SUGARLOADER
- Type
- Downloader
- Capabilities
- PersistenceDefense evasion
- Delivery
- Clickfix
- Platforms
- macOS
SUGARLOADER is a C++ macOS downloader associated with financially motivated UNC1069 activity and also observed in DPRK-linked intrusions with overlaps to Lazarus Group tradecraft. It uses an RC4-encrypted configuration to obtain command-and-control settings, supports primary and fallback servers, retrieves next-stage Mach-O payloads, and can execute them directly from memory through reflective loading. SUGARLOADER has delivered KANDYKORN in cryptocurrency-sector targeting and CHROMEPUSH in intrusions against cryptocurrency and financial-technology organizations. It has been deployed in multi-stage, socially engineered infections involving fake meeting lures and ClickFix-style user execution. Observed persistence mechanisms include a manually created macOS launch daemon and use alongside a Discord-application hijacking component. SUGARLOADER employs packing, control-flow obfuscation, and in-memory unpacking to hinder analysis.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
SUGARLOADER connects to C2, creates or decrypts its RC4-encrypted configuration, downloads KANDYKORN, and executes it directly in memory using reflective binary loading.
SUGARLOADER is a downloader written in C++ historically associated with UNC1069 intrusions. Based on the observations from this intrusion, SUGARLOADER was solely used to deploy CHROMEPUSH.
Techniques & procedures
24 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
By leveraging social media platforms like Discord with enticing lures, these actors are finding new paths into highly targeted environments.
"The meeting link is designed to redirect the victim to a fake website masquerading as Zoom (\"zoom.uswe05[.]us\")." ... "using Telegram’s hyperlink feature to hide the phishing URLs."
Further analysis revealed that the intrusion began with a Python application disguised as a cryptocurrency arbitrage bot, which was distributed through a direct message on a public Discord server.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
SUGARLOADER uses this to retrieve and execute the KANDYKORN remote access trojan in-memory via NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory and NSLinkModule.
A Discord user is socially engineered into downloading a malicious Python application, Cross-Platform Bridges.zip.
The legitimate binary /Applications/Discord.app/Contents/MacOS/Discord was renamed to .lock, and replaced by HLOADER.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
“Persistence was achieved via a manually configured launch daemon for SUGARLOADER… masquerading as a system updater.”
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
“Persistence was achieved via a manually configured launch daemon for SUGARLOADER… masquerading as a system updater.”
Stealth
8 techniques
Stealth
Numerous junk instructions, opaque predicates and indirect jumps in memory are present within the packed code, complicating the analysis of the unpacking process.
SUGARLOADER... is obfuscated using a binary packer... code used to unpack the binary in memory.
The victim believed they were installing an arbitrage bot, a software tool designed to profit from cryptocurrency rate differences between platforms.
When the breakpoint is hit, the code will already be decrypted in memory... The configuration file is encrypted using RC4... read into memory and decrypted.
When the malware first connects to the C2 server during the initialization phase, a handshake must be validated to proceed.
FinderTools... download[s] and execut[es] a hidden second stage payload .sld... The second instance... renamed to .log.
The legitimate binary /Applications/Discord.app/Contents/MacOS/Discord was renamed to .lock, and replaced by HLOADER.
SUGARLOADER... download[s] a final stage payload... and execute[s] it directly in memory... leveraging APIs such as NSCreateObjectFileImageFromMemory or NSLinkModule.
Credential Access
3 techniques
Credential Access
The goal was credential harvesting and financial theft, facilitated by multiple malware families including WAVESHAPER and SUGARLOADER.
“…keystroke logging…”
“…credential and browser data theft…”
Discovery
2 techniques
Discovery
Written in C++, SUGARLOADER checks for the existence of a configuration file at /Library/Caches/com.apple.safari.ck and downloads it from a remote C2 if missing.
When the malware first connects to the C2 server during the initialization phase, a handshake must be validated to proceed.
Collection
2 techniques
Collection
The goal was credential harvesting and financial theft, facilitated by multiple malware families including WAVESHAPER and SUGARLOADER.
“…keystroke logging…”
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
It supports two C2 servers, one as the main server, and the second one as a fallback.
Operating covertly, KANDYKORN employs a feature-rich multi-staged loader paired with a custom network protocol to facilitate a range of post-compromise activities.
The decrypted SUGARLOADER configuration for the sample analysed by Mandiant included the following C&C servers: breakdream[.]com:443 dreamdie[.]com:443
Watcher.py... fetches content from [a] Google Drive URL... written into the testSpeed.py file. testSpeed.py... fetches another Python file... FinderTools... downloading and executing... .sld.
Both KANDYKORN and SUGARLOADER use the RC4 algorithm to encrypt their communications.
All the data is encrypted with RC4 and uses the same key previously referenced in the configuration file.
Observables
21 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.