Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

DurianBeacon

Tracked since Feb 27, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs20Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
ExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionCredential theftLateral movementReconnaissanceSpoofing
Platforms
Windows

DurianBeacon is a Windows backdoor and remote access tool associated with North Korea-linked activity, particularly campaigns attributed or linked to the Andariel cluster within the Lazarus ecosystem. It has been observed in both Go and Rust implementations and has appeared in intrusions targeting South Korean organizations, including universities, ICT firms, electronics companies, shipbuilding, manufacturing, defense-related entities, automotive parts manufacturers, and semiconductor firms. DurianBeacon has also been listed among Andariel-developed implants in joint government reporting on DPRK cyber espionage.

DurianBeacon functions as a command-driven backdoor that establishes encrypted command-and-control communications and transmits basic host metadata after connecting, including user and system context details. Reported capabilities include arbitrary command execution, PowerShell execution, configurable sleep or hibernation behavior, interval changes, directory and drive enumeration, file upload and download, directory creation, file deletion, process termination, self-deletion, and SOCKS-style proxying. The Rust variant has additionally been described as using XOR packet encryption alongside SSL-style communications.

Operational reporting places DurianBeacon in broader intrusion chains involving AndarLoader, downloader components, abused enterprise software distribution mechanisms, and post-compromise credential theft tooling. In some campaigns it was installed through abuse of vulnerable enterprise software such as INNORIX Agent; in others, it was delivered after internal propagation through compromised software update workflows. DurianBeacon has also been observed alongside tooling such as Mimikatz, ProcDump, Meterpreter, MultiRDP, and browser credential theft utilities, indicating use in sustained post-compromise operations focused on persistence, internal control, credential access, and information theft.

The malware is best understood as part of a wider Andariel tradecraft evolution toward Go-based and mixed-language implants while maintaining longstanding targeting patterns centered on South Korean strategic sectors and defense-adjacent organizations. Its role in these operations is to provide durable remote access and flexible post-exploitation control over compromised Windows hosts.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2021-44228via ic3 alertsLog4ShellOver the last 15 years, the group has developed RATs, including the following... ▪ DurianBeaconView vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Andariel

최종적으로 메모리 상에서 실행된 DurianBeacon은 백도어 악성코드로서 ... 업데이트된 버전이다.

via ahnlab asec blogasec.ahnlab.com
Stonefly/Clasiopa

Over the last 15 years, the group has developed RATs, including the following... ▪ DurianBeacon

via ic3 alertsic3.gov
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1587.001MalwareEvidence2

These tools include functionality for executing arbitrary commands... and uploading content to command and control (C2) [T1587.001, T1587.004].

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

이는 스크립트 악성코드를 통해 설치된 것을 의미하며 스피어 피싱 공격이 사용된 것으로 보인다.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence1

Figure 1. 파워쉘 명령으로 설치되는 MultiRDP 악성코드 ... 명령 기능 0x02 파워쉘 명령 실행

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

실제 다음과 같은 명령들을 실행한 로그도 확인된다. > cmd /c tasklist > cmd /c ipconfig /all

Stealth

1 technique
T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

차이점이라고 한다면 자가 삭제 및 Socks Proxy 기능을 담당하는 0x10, 0x12 항목의 명령이 추가되었다는 점이다.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1

최초 접속 이후 감염 시스템의 IP 정보, 사용자 이름, 데스크탑 이름, 아키텍처, 파일명을 전송한 후

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

최초 접속 이후 감염 시스템의 IP 정보, 사용자 이름, 데스크탑 이름, 아키텍처, 파일명을 전송한 후 명령을 대기하며

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence1

지원하는 기능들 중에는 ... 파일 다운로드 / 업로드, 조회, 명령 실행 등의 기능들이 존재한다.

T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

또한 최종적으로 설치된 백도어 악성코드가 과거 Andariel의 공격 사례에서 확인된 DurianBeacon이었다는 점도 특징이다. ... 공격 대상이 된 곳은 국내 방산업체, 자동차 부품 및 반도체 제조업 등이 확인되었다. ... 내부 전파 과정에서 기업 내의 소프트웨어 업데이트 프로그램을 악용하였다는 점

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

Volgmer는 ... C&C 서버와의 통신에 HTTP 프로토콜을 사용한다.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

Go 언어로 개발되었다는 점이나 C&C 서버와의 통신 과정에서 SSL 프로토콜을 사용한다는 특징은 동일하다.

T1090.003Multi-hop ProxyEvidence1

차이점이라고 한다면 자가 삭제 및 Socks Proxy 기능을 담당하는 0x10, 0x12 항목의 명령이 추가되었다는 점이다.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

해당 악성코드는 외부에서 닷넷 어셈블리와 같은 실행 가능한 데이터를 받아 실행하는 다운로더 기능이 전부이다.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

C&C 서버와의 통신에는 SSL을 이용한 암호화가 사용되며

T1573.001Symmetric CryptographyEvidence1

DurianBeacon은 C&C 서버와의 통신 방식들 중 SSL 외에 XOR을 이용한 패킷 암호화를 지원하며 키는 0x57이다.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

20 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

6 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
+1 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching20Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.