WhiteLock
WhiteLock is a recently identified Windows ransomware family. It encrypts victim files, appends the .Fbin extension, creates a ransom note named c0ntact.Txt, and changes the desktop wallpaper after encryption. The malware communicates with external servers during execution, collects the victim device’s MAC address, hashes it with SHA-256 for identification, obtains an RSA public key from the server, generates a 32-byte AES key and 16-byte IV, uses AES-CBC to encrypt files, and protects the AES key with RSA-2048 before transmitting it to the external server. WhiteLock also checks for AnyDesk and TeamViewer and terminates related services to hinder remote response during encryption. Reported exclusions include folders such as $Recycle.Bin, \AppData, \ProgramData, \Windows, \System Volume Information, \Google, and \Windows\servicing; filenames such as c0ntact.Txt, DumpStack.Log.Tmp, pagefile.Sys, swapfile.Sys, hiberfil.Sys, desktop.ini, and ntuser.dat; already encrypted .Fbin files; and files matching keywords related to major antivirus and security products. The ransom note claims both file encryption and data theft, threatens to notify contacts, sell stolen information, and publish it on the dark web and internet if payment is not made, and directs victims to a Tor-based negotiation page. WhiteLock has been linked to intrusion chains in which information-stealing malware, specifically WezRat, was used before ransomware deployment. Multiple cited reports associate WhiteLock with Cotton Sandstorm, also tracked as Haywire Kitten and assessed in the content as affiliated with Iran’s IRGC, and state that it was deployed in some intrusions specifically against Israeli targets. High-confidence behavioral indicators mentioned in the content include mass file modification, creation of c0ntact.Txt ransom notes, abnormal external communications, termination of AnyDesk and TeamViewer services, encrypted files with the .Fbin extension, and wallpaper changes.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Cotton Sandstorm deployed WezRat and WhiteLock alongside the Altoufan persona for hack-and-leak amplification.
...attacks using ‘WhiteLock’ ransomware, deployed after WezRat infostealer.
Techniques & procedures
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
2 techniques
Initial Access
it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.
it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
it compiles a list of files and folders to be excluded from encryption... already encrypted files, ransom notes, and certain system files, thereby skipping their encryption.
it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Upon execution, the WhiteLock ransomware collects the MAC address of the compromised device.
Lateral Movement
2 techniques
Lateral Movement
it is necessary not only to detect the ransomware files themselves but also to continuously monitor for phishing, account compromise, remote access exploitation, abnormal external communications, and signs of internal propagation.
WhiteLock should not be viewed merely as a standalone executable file but understood as a ransomware threat that can be deployed following Initial Breach, information theft, and internal propagation.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
A key characteristic of this ransomware is that it communicates with external servers during the encryption process.
Impact
4 techniques
Impact
WhiteLock ransomware encrypts key files on Windows systems and then generates a ransom note demanding payment.
WhiteLock searches for and terminates AnyDesk and TeamViewer-related services.
Once encryption is complete, WhiteLock changes the victim’s device wallpaper.
bulk file modifications, generation of ransom notes, termination of services related to remote access tools, and abnormal external communications are behaviors that require close monitoring
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.