Russian state-backed operations.

via register securitytheregister.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

27 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The threat actor reportedly gained initial access through Fortinet FortiGate devices exposed to the internet.

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence2

Attackers gained initial access through Fortinet FortiGate devices exposed to the internet ... exploiting ... Historical vulnerabilities in unpatched devices.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

A compromised update to Apple’s operating system (iOS-32) for iPhones and iPads reaches users on the European continent and in the United Kingdom... iOS-32 unwittingly includes a new version of the malware DynoWiper

T1566PhishingEvidence1

“Initial Access T1566 Phishing” (DynoWiper section).

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Execution Technique Scheduled Task/Job T1053.005 ... Monitor for ... GPO modifications creating scheduled tasks with SYSTEM privileges.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

“Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter” (Sicarii section) and “Execution T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter” (DynoWiper section).

T1106Native APIEvidence2

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used multiple native Windows functions, such as `GetLogicalDrives` and `FindNextFile` for discovery and file deletion.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

“Execution T1204 User Execution” (DynoWiper section).

Persistence

3 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Execution Technique Scheduled Task/Job T1053.005 ... Monitor for ... GPO modifications creating scheduled tasks with SYSTEM privileges.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.

T1133External Remote ServicesEvidence1

The threat actor reportedly gained initial access through Fortinet FortiGate devices exposed to the internet.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

MITRE ATT&CK Mapping Tactic Execution Technique Scheduled Task/Job T1053.005 ... Monitor for ... GPO modifications creating scheduled tasks with SYSTEM privileges.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

the wiper obtains its own process token using OpenProcessToken() , enables SeShutdownPrivilege through AdjustTokenPrivileges()

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence3

Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification T1484.001 Distribution of the wiper within the domain via modification of the “Default Domain Policy” GPO

Stealth

7 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has been named after well-known files schtask.exe, schtask2.exe, and <redacted>_update.exe.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

“Defense Evasion T1070 Indicator Removal” (Sicarii) and “Defense Evasion T1070 Indicator Removal on Host” (DynoWiper).

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

“removes the files ‘C:\Windows\Temp\manifest.xml’, ‘C:\Windows\Temp\{$backupId}\*’.”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

VPN interfaces allowing authentication without multi-factor authentication; Reused credentials across multiple facilities.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

the wiper obtains its own process token using OpenProcessToken() , enables SeShutdownPrivilege through AdjustTokenPrivileges()

T1678Delay ExecutionEvidence2

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has utilized a five-second delay using `Sleep(5000)` between two of the three phases of the attack that involves file overwriting, file deletion, and system reboot.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)

T1679Selective ExclusionEvidence2

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has recursively enumerated directories with the exception of the following: System32, Windows, Program Files, Program Files(x86), Temp, Recycle.Bin, $Recycle.Bin, Boot, PerfLogs, AppData, Documents and Settings.(Citation: CERT Polska)(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)

Defense Impairment

4 techniques
T1222File and Directory Permissions ModificationEvidence3

Removing file protection attributes via SetFileAttributesW(FILE_ATTRIBUTE_NORMAL).

T1222.001Windows PermissionsEvidence1

For each applicable file, attributes are cleared with SetFileAttributesW()

T1484.001Group Policy ModificationEvidence3

Domain or Tenant Policy Modification: Group Policy Modification T1484.001 Distribution of the wiper within the domain via modification of the “Default Domain Policy” GPO

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

The incident was later attributed to the Russian state-backed hacking group Sandworm, which attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper data-wiping malware and disable compromised devices.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence4

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used the Microsoft Windows native `FindFirstFile()` and `FindNextFile()` to recursively enumerate directories and files on the system.(Citation: CERT Polska)

T1120Peripheral Device DiscoveryEvidence2

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has enumerated and overwritten files on all removeable and fixed drives.(Citation: ESET DynoWiper JAN 2026)

T1680Local Storage DiscoveryEvidence5

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used the Microsoft Windows native `GetLogicalDrives()` and `GetDriveType()` functions to enumerate all the drives visible to the system.(Citation: CERT Polska)

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

“Command and Control T1071 Application Layer Protocol” (Sicarii) and “Command and control T1071 Application Layer Protocol” (DynoWiper).

Impact

4 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence23

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has overwritten files with 16-byte sequences of random data generated by the Mersenne Twister algorithm using the Microsoft Windows native `CreateFileW()` function to open the file and the `SetFilePointerEx()` and `WriteFile()` functions to overwrite the file.(Citation: CERT Polska) Additionally, versions of [DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) can also delete files using the `DeleteFileW` API.(Citation: ESET DynoWiper Update JAN 2026)

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence2

The references include multiple wiper campaigns and destructive malware operations such as NotPetya, SwiftSlicer, AcidRain, AcidPour, and DynoWiper associated with Sandworm/APT44.

T1529System Shutdown/RebootEvidence7

[DynoWiper](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S9038) has used the Microsoft Windows native `ExitWindowsEx()` function to log off the interactive user and shutdown the system.(Citation: CERT Polska)

T1561Disk WipeEvidence3

Although ultimately unsuccessful in causing widespread disruption, the attackers attempted to deploy the destructive DynoWiper malware, a tactic associated with Russian state-backed operations.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

54 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+49 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping27Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.