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Malware1 associated actor

Harpy

Tracked since Jan 24, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK6Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationReconnaissanceDefense evasion
Delivery
Phishing
Platforms
Windows

Harpy, also referred to as Griffon, is a JavaScript-based backdoor associated with FIN7, also tracked as CARBON SPIDER. It has been used in financially motivated intrusion activity and broader post-compromise operations conducted by the group. Harpy supports resilient command-and-control communications, including use of HTTP with DNS as a fallback channel when the primary method fails, reflecting FIN7’s emphasis on maintaining access in contested environments.

Harpy has been distributed through malicious Microsoft Office documents, including Word documents used in phishing campaigns. In observed 2021 activity, FIN7 used themed lure documents to deliver Harpy to Windows victims. After establishing contact with its command-and-control infrastructure, Harpy was observed receiving and executing a JavaScript system-enumeration module, indicating a role in host discovery and follow-on intrusion enablement.

The malware forms part of FIN7’s broader intrusion toolkit alongside loaders, post-exploitation frameworks, and credential-access tooling. FIN7 has historically targeted sectors such as retail, hospitality, and restaurants, while also expanding into other industries including finance, technology, energy, government, and telecommunications. Within those operations, Harpy functions as a backdoor for persistent remote access and post-exploitation activity on compromised Windows systems.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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FIN7

FIN7's Harpy backdoor malware can use DNS as a backup channel for C2 if HTTP fails.

via mitre attack websiteattack.mitre.org
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

6 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

Le vecteur d’infection principalement employé par FIN7 est le courriel d’hameçonnage. Il contient une pièce jointe malveillante et plus rarement une URL pointant vers des sites compromis ou des services légitimes tels que Google Docs.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Le vecteur d’infection principalement employé par FIN7 est le courriel d’hameçonnage. Il contient une pièce jointe malveillante.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

Harpy (Griffon) ... Porte dérobée Javascript. / Bateleur ... Porte dérobée modulaire.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Les destinataires sont parfois appelés au téléphone par les attaquants et incités à cliquer sur la pièce jointe malveillante et à activer les macros.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

APT41 used the Steam community page as a fallback mechanism for C2. Bazar has the ability to use an alternative C2 server if the primary server fails. BISCUIT malware contains a secondary fallback command and control server that is contacted after the primary command and control server.

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

FIN7's Harpy backdoor malware can use DNS as a backup channel for C2 if HTTP fails. OilRig malware ISMAgent falls back to its DNS tunneling mechanism if it is unable to reach the C2 server over HTTP. QUADAGENT uses multiple protocols (HTTPS, HTTP, DNS) for its C2 server as fallback channels if communication with one is unsuccessful.

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Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping6Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.