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MalwareUsed by 1 actor

ZOV

ZOV is a destructive wiper malware family attributed by ESET to the Russia-aligned Sandworm threat group with high confidence. It has been used against Ukrainian targets, including a Ukrainian energy company on January 25, 2024, and a financial institution in Ukraine in November 2025. Reporting states that ZOV wipes files on fixed drives, skips specific directories, and uses size-based overwrite logic. ESET also notes that Sandworm typically deploys ZOV via Active Directory Group Policy using a PowerShell deployment script from a shared network directory, an approach that generally requires Domain Admin privileges. ZOV is described as closely related in tactics and coding patterns to the later DynoWiper malware, with analysts highlighting strong similarities between the two families. The available content does not provide specific ZOV file hashes or broader IOC sets beyond these behavioral characteristics and victimology.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

ESET attributes the malware to the Russia-aligned threat group Sandworm with medium confidence, noting shared tactics and coding patterns with previous destructive wiper families like ZOV.

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MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Impact

1 technique
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1

Designed to overwrite files and force a system reboot, DynoWiper erases data across removable and fixed drives, rendering systems inoperable if unprotected.

What this page doesn’t show

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IOC matching

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Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping1

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.