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Mallory
Malware7 associated actors1 associated CVE

EAGERBEE

Tracked since Jan 25, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors7Associated
ATT&CK43Techniques
IOCs76Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissanceDLL sideloadingProcess injection
Delivery
Exploit kit
Platforms
Windows

EAGERBEE, also known as Thumtais, is a Windows backdoor framework used in targeted cyberespionage operations against government entities, internet service providers, and other organizations in Asia, the Middle East, and Russia. First observed in 2023, it supports outbound and passive-listening command-and-control modes, optional TLS, proxy-aware communications, host profiling, and in-memory execution of remotely supplied 64-bit PE payloads.

EAGERBEE variants use dynamic API resolution, encrypted or XOR-obfuscated configuration data, mutex-based single-instance control, and memory-resident execution to reduce detection. A service-injector component abuses DLL hijacking and legitimate Windows services to inject the backdoor into service processes. The framework can establish service-based persistence and includes a plugin orchestrator that loads, invokes, unloads, and removes plugins in memory.

Documented plugins provide file and directory enumeration and manipulation, process and service management, network-connection discovery, command-shell execution, payload injection, and remote-access functions including RDP enablement. Some variants can disrupt DNS resolution or communications involving security-vendor infrastructure. EAGERBEE activity has been associated with DLL sideloading, and earlier East Asian intrusions linked EAGERBEE deployment to exploitation of Microsoft Exchange ProxyLogon vulnerability CVE-2021-26855 followed by web-shell use.

EAGERBEE has been linked with confidence to China-nexus espionage activity, including REF5961 and Operation Crimson Palace-related activity. Code, infrastructure, and operational overlaps have also been reported with LuckyMouse/APT27, TA428-related tooling, Tonto Team activity, and the CoughingDown threat group; these relationships do not establish exclusive ownership, and the malware appears to have been used by multiple China-based operator groups.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-26855via securelistExploited in the wildProxyLogon SSRF in Microsoft Exchange ServerTwo of these organizations were breached via the infamous ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) in Exchange servers, after which malicious webshells were uploaded and utilized to execute commands on the breached servers. | In our recent investigation into the EAGERBEE backdoor, we found that it was being deployed at ISPs and governmental entities in the Middle East.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

7 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
CoughingDown APT

Eagerbee is an advanced backdoor malware used in targeted attacks against Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and government entities in the Middle East. It operates primarily in memory and uses a service injector and plugins for persistence, command execution, collection, and C2 communications.

via imda singaporeimda.gov.sg
REF5961

EAGERBEE is a newly identified backdoor discovered by Elastic Security Labs that loads additional capabilities using remotely-downloaded PE files, hosted in C2.

via elastic security labselastic.co
REF2924

EAGERBEE is a newly identified backdoor discovered by Elastic Security Labs that loads additional capabilities using remotely-downloaded PE files, hosted in C2.

via elastic security labselastic.co
TA428

EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。

via lac watchlac.co.jp
Tonto

EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。

via lac watchlac.co.jp
Threat Group-3390

EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。

via lac watchlac.co.jp

+1 more in the app. View in Mallory

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

43 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

Two of these organizations were breached via the infamous ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) in Exchange servers, after which malicious webshells were uploaded and utilized to execute commands on the breached servers.

Execution

5 techniques
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence3

Annex B lists Execution: “T1059.003 Command and Scripting Interpreter: Windows Command Shell.”

T1569.002Service ExecutionEvidence1

c:\programdata\microsoft\vmware\vmnat\vmtools\instsrv.exe vmnattools c:\programdata\microsoft\vmware\vmnat\vmtools\srvany.exe

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

“Upon installing and running the payload, the service injector targets legitimate windows services ... to write the backdoor payload in memory via DLL hijacking.”

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The attackers abused the legitimate Windows services MSDTC, IKEEXT and SessionEnv to execute malicious DLLs: oci.dll, wlbsctrl.dll and TSVIPSrv.dll, respectively.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The attacker created two DLLs (swprvs.dll and appmgmt.dll) and replaced the legitimate Shadow Copy Provider Service and Application Management Service DLL paths in the registry.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

It uses a known technique to try to crash EDR processes, by creating a Registry key named SophosFileScanner.exe in the path SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\

T1505.003Web ShellEvidence1

Two of these organizations were breached via the infamous ProxyLogon vulnerability (CVE-2021-26855) in Exchange servers, after which malicious webshells were uploaded and utilized to execute commands on the breached servers.

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

“The service injector targets legitimate windows services such as ‘Themes’ service, SessionENV, IKEEXT, and MSDTC.” Annex B lists “T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Services.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence is configured using a Registry Run Key.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

“The latest version of EAGERBEE features a novel service injector designed to inject the backdoor into a running service.”

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

the registry key additions gave the infected service additional unauthorized privileges. Specifically, the actor invoked a series of token privileges, including SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, and SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege ... Another invoked privilege was SeTcbPrivilege

T1543.003Windows ServiceEvidence4

“The service injector targets legitimate windows services such as ‘Themes’ service, SessionENV, IKEEXT, and MSDTC.” Annex B lists “T1543.003 Create or Modify System Process: Windows Services.”

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

Persistence is configured using a Registry Run Key.

Stealth

15 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

The C2 addresses are either hardcoded values or stored in an XOR-encrypted file named c:\users\public\iconcache.mui.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

また、この亜種には、コードがVMProtectで難読化されているものや

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

EAGERBEE dynamically constructs its Import Address Table (IAT) during runtime; RUDEBIRD resolves imports dynamically by walking the TEB/PEB and loaded modules.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

When we found the backdoor in the infected system, it was named dllloader1x64.dll.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

“EAGERBEE appears on the infected system as ‘dlloader1x64.dll’.” Annex B lists “T1036.005 Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location.”

T1055Process InjectionEvidence4

“The latest version of EAGERBEE features a novel service injector designed to inject the backdoor into a running service.”

T1070.006TimestompEvidence1

change the creation, last access and write time, timestamp of the file to "1/8/2019 9:57"

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

the registry key additions gave the infected service additional unauthorized privileges. Specifically, the actor invoked a series of token privileges, including SeBackupPrivilege, SeRestorePrivilege, and SeTakeOwnershipPrivilege ... Another invoked privilege was SeTcbPrivilege

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

the HUI loader (msedge_elf.dll), which de-obfuscated the file log.ini to reveal a Cobalt Strike reflective Loader

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The sample's operational schedule is controlled by the string '0-5:00:23;6:00:23;' and allows the malware to impose self-restrictions during specific timeframes.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

attrib . exe + s + h + a C : \ users \ public \ ntusers0 . dat ... attrib . exe + s + h + a system32 \ tsvipsrv . dll

T1574.001DLLEvidence5

“Upon installing and running the payload, the service injector targets legitimate windows services ... to write the backdoor payload in memory via DLL hijacking.”

T1574.010Services File Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The attackers abused the legitimate Windows services MSDTC, IKEEXT and SessionEnv to execute malicious DLLs: oci.dll, wlbsctrl.dll and TSVIPSrv.dll, respectively.

T1574.011Services Registry Permissions WeaknessEvidence1

The attacker created two DLLs (swprvs.dll and appmgmt.dll) and replaced the legitimate Shadow Copy Provider Service and Application Management Service DLL paths in the registry.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

EAGERBEEは、Microsoft Visual C/C++で開発されたダウンローダ型マルウェアであり、C2サーバからダウンロードしたファイルをメモリ上で実行する機能を備えています。

Defense Impairment

2 techniques
T1112Modify RegistryEvidence2

It uses a known technique to try to crash EDR processes, by creating a Registry key named SophosFileScanner.exe in the path SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows NT\CurrentVersion\Image File Execution Options\

T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence3

High prioritization of evasive tactics and tools: ... overwriting ntdll.dll in memory to unhook the Sophos AV agent process from the kernel, abusing AV software for sideloading... Deployment of new EAGERBEE malware variants with updated capability of modifying packets to disrupt security agent network communications.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1003.002Security Account ManagerEvidence1

Once connected, the actor harvested credentials using a common technique, “reg save hklm\sam sam”, to target the Security Accounts Manager (SAM) registry hive.

Discovery

9 techniques
T1012Query RegistryEvidence1

The backdoor retrieves the proxy host and port information for the current user by reading the registry key Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Internet Settings\ProxyServer.

T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence1

“[Eagerbee] initiates the collection of information such as operating system characteristics and network addresses.” Annex B lists “T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery.”

T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

The module also collects user accounts associated with the processes.

T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

Network Manager This plugin lists the network connections in the system... Get information about the list of IPv4 and IPv6 TCP and UDP connections

T1049System Network Connections DiscoveryEvidence1

Annex B lists Discovery: “T1049 System Network Connections Discovery.”

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

It then collects details about all running processes on the system, including: Process identifiers; The number of execution threads started by each process; The identifier of the parent process; The fully qualified path of each process executable.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence3

EAGERBEE gathers the computer name, Windows version, GUID, processor architecture, and Windows product/build details. RUDEBIRD enumerates hostname, username, IP address, architecture, and current-user privilege.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

This plugin performs a wide range of file system functions, including: Listing drives, files and folders in the system... Get a list of files and folders at a specified location recursively.

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

The sample's operational schedule is controlled by the string '0-5:00:23;6:00:23;' and allows the malware to impose self-restrictions during specific timeframes.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

0x0B (11) Perform the operations below to enable and persist an RDP session: Set remote desktop services to autostart... Enable remote desktop connections. Enable concurrent (multiple) RDP sessions.

T1021.002SMB/Windows Admin SharesEvidence1

net . exe use \\ << internal ip >> \ c$ < password > / user : < username >

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Upon execution, sensitive data and files were collected from the machine and uploaded to a hard-coded Mongolian government URL ( www.president[.]mn/upload.php ) via cURL.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Reverseモードでは、マルウェアが実行されるとコールバック通信を発生させ、感染端末からC2サーバへ接続します。一方、Listenモードでは、感染端末のポートを開放し、C2サーバからの通信を待ち受けます

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS. EAGERBEE can initialize a proxy by sending a CONNECT request.

T1071.004DNSEvidence1

Dormant C2 communications via DNS requests and TCP network connections continued for approximately two days.

T1090ProxyEvidence2

EAGERBEE detects HTTP proxy configuration through the ProxyEnable and ProxyServer registry keys, then sends a CONNECT request to the configured proxy destination.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

Upon establishing a connection to C2, the malware downloads executable files from C2, validates that each executable is 64bit, and executes it.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

The optional 's' in EAGERBEE C2 configuration instructs the malware to open SSL; RUDEBIRD communicates using HTTPS.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Upon execution, sensitive data and files were collected from the machine and uploaded to a hard-coded Mongolian government URL ( www.president[.]mn/upload.php ) via cURL.

Impact

1 technique
T1489Service StopEvidence1

Command Description 0x12 (18) Stop and delete the service.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

76 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching76Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors7Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping43Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.