EAGERBEE
- Type
- Backdoor
- Capabilities
- ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injection
- Delivery
- Exploit kit
- Platforms
- Windows
EAGERBEE, also known as Thumtais, is a Windows backdoor framework used in targeted cyberespionage operations against government entities, internet service providers, and other organizations in Asia, the Middle East, and Russia. First observed in 2023, it supports outbound and passive-listening command-and-control modes, optional TLS, proxy-aware communications, host profiling, and in-memory execution of remotely supplied 64-bit PE payloads.
EAGERBEE variants use dynamic API resolution, encrypted or XOR-obfuscated configuration data, mutex-based single-instance control, and memory-resident execution to reduce detection. A service-injector component abuses DLL hijacking and legitimate Windows services to inject the backdoor into service processes. The framework can establish service-based persistence and includes a plugin orchestrator that loads, invokes, unloads, and removes plugins in memory.
Documented plugins provide file and directory enumeration and manipulation, process and service management, network-connection discovery, command-shell execution, payload injection, and remote-access functions including RDP enablement. Some variants can disrupt DNS resolution or communications involving security-vendor infrastructure. EAGERBEE activity has been associated with DLL sideloading, and earlier East Asian intrusions linked EAGERBEE deployment to exploitation of Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 followed by web-shell use.
EAGERBEE has been linked with confidence to China-nexus espionage activity, including REF5961 and Operation Crimson Palace-related activity. Code, infrastructure, and operational overlaps have also been reported with LuckyMouse/APT27, TA428-related tooling, Tonto Team activity, and the CoughingDown threat group; these relationships do not establish exclusive ownership, and the malware appears to have been used by multiple China-based operator groups.
Associated vulnerabilities
1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.
Associated threat actors
7 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Eagerbee is an advanced backdoor malware used in targeted attacks against Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and government entities in the Middle East. It operates primarily in memory and uses a service injector and plugins for persistence, command execution, collection, and C2 communications.
EAGERBEE is a newly identified backdoor discovered by Elastic Security Labs that loads additional capabilities using remotely-downloaded PE files, hosted in C2.
EAGERBEE is a newly identified backdoor discovered by Elastic Security Labs that loads additional capabilities using remotely-downloaded PE files, hosted in C2.
EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。
EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。
EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。
+1 more in the app. View in Mallory
Techniques & procedures
43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Two of these organizations were breached via the infamous ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) in Exchange servers, after which malicious webshells were uploaded and utilized to execute commands on the breached servers.
Execution
5 techniques
Execution
Annex B lists Execution: “T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell.”
c:\programdata\microsoft\vmware\vmnat\vmtools\instsrv.exe vmnattools c:\programdata\microsoft\vmware\vmnat\vmtools\srvany.exe
“Upon installing and running the payload, the service injector targets legitimate windows services ... to write the backdoor payload in memory via DLL hijacking.”
The attackers abused the legitimate Windows services MSDTC, IKEEXT and SessionEnv to execute malicious DLLs: oci.dll, wlbsctrl.dll and TSVIPSrv.dll, respectively.
The attacker created two DLLs (swprvs.dll and appmgmt.dll) and replaced the legitimate Shadow Copy Provider Service and Application Management Service DLL paths in the registry.
Persistence
4 techniques
Persistence
It uses a known technique to try to crash EDR processes, by creating a Registry key named SophosFileScanner.exe in the path SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
Two of these organizations were breached via the infamous ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) in Exchange servers, after which malicious webshells were uploaded and utilized to execute commands on the breached servers.
“The service injector targets legitimate windows services such as ‘Themes’ service, SessionENV, IKEEXT, and MSDTC.” Annex B lists “T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Services.”
Persistence is configured using a Registry Run Key.
Privilege Escalation
4 techniques
Privilege Escalation
“The latest version of EAGERBEE features a novel service injector designed to inject the backdoor into a running service.”
the registry key additions gave the infected service additional unauthorized privileges. Specifically, the actor invoked a series of token privileges, including SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, and SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege ... Another invoked privilege was SeTcbPrivilege
“The service injector targets legitimate windows services such as ‘Themes’ service, SessionENV, IKEEXT, and MSDTC.” Annex B lists “T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Services.”
Persistence is configured using a Registry Run Key.
Stealth
15 techniques
Stealth
The C2 addresses are either hardcoded values or stored in an XOR-encrypted file named c:\users\public\iconcache.mui.
また、この亜種には、コードがVMProtectで難読化されているものや
EAGERBEE dynamically constructs its Import Address Table (IAT) during runtime; RUDEBIRD resolves imports dynamically by walking the TEB/PEB and loaded modules.
When we found the backdoor in the infected system, it was named dllloader1x64.dll.
“EAGERBEE appears on the infected system as ‘dlloader1x64.dll’.” Annex B lists “T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location.”
“The latest version of EAGERBEE features a novel service injector designed to inject the backdoor into a running service.”
change the creation, last access and write time, timestamp of the file to "1/8/2019 9:57"
the registry key additions gave the infected service additional unauthorized privileges. Specifically, the actor invoked a series of token privileges, including SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, and SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege ... Another invoked privilege was SeTcbPrivilege
the HUI loader (msedge_elf.dll), which de-obfuscated the file log.ini to reveal a Cobalt Strike reflective Loader
The sample's operational schedule is controlled by the string '0-5:00:23;6:00:23;' and allows the malware to impose self-restrictions during specific timeframes.
attrib . exe + s + h + a C : \ users \ public \ ntusers0 . dat ... attrib . exe + s + h + a system32 \ tsvipsrv . dll
“Upon installing and running the payload, the service injector targets legitimate windows services ... to write the backdoor payload in memory via DLL hijacking.”
The attackers abused the legitimate Windows services MSDTC, IKEEXT and SessionEnv to execute malicious DLLs: oci.dll, wlbsctrl.dll and TSVIPSrv.dll, respectively.
The attacker created two DLLs (swprvs.dll and appmgmt.dll) and replaced the legitimate Shadow Copy Provider Service and Application Management Service DLL paths in the registry.
EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。
Defense Impairment
2 techniques
Defense Impairment
It uses a known technique to try to crash EDR processes, by creating a Registry key named SophosFileScanner.exe in the path SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\
High prioritization of evasive tactics and tools: ... overwriting ntdll.dll in memory to unhook the Sophos AV agent process from the kernel, abusing AV software for sideloading... Deployment of new EAGERBEE malware variants with updated capability of modifying packets to disrupt security agent network communications.
Credential Access
1 technique
Credential Access
Once connected, the actor harvested credentials using a common technique, “reg save hklm\sam sam”, to target the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) registry hive.
Discovery
9 techniques
Discovery
The backdoor retrieves the proxy host and port information for the current user by reading the registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyServer.
“[Eagerbee] initiates the collection of information such as operating system characteristics and network addresses.” Annex B lists “T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery.”
The module also collects user accounts associated with the processes.
Network Manager This plugin lists the network connections in the system... Get information about the list of IPv4 and IPv6 TCP and UDP connections
Annex B lists Discovery: “T1049 System Network Connections Discovery.”
It then collects details about all running processes on the system, including: Process identifiers; The number of execution threads started by each process; The identifier of the parent process; The fully qualified path of each process executable.
EAGERBEE gathers the computer name, Windows version, GUID, processor architecture, and Windows product/build details. RUDEBIRD enumerates hostname, username, IP address, architecture, and current-user privilege.
This plugin performs a wide range of file system functions, including: Listing drives, files and folders in the system... Get a list of files and folders at a specified location recursively.
The sample's operational schedule is controlled by the string '0-5:00:23;6:00:23;' and allows the malware to impose self-restrictions during specific timeframes.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
0x0B (11) Perform the operations below to enable and persist an RDP session: Set remote desktop services to autostart... Enable remote desktop connections. Enable concurrent (multiple) RDP sessions.
net . exe use \\ << internal ip >> \ c$ < password > / user : < username >
Collection
1 technique
Collection
Upon execution, sensitive data and files were collected from the machine and uploaded to a hard-coded Mongolian government URL ( www.president[.]mn/upload.php ) via cURL.
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
Reverseモードでは、マルウェアが実行されるとコールバック通信を発生させ、感染端末からC2サーバへ接続します。一方、Listenモードでは、感染端末のポートを開放し、C2サーバからの通信を待ち受けます
RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS. EAGERBEE can initialize a proxy by sending a CONNECT request.
Dormant C2 communications via DNS requests and TCP network connections continued for approximately two days.
EAGERBEE detects HTTP proxy configuration through the ProxyEnable and ProxyServer registry keys, then sends a CONNECT request to the configured proxy destination.
Upon establishing a connection to C2, the malware downloads executable files from C2, validates that each executable is 64bit, and executes it.
The optional 's' in EAGERBEE C2 configuration instructs the malware to open SSL; RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Upon execution, sensitive data and files were collected from the machine and uploaded to a hard-coded Mongolian government URL ( www.president[.]mn/upload.php ) via cURL.
Impact
1 technique
Impact
Command Description 0x12 (18) Stop and delete the service.
Observables
76 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.