Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

WhiteLock

Tracked since Feb 23, 2026 · Updated 4 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs0Tracked

WhiteLock is a recently identified Windows ransomware family. It encrypts victim files, appends the .Fbin extension, creates a ransom note named c0ntact.Txt, and changes the desktop wallpaper after encryption. The malware communicates with external servers during execution, collects the victim device’s MAC address, hashes it with SHA-256 for identification, obtains an RSA public key from the server, generates a 32-byte AES key and 16-byte IV, uses AES-CBC to encrypt files, and protects the AES key with RSA-2048 before transmitting it to the external server. WhiteLock also checks for AnyDesk and TeamViewer and terminates related services to hinder remote response during encryption. Reported exclusions include folders such as $Recycle.Bin, \AppData, \ProgramData, \Windows, \System Volume Information, \Google, and \Windows\servicing; filenames such as c0ntact.Txt, DumpStack.Log.Tmp, pagefile.Sys, swapfile.Sys, hiberfil.Sys, desktop.ini, and ntuser.dat; already encrypted .Fbin files; and files matching keywords related to major antivirus and security products. The ransom note claims both file encryption and data theft, threatens to notify contacts, sell stolen information, and publish it on the dark web and internet if payment is not made, and directs victims to a Tor-based negotiation page. WhiteLock has been linked to intrusion chains in which information-stealing malware, specifically WezRat, was used before ransomware deployment. Multiple cited reports associate WhiteLock with Cotton Sandstorm, also tracked as Haywire Kitten and assessed in the content as affiliated with Iran’s IRGC, and state that it was deployed in some intrusions specifically against Israeli targets. High-confidence behavioral indicators mentioned in the content include mass file modification, creation of c0ntact.Txt ransom notes, abnormal external communications, termination of AnyDesk and TeamViewer services, encrypted files with the .Fbin extension, and wallpaper changes.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Cotton Sandstorm

Cotton Sandstorm deployed WezRat and WhiteLock alongside the Altoufan persona for hack-and-leak amplification.

via centripetal threat researchcentripetal.ai
Handala

...attacks using ‘WhiteLock’ ransomware, deployed after WezRat infostealer.

via checkpoint research blogresearch.checkpoint.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.

T1566PhishingEvidence1

it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.

Persistence

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

it compiles a list of files and folders to be excluded from encryption... already encrypted files, ransom notes, and certain system files, thereby skipping their encryption.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.

Discovery

1 technique
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

Upon execution, the WhiteLock ransomware collects the MAC address of the compromised device.

Lateral Movement

2 techniques
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.

T1570Lateral Tool TransferEvidence1

WhiteLock should not be viewed merely as a standalone executable file but understood as a ransomware threat that can be deployed following Initial Breach, information theft, and internal propagation.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

A key characteristic of this ransomware is that it communicates with external servers during the encryption process.

Impact

4 techniques
T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence2

WhiteLock ransomware encrypts key files on Windows systems and then generates a ransom note demanding payment.

T1489Service StopEvidence1

WhiteLock searches for and terminates AnyDesk and TeamViewer-related services.

T1491.001Internal DefacementEvidence1

Once encryption is complete, WhiteLock changes the victim’s device wallpaper.

T1565Data ManipulationEvidence1

bulk file modifications, generation of ransom notes, termination of services related to remote access tools, and abnormal external communications are behaviors that require close monitoring

Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+3 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matchingMatch every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.