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Malware5 associated actors

HTTPSnoop

Tracked since Mar 5, 2026 · Updated 18 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK10Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
Type
Backdoor
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasion
Platforms
Windows

HTTPSnoop is a compact Windows backdoor first discovered in 2023 and associated with ShroudedSnooper, an Iranian government-linked threat group. It has been deployed against internet-facing servers at telecommunications providers in the Middle East. The implant interfaces with Windows HTTP kernel drivers and devices to listen for requests matching selected HTTP(S) URL patterns, decode attacker-supplied shellcode, and execute it on the compromised endpoint, enabling remote command execution.

HTTPSnoop operates as a passive implant, disguising its communications as Microsoft Exchange Web Services and Autodiscover traffic. It can also masquerade as a legitimate security software component, including an extended detection and response agent. ShroudedSnooper uses HTTPSnoop alongside web shells and other implants to establish and maintain access that can subsequently be transferred to other Iranian threat groups. HTTPSnoop has also been observed before Druidfly destructive operations involving BibiWiper; its role in those intrusions is as an access implant rather than a wiping tool.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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ShroudedSnooper

An updated version of HTTPSnoop, a custom compact backdoor that we first discovered in 2023.

via talos intelligence blogstorage.ghost.io
Scarred Manticore

ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Storm-0861

ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.

via talosintelligence otherblog.talosintelligence.com
Druidfly

Tracing other tools used to initiate the BibiWiper attacks against Israel revealed the following overlap in tactics, techniques, and procedures between these attacks and earlier Druidfly attacks: HTTPSnoop malware was previously deployed prior to the Druidfly wiping attacks.

via symantec blogsecurity.com
Handala

HTTPSnoop malware was previously deployed prior to the Druidfly wiping attacks

via symantec blogsecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

10 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence1

“it is likely that internet-facing servers were exploited to deploy HTTPSnoop to gain initial access.”

Execution

2 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

L'attaque est menée à l'aide d'une porte dérobée appelée « HTTPSnoop », qui exploite le noyau HTTP de Windows.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

“allowing threat actors to remotely execute commands on infected devices” and HTTPSnoop can “execute decoded shellcode on the infected internet facing endpoint(s).”

Persistence

1 technique
T1505.003Web ShellEvidence2

ShroudedSnooper is associated with the Iranian government, mainly tasked with gaining initial access and then deploying webshells and passive implants such as HTTPSnoop, PipeSnoop and more.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036.004Masquerade Task or ServiceEvidence1

“The two new malware HTTPSnoop and PipeSnoop can masquerade as legitimate security software components, such as eXtended Detection and Response (XDR) agents.”

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

HTTPSnoop listens for specified HTTP(S) requests and can “execute decoded shellcode on the infected internet facing endpoint(s).”

Credential Access

1 technique
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

“HTTPSnoop is a backdoor implant that interfaces with Windows HTTP kernel drivers and devices to listen to incoming requests for specific HTTP(S) URLs.”

Discovery

1 technique
T1040Network SniffingEvidence1

“HTTPSnoop is a backdoor implant that interfaces with Windows HTTP kernel drivers and devices to listen to incoming requests for specific HTTP(S) URLs.”

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021Remote ServicesEvidence1

“PDQ remote access tool… used for remote access and persistence… Use of the remote desktop tools AnyDesk and ScreenConnect”

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

Les codes malicieux utilisés sont conçus pour voler des données sensibles, notamment des enregistrements d'appels, des messages texte et l'historique de navigation.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence2

“To masquerade as benign traffic, HTTPSnoop listens to URL patterns that make it look like the infected system being contacted is a server hosting Microsoft’s Exchange Web Services (EWS) API… URLs consisting of ‘ews’ and ‘autodiscover’ keywords over ports 443 and 444.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping10Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.