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Malware2 associated actors

WAVESHAPER

Tracked since Feb 10, 2026 · Updated 5 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK26Techniques
IOCs25Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ReconnaissancePost exploitationExfiltrationPersistenceDefense evasion
Delivery
ClickfixFake updateLure
Platforms
macOSLinuxWindows

WAVESHAPER is a backdoor family associated with UNC1069, a financially motivated North Korea-linked threat cluster targeting cryptocurrency businesses, financial technology organizations, developers, and open-source software maintainers. The original malware is a C++ backdoor targeting macOS and Linux. It gathers host information, communicates with command-and-control infrastructure over HTTP or HTTPS using the curl library, and downloads and executes additional payloads. In macOS intrusions, it has deployed HYPERCALL, a Go-based downloader that extends the infection chain with additional backdoors and data-stealing tools.

WAVESHAPER has been delivered through social engineering involving impersonated business contacts, compromised messaging accounts, and fraudulent video meetings. Fake audio problems and software-update prompts induce victims to execute troubleshooting commands or install malicious software. These operations support credential harvesting and financial theft.

WAVESHAPER.V2 extends the family with C++ macOS, PowerShell Windows, and Python Linux implementations. It was deployed in the 2026 Axios npm supply-chain compromise through a malicious dependency whose installation hook executed the SILKBELL dropper. The variants share a command-and-control protocol using Base64-encoded JSON over HTTP POST and approximately 60-second polling intervals. They collect system and process information, enumerate directories, execute operator-supplied commands or scripts, and execute additional binary payloads. The Windows variant can reflectively load .NET assemblies and establish persistence through an autorun mechanism; the macOS and Linux variants lack native persistence mechanisms. Both generations accept command-and-control configuration through command-line arguments and use a distinctive legacy browser user-agent string.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT38

The macOS Mach-O binary delivered by the plain-crypto-js postinstall hook exhibits significant overlap with WAVESHAPER, a C++ backdoor tracked by Mandiant and attributed to UNC1069.

via elastic security labselastic.co
Lazarus

Based on the above attribution analysis, we assess that the com.apple.act.mond trojan used in the current incident is the WAVESHAPER trojan, and that the threat organization behind it is the Lazarus APT Group.

via threatbook blogthreatbook.io
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

26 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

5 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence13

In this attack, Lazarus hijacked an Axios maintainer account to publish malicious versions, covertly planting the malicious dependency plain-crypto-js@4.2.1.

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence2

Компрометация publishing identity - кража npm-токена или GitHub PAT (T1195.001, Initial Access)

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

Публикация вредоносной версии пакета в registry (T1195.002, Initial Access)

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

"The meeting link is designed to redirect the victim to a fake website masquerading as Zoom (\"zoom.uswe05[.]us\")." ... "using Telegram’s hyperlink feature to hide the phishing URLs."

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence5

The trojan's main function supports parsing C2 commands and executing the corresponding basic remote control functions: process termination, shell execution, process injection (DoActionIjt), script execution (DoRunScpt / DoActionScpt)...

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence5

At that point, the victim is prompted to fix the issue, either by clicking a link that downloads a malicious AppleScript or by running a command pasted into the terminal.

T1059.006PythonEvidence2

Linux: Python RAT загружался в /tmp/ld.py и запускался через nohup для persistence (T1059.006 - Python, Execution)

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence2

The package.json introduces a postinstall trigger that executes the malicious setup.js file. The setup.js that runs is obfuscated JavaScript code.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence7

This package uses a postinstall hook to automatically execute a script that downloads a remote access trojan, enabling device compromise and data theft.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

The axios npm compromise (March 30-31, malicious versions 1.14.1 and 0.30.4) has received formal attribution.

T1204.005Malicious LibraryEvidence1

Автоматическое выполнение через postinstall hooks или import-time код (T1204.005 - Malicious Library, Execution)

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The trojan's main function supports parsing C2 commands and executing the corresponding basic remote control functions: process termination, shell execution, process injection (DoActionIjt)...

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

The setup.js that runs is obfuscated JavaScript code.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Windows ( %PROGRAMDATA%\wt.exe )

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The trojan's main function supports parsing C2 commands and executing the corresponding basic remote control functions: process termination, shell execution, process injection (DoActionIjt)...

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

Every artifact was designed to self-destruct... The dropper contacts a live command-and-control server... then erases itself and replaces its own package.json with a clean decoy.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

It was part of a coordinated, scalable attack pattern aimed at high-trust, high-impact open source maintainers.

Credential Access

2 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The goal was credential harvesting and financial theft, facilitated by multiple malware families including WAVESHAPER and SUGARLOADER.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

The malware can exfiltrate .npmrc tokens, browser session cookies, AWS credentials, keychain contents, and anything else stored on the machine.

Discovery

3 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

After the trojan runs with the C2_url, it first collects basic host information including hostname, username, OS type and version, CPU information, system time, and the user process list.

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence6

After the trojan runs with the C2_url, it first collects basic host information including hostname, username, OS type and version, CPU information, system time, and the user process list.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

The trojan's main function supports parsing C2 commands and executing the corresponding basic remote control functions: ... and collection of directory information from specified paths (DoActionDir).

Collection

1 technique
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

The goal was credential harvesting and financial theft, facilitated by multiple malware families including WAVESHAPER and SUGARLOADER.

Command and Control

4 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence11

It then beacons to the C2 provided in the parameters — http://sfrclak.com:8000/6202033 — using the hardcoded UA: mozilla/4.0 (compatible; msie 8.0; windows nt 5.1; trident/4.0).

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

Recommended action: Organizations that installed axios v1.14.1 or v0.30.4 should check for platform-specific IOCs... Block C2 domain sfrclak[.]com and IP 142.11.206[.]73.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

The function of this JS file is to detect the platform of the host, use the relevant packages.npm.org/ URL as a parameter to download the payload appropriate for the host system, and execute the download of the subsequent trojan carrying the attacker's C2_url parameter.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence3

Google described WAVESHAPER.V2 as a “fully functional RAT”, capable of reconnaissance, command execution... and system enumeration

Indicators of compromise

Observables

25 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching25Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping26Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.