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Malware2 associated actors

WezRat

Tracked since Feb 23, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK12Techniques
IOCs3Tracked

WezRat is a custom, purpose-built modular information stealer associated with the Iranian threat actor Emennet Pasargad, also tracked as Cotton Sandstorm and Haywire Kitten. Reporting in the provided content states that the group routinely delivers WezRat via spearphishing campaigns masquerading as urgent software updates, and that it was deployed in intrusions in the months leading up to the February 28, 2026 conflict escalation. Check Point Research is cited as assessing that Cotton Sandstorm pre-positioned WezRat before the strikes, and that the malware was used alongside the Altoufan persona for hack-and-leak amplification. The content further states that WezRat has been followed in some cases by deployment of WhiteLock ransomware, including activity specifically described against Israeli targets. High-confidence context in the source material links WezRat to Iranian influence and intrusion operations targeting Israel and other countries in the Middle East, with Emennet Pasargad also described as conducting operations against the U.S., France, and Sweden. No specific file hashes, domains, or other concrete IOCs for WezRat are provided in the content.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Cotton Sandstorm

Cotton Sandstorm deployed WezRat and WhiteLock alongside the Altoufan persona for hack-and-leak amplification.

via centripetal threat researchcentripetal.ai
Handala

...‘WhiteLock’ ransomware, deployed after WezRat infostealer.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

12 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

“pivoting to exploit zero-day vulnerabilities in industrial time-management software…” and “identify and exploit public-facing applications at scale.”

T1566PhishingEvidence1

In recent years, Iranian-linked threat actors have commonly used phishing (T1566) as the primary vector for initial access.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

"WezRat, a custom modular infostealer delivered via spearphishing campaigns that masquerade as urgent software updates"

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

Defense evasion has remained a critical phase, where threat actors employ multiple obfuscation techniques (T1140) and masquerading (T1036) to bypass security controls.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

“…employ multiple obfuscation techniques (T1140)…” and references to obfuscated delivery chains / packed payloads.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The backdoor's capabilities span keylogging, screen capture, browser credential and session cookie theft

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

browser credential and session cookie theft

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence1

"WezRat, a custom modular infostealer..."

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

During the credential access phase, Iranian-linked attackers have prioritized stealing credentials from web browsers (T1555.003)

Collection

2 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The backdoor's capabilities span keylogging, screen capture, browser credential and session cookie theft

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

The backdoor's capabilities span keylogging, screen capture, browser credential and session cookie theft

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

and on exfiltration over C2 channel (T1041) to maintain communication.

Impact

1 technique
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence1

“attacks using ‘WhiteLock’ ransomware, deployed after WezRat infostealer.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping12Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.