Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

TigerDownloader

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 10 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK17Techniques
IOCs37Tracked
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Andariel

We call these the TigerDownloader and TigerRAT families, using names originally introduced by KrCERT.

via threatray blogthreatray.com
Lazarus

We call these the TigerDownloader and TigerRAT families, using names originally introduced by KrCERT.

via threatray blogthreatray.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

17 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1584.006Web ServicesEvidence1

The 2nd stage samples use a domain whereas the 3rd stage samples directly use an IP address.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence2

KISA 보고서 '타겟형 워터링홀 공격전략 분석'에 따르면 공격자는 타겟형 워터링홀 공격을 이용하였으며, 대상 기관이 사용 중인 소프트웨어의 취약점을 이용해 다운로더 악성코드를 설치하였다고 한다.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

Malwarebytes has reported a recent attack targeting South Korea using a malicious Word document.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence1

The table below shows the MITRE ATT&CK Mapping after combining all these attacks/campaigns from previous reports and our analysis.

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

대상 기관이 사용 중인 소프트웨어의 취약점을 이용해 다운로더 악성코드를 설치하였다고 한다.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Malwarebytes has reported a recent attack targeting South Korea using a malicious Word document.

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

사용되는 API와 DLL 이름 등의 문자열을 암호화하여 저장하고 있다... C&C 서버의 주소는 DES ECB 알고리즘을 이용해 인코딩되어 있다.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

악성코드 제작자는 파일 진단을 우회하기 위한 목적으로 각각의 파일들을 패킹하여 유포하고 있다.

T1027.003SteganographyEvidence1

Malwarebytes has reported a recent attack targeting South Korea using a malicious Word document... Malwarebytes discovered a novel downloader component used in the attack.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

RAT VARIANT HTTP HEADER RAT-KrCERT-x64 HTTP 1.1 /index.php?member=sbi2009 SSL3.3.7 RAT-KrCERT-x64, RAT-Kaspersky-x86 HTTP 1.1 /member.php SSL3.4

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

140001bf0 (27/27) anti_analysis_check() ... We could also confirm the presence of junk code to avoid detection technologies.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

감염된 시스템의 사용자 이름, 컴퓨터 이름, MAC 및 IP 정보 등 기본적인 정보를 Base64 인코딩하여 ... C&C 서버에 전송한다.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

감염된 시스템의 사용자 이름, 컴퓨터 이름, MAC 및 IP 정보 등 기본적인 정보를 Base64 인코딩하여 ... C&C 서버에 전송한다.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence1

140001bf0 (27/27) anti_analysis_check() ... We could also confirm the presence of junk code to avoid detection technologies.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

In addition to this protocol change, we have also observed a change in the HTTP header that is sent at the beginning of the communication in the very first request by the RAT-KrCERT-x64 variant.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

해당 악성코드는 외부에서 추가 악성코드를 다운로드 받고 실행하는 기능을 하는 다운로더이다... 해당 악성코드가 NukeSped 악성코드를 직접 다운로드하여 실행한 로그를 확인할 수 있다.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

The decryption scheme is a simple XOR using a 16-byte key... KrCERT reports that the communication is encoded using Base64, which we have also observed in our samples.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

IDENTIFIER ACTION Tiger103 File upload

Indicators of compromise

Observables

37 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching37Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping17Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.