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Malware2 associated actors

HYPERCALL

Tracked since Feb 10, 2026 · Updated 8 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

HYPERCALL is a Golang/Go-based downloader and backdoor component used by the DPRK-nexus threat actor UNC1069, also tracked as CryptoCore and MASAN, in financially motivated intrusions targeting the cryptocurrency and broader Web3 sector. It has been observed in social-engineering-driven compromise chains in which victims are lured through fake Zoom or meeting workflows, including ClickFix-style troubleshooting prompts, leading to malware execution on macOS. Mandiant reporting describes HYPERCALL as one of the initial malicious files deployed alongside WAVESHAPER, where it is used to expand the attacker’s foothold and serve additional payloads.

Its documented behavior includes reading an RC4-encrypted configuration, connecting to command-and-control infrastructure over WebSockets on TCP 443, downloading malicious dynamic libraries from C2, and reflectively loading those libraries into memory. In observed UNC1069 operations, HYPERCALL was used to deliver additional malware including HIDDENCALL, a Golang backdoor providing interactive access, and DEEPBREATH, a Swift-based data theft component. The broader intrusion set associated with HYPERCALL also included WAVESHAPER, SUGARLOADER, SILENCELIFT, and CHROMEPUSH.

The malware has been linked to intrusions against cryptocurrency-sector organizations and individuals, including a FinTech victim, as part of campaigns aimed at credential theft, browser/session theft, and ultimately cryptocurrency theft and follow-on social engineering. High-confidence associated behaviors from the surrounding intrusion include theft of Keychain credentials, browser artifacts from Chrome, Brave, and Edge, Telegram data, Apple Notes data, cookies, and keystrokes by companion tooling. No standalone IOC set for HYPERCALL beyond its RC4-encrypted configuration handling, WebSocket C2 over TCP 443, and reflective DLL loading is provided in the source content.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT38

Their tooling, including the WAVESHAPER backdoor, HYPERCALL downloader, DEEPBREATH data miner, and CHROMEPUSH browser extension stealer, was designed for deep, persistent compromise of individual machines.

via socket blogsocket.dev
Lazarus

...distribute a Go-based downloader codenamed HYPERCALL, which is then used to serve additional payloads...

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

The fake meeting infrastructure is built to look genuine. Attackers use real SDKs and CSS from platforms like Zoom and Microsoft Teams to recreate the interface. The call appears in-browser, with no application to install, until the audio 'fails.'

T1566PhishingEvidence1

It began on March 5 with a LinkedIn message from someone posing as a representative of Openfort. After exchanging messages, he was invited into two separate Slack workspaces by two different personas.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

"The meeting link is designed to redirect the victim to a fake website masquerading as Zoom (\"zoom.uswe05[.]us\")." ... "using Telegram’s hyperlink feature to hide the phishing URLs."

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

When Wessman refused to run the app, the attackers made a last-ditch attempt to get him to run a curl command in his terminal, then went dark and deleted all conversations.

T1059.002AppleScriptEvidence1

At that point, the victim is prompted to fix the issue, either by clicking a link that downloads a malicious AppleScript or by running a command pasted into the terminal.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence4

At that point, the victim is prompted to fix the issue, either by clicking a link that downloads a malicious AppleScript or by running a command pasted into the terminal.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

"trick the victim into running commands that installed multiple backdoors"

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

“after RC4 decryption of configuration data… SUGARLOADER, configured with an RC4-encrypted file…”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

“HYPERCALL… reflectively loads dynamic libraries from C2 servers after RC4 decryption of configuration data.”

T1684.001ImpersonationEvidence1

It was part of a coordinated, scalable attack pattern aimed at high-trust, high-impact open source maintainers.

Credential Access

1 technique
T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

"designed to vacuum up everything from browser data to Telegram messages and Apple Notes"

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

“the commands downloaded and executed an initial payload… facilitating deployment of HYPERCALL… [which] loads dynamic libraries from C2 servers…”

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Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.