Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

SUGARLOADER

Tracked since Feb 10, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK24Techniques
IOCs21Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
Clickfix
Platforms
macOS

SUGARLOADER is a C++ macOS downloader associated with financially motivated UNC1069 activity and also observed in DPRK-linked intrusions with overlaps to Lazarus Group tradecraft. It uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obtain command-and-control settings, supports primary and fallback servers, retrieves next-stage Mach-O payloads, and can execute them directly from memory through reflective loading. SUGARLOADER has delivered KANDYKORN in cryptocurrency-sector targeting and CHROMEPUSH in intrusions against cryptocurrency and financial-technology organizations. It has been deployed in multi-stage, socially engineered infections involving fake meeting lures and ClickFix-style user execution. Observed persistence mechanisms include a manually created macOS launch daemon and use alongside a Discord-application hijacking component. SUGARLOADER employs packing, control-flow obfuscation, and in-memory unpacking to hinder analysis.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Lazarus

SUGARLOADER connects to C2, creates or decrypts its RC4-encrypted configuration, downloads KANDYKORN, and executes it directly in memory using reflective binary loading.

via elastic security labselastic.co
APT38

SUGARLOADER is a downloader written in C++ historically associated with UNC1069 intrusions. Based on the observations from this intrusion, SUGARLOADER was solely used to deploy CHROMEPUSH.

via mandiant threat intelligencecloud.google.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

By leveraging social media platforms like Discord with enticing lures, these actors are finding new paths into highly targeted environments.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

"The meeting link is designed to redirect the victim to a fake website masquerading as Zoom (\"zoom.uswe05[.]us\")." ... "using Telegram’s hyperlink feature to hide the phishing URLs."

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence2

Further analysis revealed that the intrusion began with a Python application disguised as a cryptocurrency arbitrage bot, which was distributed through a direct message on a public Discord server.

Execution

3 techniques
T1106Native APIEvidence1

SUGARLOADER uses this to retrieve and execute the KANDYKORN remote access trojan in-memory via NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory and NSLinkModule.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence4

A Discord user is socially engineered into downloading a malicious Python application, Cross-Platform Bridges.zip.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence3

The legitimate binary /Applications/Discord.app/Contents/MacOS/Discord was renamed to .lock, and replaced by HLOADER.

Persistence

1 technique
T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence2

“Persistence was achieved via a manually configured launch daemon for SUGARLOADER… masquerading as a system updater.”

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1543.004Launch DaemonEvidence2

“Persistence was achieved via a manually configured launch daemon for SUGARLOADER… masquerading as a system updater.”

Stealth

8 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

Numerous junk instructions, opaque predicates and indirect jumps in memory are present within the packed code, complicating the analysis of the unpacking process.

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

SUGARLOADER... is obfuscated using a binary packer... code used to unpack the binary in memory.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The victim believed they were installing an arbitrage bot, a software tool designed to profit from cryptocurrency rate differences between platforms.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

When the breakpoint is hit, the code will already be decrypted in memory... The configuration file is encrypted using RC4... read into memory and decrypted.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

When the malware first connects to the C2 server during the initialization phase, a handshake must be validated to proceed.

T1564.001Hidden Files and DirectoriesEvidence1

FinderTools... download[s] and execut[es] a hidden second stage payload .sld... The second instance... renamed to .log.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence3

The legitimate binary /Applications/Discord.app/Contents/MacOS/Discord was renamed to .lock, and replaced by HLOADER.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence3

SUGARLOADER... download[s] a final stage payload... and execute[s] it directly in memory... leveraging APIs such as NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory or NSLinkModule.

Credential Access

3 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The goal was credential harvesting and financial theft, facilitated by multiple malware families including WAVESHAPER and SUGARLOADER.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

“…keystroke logging…”

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

“…credential and browser data theft…”

Discovery

2 techniques
T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

Written in C++, SUGARLOADER checks for the existence of a configuration file at /Library/Caches/com.apple.safari.ck and downloads it from a remote C2 if missing.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

When the malware first connects to the C2 server during the initialization phase, a handshake must be validated to proceed.

Collection

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The goal was credential harvesting and financial theft, facilitated by multiple malware families including WAVESHAPER and SUGARLOADER.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

“…keystroke logging…”

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1008Fallback ChannelsEvidence1

It supports two C2 servers, one as the main server, and the second one as a fallback.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

Operating covertly, KANDYKORN employs a feature-rich multi-staged loader paired with a custom network protocol to facilitate a range of post-compromise activities.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The decrypted SUGARLOADER configuration for the sample analysed by Mandiant included the following C&C servers: breakdream[.]com:443 dreamdie[.]com:443

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence8

Watcher.py... fetches content from [a] Google Drive URL... written into the testSpeed.py file. testSpeed.py... fetches another Python file... FinderTools... downloading and executing... .sld.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence2

Both KANDYKORN and SUGARLOADER use the RC4 algorithm to encrypt their communications.

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

All the data is encrypted with RC4 and uses the same key previously referenced in the configuration file.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

21 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching21Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping24Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.