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Malware2 associated actors

CHROMEPUSH

Tracked since Feb 10, 2026 · Updated 5 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs2Tracked

CHROMEPUSH is a C++ data-stealing malware family deployed in UNC1069 intrusions, assessed in the provided content as DPRK-linked and financially motivated, particularly against cryptocurrency and FinTech targets. It is described as a malicious browser extension stealer targeting Chromium-based browsers, specifically Google Chrome and Brave. CHROMEPUSH masquerades as a Google Docs Offline editing tool and installs as a Chromium native messaging host for persistence. Reported installation artifacts include copying itself to %HOME%/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/NativeMessagingHosts/Google Chrome Docs and creating a manifest file named com.google.docs.offline.json in the same NativeMessagingHosts directory. The malware collects keystrokes, username and password inputs, browser cookies, and browser login data, uploads stolen data to a web server, and in some reporting may optionally capture screenshots and exfiltrate data via HTTP POST. In the observed macOS intrusion chain, SUGARLOADER, a C++ downloader, was used solely to deploy CHROMEPUSH. The malware was part of a broader toolset that also included WAVESHAPER, HYPERCALL, DEEPBREATH, and SILENCELIFT, used for deep and persistent compromise of individual machines.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT38

Their tooling, including the WAVESHAPER backdoor, HYPERCALL downloader, DEEPBREATH data miner, and CHROMEPUSH browser extension stealer, was designed for deep, persistent compromise of individual machines.

via socket blogsocket.dev
Lazarus

...several new malware families, such as... CHROMEPUSH... CHROMEPUSH also acts as a data stealer... deployed as a browser extension to Google Chrome and Brave browsers by masquerading as a tool for editing Google Docs offline.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

"The meeting link is designed to redirect the victim to a fake website masquerading as Zoom (\"zoom.uswe05[.]us\")." ... "using Telegram’s hyperlink feature to hide the phishing URLs."

Execution

2 techniques
T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

"...a social engineering scheme involving a compromised Telegram account, a fake Zoom meeting, a ClickFix infection vector, and reported usage of AI-generated video to deceive the victim."

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

"trick the victim into running commands that installed multiple backdoors"

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

T1176Software ExtensionsEvidence3

CHROMEPUSH... installs itself as a browser extension targeting Chromium-based browsers, such as Google Chrome and Brave, to collect keystrokes, username and password inputs, and browser cookies | CHROMEPUSH establishes persistence by installing itself as a native messaging host for Chromium-based browsers. For Google Chrome, CHROMEPUSH copies itself to %HOME%/Library/Application Support/Google/Chrome/NativeMessagingHosts/Google Chrome Docs and creates a corresponding manifest file, com.google.docs.offline.json, in the same directory.

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

"CHROMEPUSH establishes persistence by installing itself as a native messaging host for Chromium-based browsers... copies itself to .../NativeMessagingHosts/... and creates a corresponding manifest file"

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

T1546.003Windows Management Instrumentation Event SubscriptionEvidence1

"CHROMEPUSH establishes persistence by installing itself as a native messaging host for Chromium-based browsers... copies itself to .../NativeMessagingHosts/... and creates a corresponding manifest file"

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

“installs as a Chromium native messaging host masquerading as a Google Docs Offline extension”

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

With that access, publishing a malicious package to npm requires no additional authentication bypass.

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

It was part of a coordinated, scalable attack pattern aimed at high-trust, high-impact open source maintainers.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

CHROMEPUSH... installs itself as a browser extension targeting Chromium-based browsers, such as Google Chrome and Brave, to collect keystrokes, username and password inputs, and browser cookies

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

Browser Data: Copies cookies, login data, and local extension settings from major browsers including Google Chrome, Brave, and Microsoft Edge across all user profiles

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

The malware can exfiltrate .npmrc tokens, browser session cookies, AWS credentials, keychain contents, and anything else stored on the machine.

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

"steal ... data from Google Chrome, Brave, and Microsoft Edge" ... "extract browser cookies"

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence6

CHROMEPUSH... installs itself as a browser extension targeting Chromium-based browsers, such as Google Chrome and Brave, to collect keystrokes, username and password inputs, and browser cookies

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence2

“potentially record screenshots before exfiltrating via HTTP POST.”

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence4

The URLs are queried to download the next stage of the infection; if the first URL responds with a suitable executable payload, then the second URL is not queried.

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

“exfiltrated using curl… exfiltrating via HTTP POST.”

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

CHROMEPUSH... collect[s] keystrokes, username and password inputs, and browser cookies, which it uploads to a web server.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

2 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching2Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.