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Mallory
Threat actorIran

Cotton Sandstorm

Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days4 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
CVEs0Associated
Malware3Families
ATT&CK18Techniques
IOCs0Tracked
Origin
🇮🇷 Iran
Motivation
Influence operations
Targets
FRILUSSEAECAGB
Ransomware tactics
Data theft extortion
Capabilities
Initial accessReconnaissanceExfiltrationSpoofingExtortion
Also known asaria_sepehr_ayandehsazanayandeh_sazan_sepehr_aryaCotton Sandstormeeleyanet_gostaremennet_pasargadHAYWIRE KITTENmarnanbridgeNEPTUNIUMnet_peygard_samavat_companyshahid_shushtariVice Leaker

Cotton Sandstorm is an Iranian state-sponsored threat actor associated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Cyber-Electronic Command (IRGC-CEC). Also tracked as Emennet Pasargad, Neptunium, DEV-0198, Haywire Kitten, MarnanBridge, and Vice Leaker, it is associated with the IRGC unit Shahid Shushtari, also transliterated Shahid Shoostari, and the corporate identity Aria Sepehr Ayandehsazan. Its operations combine targeted intrusions, data theft, website defacement, service disruption, intimidation, and cyber-enabled influence campaigns supporting Iranian state objectives. The actor has targeted Israel, the United States, France, Sweden, and the United Arab Emirates, with television-service disruptions also affecting Canada and the United Kingdom. Targets include media organizations, hosting providers, online services, digital-signage operators, messaging services, and election-related information. During the 2020 U.S. presidential election, it stole confidential voter information and sent threatening messages while impersonating far-right extremists. In 2023, it defaced Charlie Hebdo’s online shop and stole its subscriber database, exposing information belonging to more than 200,000 subscribers. It also compromised a French digital-signage provider in 2024 in an attempt to display propaganda opposing Israeli participation in the Paris Olympic and Paralympic Games; the operation was detected before the images appeared. Cotton Sandstorm uses public-facing personas to disguise attribution and amplify intrusions, including Holy Souls, Anzu Team, For Humanity, Hackers of Savior, and Altoufan Team. Under For Humanity, it disrupted streaming television services in December 2023 and replaced programming with a propaganda transmission featuring a likely AI-generated presenter. Between September 2023 and February 2024, its personas marketed stolen Israeli dating-service data and offered paid removal of individual profiles. Its tooling includes the modular WezRat information stealer, and it has also deployed WhiteLock. The actor has been subject to U.S. and European Union sanctions for malicious cyber activity and election interference.

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Operational profile

Targeting

Who, where, and from where this actor operates. Pulled from open-source reporting and Mallory's analyst review.

Who they target

Sectors the actor has been observed targeting.

  • Media & Entertainment
  • Energy
  • Financials
  • Government & Administration
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Non-Governmental Organizations
  • Telecommunication Services

Where they target

Geographies tied to known operations.

  • France
  • Israel
  • United States
  • United Arab Emirates
  • Canada
  • United Kingdom

Where they're from

Attributed origin per open-source reporting.

  • Iran
MITRE ATT&CK

Tradecraft

18 distinct techniques observed across reporting, grouped by tactic. Hover any cell for the evidence excerpt.

7 of 15 tactics23 techniques
= intelligence reports citing the technique
TA0042Resource Development2 techniques
T1583×2Acquire Infrastructure
T1584Compromise Infrastructure
TA0001Initial Access2 techniques
T1190Exploit Public-Facing Application
T1566×3Phishing
TA0005Stealth2 techniques
T1036Masquerading
T1684Social Engineering
T1684.001×2Impersonation
TA0006Credential Access3 techniques
T1056Input Capture
T1056.001Keylogging
T1539Steal Web Session Cookie
T1555Credentials from Password Stores
T1555.003Credentials from Web Browsers
TA0009Collection3 techniques
T1005Data from Local System
T1056Input Capture
T1056.001Keylogging
T1113Screen Capture
TA0010Exfiltration2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1537Transfer Data to Cloud Account
TA0040Impact4 techniques
T1485×2Data Destruction
T1486×3Data Encrypted for Impact
T1491×4Defacement
T1491.002External Defacement
T1498Network Denial of Service
FAQ

Frequently asked questions

Who does Cotton Sandstorm target?
Cotton Sandstorm targets Media & Entertainment, Energy, Financials, Government & Administration, Non-Governmental Organizations, and Telecommunication Services in France, Israel, United States, United Arab Emirates, Canada, and United Kingdom.
What malware does Cotton Sandstorm use?
Cotton Sandstorm is associated with WezRat, WhiteLock, and DNSpionage.
What other names is Cotton Sandstorm known by?
Cotton Sandstorm is also known as HAYWIRE KITTEN, NEPTUNIUM, and Vice Leaker.
Where is Cotton Sandstorm from?
Mallory's sources associate Cotton Sandstorm with Iran.
Activity feed

Recent activity

20 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
breachnewsNews · Nov 10, 2026France Blames Iran for Supermarket Refrigeration AttacksDiscussed as background on earlier IRGC operations against France, rather than as a participant in the October refrigeration campaign. The report attributes targeting of Charlie Hebdo in 2020, the January 2023 defacement of its online shop and database theft, and a July 2024 compromise of a French video-display operator to this unit. The latter operation attempted to display messages protesting Israeli athletes at the Paris Olympics and Paralympics but was stopped before publication.Read more ↗anssi frNews · Nov 10, 2026Campagnes de déstabilisation et sabotage menées à l’encontre des intérêts français par la République islamique d’Iran - ANSSINamed as the designer of a cyberattack plan against Charlie Hebdo exposed in 2021 and as the operator responsible for defacing its online store and stealing database information in 2023. The report describes retaliation and intimidation as the motives and attributes these actions to Shahid Shoostari acting for CGRI-CEC; it does not explicitly establish that the two names are aliases.Read more ↗bank info securityNews · Nov 10, 2026France Blames Iran for Cyberattacks on SupermarketsMentioned as historical background on Iranian cyber operations against France. The article describes the firm as an apparent front for the IRGC's Shahid Shoostari unit and reports EU sanctions over attacks against Charlie Hebdo and an attempted takeover of Paris Olympics display screens. It does not link the firm to the refrigeration sabotage.Read more ↗govinfosecurityNews · Nov 10, 2026France Blames Iran for Cyberattacks on SupermarketsMentioned as historical context for Iranian cyber operations against France. The article associates the firm with hacks of Charlie Hebdo in 2020 and 2023 and an attempted takeover of display screens at the 2024 Paris Olympics; it does not connect the firm to the supermarket sabotage.Read more ↗
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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what's public. Mallory adds the parts that aren't: whether this actor's tooling has touched your footprint, the IOCs they're burning right now, and the detections to deploy next.
Target overlapMatch sector + geo + tech-stack targeting against your real footprint.
Tradecraft mapping18MITRE ATT&CK techniques reported for this actor, grouped by tactic.
Associated malware3Families linked to this actor, with IOCs and behavior.
Associated CVEsCVEs linked to this actor, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
ObservablesDomains, IPs, and hashes tied to this actor, refreshed continuously.