Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware5 associated actors

OmniStealer

Tracked since Mar 11, 2026 · Updated 7 days ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days6 mentions · peak 4 in a dayToday
Vulns0Associated
Actors5Associated
ATT&CK42Techniques
IOCs57Tracked
Type
Infostealer
Capabilities
Credential theftSession hijackingExfiltrationCrypto theft
Delivery
Lure
Platforms
WindowsmacOSLinux

OmniStealer is a Python-based information stealer targeting Windows, macOS, and Linux. It harvests browser credentials and cookies, cryptocurrency wallets and private keys, password-manager data, cloud-storage credentials, and developer secrets. Its collection targets include Chromium-based browsers and Firefox, wallet browser extensions and standalone wallet applications, and password-manager extensions and applications. Developer-focused collection includes Git credentials, GitHub access tokens, source code, and development-environment data. Stolen information can be exfiltrated over HTTP, with Telegram Bot API uploads available as a fallback.

OmniStealer is deployed in North Korea-linked developer-targeting operations, including DeceptiveDevelopment and campaigns tracked as PolinRider and Cross-Chain TxDataHiding. Infection chains use fraudulent recruitment offers and coding assignments to persuade developers to execute weaponized projects. Compromised legitimate repositories and software packages also distribute loaders to downstream users. Some delivery chains retrieve encrypted stages through public blockchain transaction data before downloading the Python stealer. OmniStealer is frequently deployed alongside the DEV#POPPER remote-access trojan, serving as the dedicated data-theft component rather than the remote-control or application-persistence component.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

5 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
Contagious Interview

Payloads included OmniStealer, a cross-platform Python tool targeting credentials, wallets, password managers, and developer secrets.

via cryptika blogcryptika.com
APT37

“Access to lsass is observed, and a second YARA rule fires for an XFiles and OmniStealer style information stealer.”

via malbeacon blogblog.deception.pro
Lazarus

“Access to lsass is observed, and a second YARA rule fires for an XFiles and OmniStealer style information stealer.”

via malbeacon blogblog.deception.pro
DPRK

the first Python Downloader ( Payload1_2 (HTTP Payload Stager) ) which ultimately leads to downloading the OmniStealer malware as discussed in Part 2

via ransom isac blogransom-isac.org
PolinRider

The decrypted payloads then deploy remote access malware, including DEV#POPPER RAT and OmniStealer, to exfiltrate data from the compromised systems.

via cysecurity newscysecurity.news
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

42 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583Acquire InfrastructureEvidence1

Contagious Interview ... approaches prospective targets and tricks them into executing malicious code from a fake repository as part of an assessment. Some of these efforts have used weaponized Node.js projects hosted on GitHub.

Initial Access

8 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

temp_auto_push.bat , the script behind the GitHub and Go compromises, runs locally on the infected machine using the developer's own already-authorized git credentials.

T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence1

Contagious Interview ... tricks them into executing malicious code from a fake repository as part of an assessment.

T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence13

“Victim receives a fake job offer via Telegram, pointing to a GitHub repo or trojanized NPM package.”

T1195.001Compromise Software Dependencies and Development ToolsEvidence1

DPRK’s goal is to compromise developer machines and accounts to silently propagate malicious code, clone repositories, and push backdoored commits without active human intervention.

T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence3

SlippyNunchucks cible des individus sinophones au Sri Lanka via le détournement des mises à jour de QuickFox pour déployer le toolset DarkVigil (aka FDMTP) ; DeceptiveDevelopment remonte la chaîne d’approvisionnement logicielle : vol de credentials Git/SSH, injection de code malveillant dans des dépôts publics/privés

T1566PhishingEvidence1

What initially appeared to be a standard phishing campaign quickly evolved into something far more sophisticated... In our case, this was an attempt via Telegram of a Social Engineering attack.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

“Victim receives a fake job offer via Telegram, pointing to a GitHub repo or trojanized NPM package.”

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

PolinRider has spent at least five months getting into thousands of developer machines any way it can: fake interviews, poisoned forks, malicious VS Code tasks, typosquatted packages.

Execution

7 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

It can also quietly launch a second hidden process in the background using child_process.spawn() with the windowsHide flag set to true, keeping everything out of sight on Windows systems.

T1059.006PythonEvidence7

“[The HTTP stager] acted as a Python dropper: it installed Python silently on the victim's machine, then used it to fetch ... the OmniStealer payload.”

T1059.007JavaScriptEvidence6

the payload dropped into each module is DPRK's obfuscated JavaScript loader. It resolves a second-stage payload from blockchain RPC infrastructure ... decrypts it with an embedded XOR key, and executes it with eval()

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The malware sits quietly inside what looks like a standard Tailwind CSS configuration file... Once that obfuscated code runs, it quietly transforms into a full JavaScript malware loader operating inside Node.js.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

A committed .vscode/tasks.json with runOptions.runOn: 'folderOpen' executes the moment the project folder opens in VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity, or GitHub Desktop, bypassing npm v12's lifecycle-script protections entirely.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Contagious Interview ... tricks them into executing malicious code from a fake repository as part of an assessment.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

GitHub Repository is cloned/installed after collaboration and runs locally on the user's device to execute.

Persistence

3 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

temp_auto_push.bat , the script behind the GitHub and Go compromises, runs locally on the infected machine using the developer's own already-authorized git credentials.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Execution is triggered quietly through Visual Studio Code task files, which can run automatically when a folder is opened... .vscode/tasks.json Task file abused with “runOn”: “folderOpen” to trigger loader execution.

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

In each case, a malicious version was published under the package owner’s identity but without their consent.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

temp_auto_push.bat , the script behind the GitHub and Go compromises, runs locally on the infected machine using the developer's own already-authorized git credentials.

T1546Event Triggered ExecutionEvidence1

Execution is triggered quietly through Visual Studio Code task files, which can run automatically when a folder is opened... .vscode/tasks.json Task file abused with “runOn”: “folderOpen” to trigger loader execution.

Stealth

7 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence7

“The initial loader checks transactions on TRON ... to locate encrypted JavaScript stored in BNB Smart Chain transactions.”

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

public/fonts/fa-solid-400.woff2 isn't a font. It's JavaScript that reads XOR-encrypted payloads from on-chain transactions

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence1

temp_auto_push.bat , the script behind the GitHub and Go compromises, runs locally on the infected machine using the developer's own already-authorized git credentials.

T1127Trusted Developer Utilities Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The malware sits quietly inside what looks like a standard Tailwind CSS configuration file... Once that obfuscated code runs, it quietly transforms into a full JavaScript malware loader operating inside Node.js.

T1127.001MSBuildEvidence1

A committed .vscode/tasks.json with runOptions.runOn: 'folderOpen' executes the moment the project folder opens in VS Code, Cursor, Antigravity, or GitHub Desktop, bypassing npm v12's lifecycle-script protections entirely.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence3

Finally, the retrieved data is decrypted using XOR or similar algorithms to reveal the executable malicious code.

T1564.003Hidden WindowEvidence1

decrypts it with an embedded XOR key, and executes it with eval() for remote code execution and persistence through detached background processes.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

In each case, a malicious version was published under the package owner’s identity but without their consent.

Credential Access

7 techniques
T1003OS Credential DumpingEvidence1

“Access to lsass is observed, and a second YARA rule fires for an XFiles and OmniStealer style information stealer.”

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The follow-on payloads are the familiar Lazarus toolkit: DEV#POPPER, OmniStealer, and InvisibleFerret, covering credential theft, browser-data theft, crypto-wallet exfiltration, and keylogging.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence3

covering credential theft, browser-data theft, crypto-wallet exfiltration, and keylogging.

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence5

“A separate one-time stealer seeks browser information, password manager data, cloud storage credentials and cryptocurrency wallet material.”

T1555.003Credentials from Web BrowsersEvidence1

This includes cryptocurrency wallets, private keys, browser credentials... The code systematically harvests credentials from Chrome, Edge, Brave, Firefox...

T1556Modify Authentication ProcessEvidence1

In each case, a malicious version was published under the package owner’s identity but without their consent.

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence2

Once the malware has harvested a maintainer's ~/.npmrc token, it either publishes directly, or it simply waits and lets the maintainer's own next npm publish carry the payload along.

Discovery

1 technique
T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

Collect basic host details

Collection

4 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence2

OmniStealer... systematically harvests credentials... cloud storage services... browser cookies, login databases, system information, environment variables, and extension data across Windows, macOS, and Linux systems.

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence1

The follow-on payloads are the familiar Lazarus toolkit: DEV#POPPER, OmniStealer, and InvisibleFerret, covering credential theft, browser-data theft, crypto-wallet exfiltration, and keylogging.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence1

“pip installs requests, pyperclip, mss, and Pillow, the toolkit for clipboard theft, screen capture, and HTTP exfiltration.”

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

“pip installs … pyperclip … the toolkit for clipboard theft” and “ClipboardMonitor.”

Command and Control

8 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

novel tradecraft such as Cross-Chain TxDataHiding techniques combined with the subsequent creation of a takedown-proof Command and control (C2) infrastructure

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

a multi-layered attack leveraging novel blockchain-based command-and-control infrastructure

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence5

“C2 path /init Port 443 endpoint returning the RAT and scanner” and “C2 path /boot Port 443 Ethereum recovery endpoint.”

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

“The malware queries a TRON wallet ... with Aptos as a fallback,” retrieves encrypted JavaScript from BSC transaction calldata, and “_Z scans Ethereum mainnet” through public RPC services.

T1102.001Dead Drop ResolverEvidence2

MITRE ATT&CK # T1102.001 — Web Service: Dead Drop Resolver

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence14

“The server then supplies code that can rebuild the infection.”

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

The payloads observed so far include DEV#POPPER and OmniStealer, both capable of remote command execution, communicating with attacker servers through socket.io-client.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

This multi-chain approach significantly increases resilience... extracting the transaction input field containing the encrypted payload. After XOR decryption...

Exfiltration

2 techniques
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence5

“The stealer begins POSTing host data to 150.251.113[.]223:8443” and the indicator labels the host “Stealer exfil.”

T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence3

“Researchers counted 153 wallet targets and said stolen data leaves through a messaging bot interface.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

57 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

32 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
cyber security newsNews · Nov 10, 2026North Korean Hackers Target Drone Technology and Software Supply Chains in New Cyberespionage CampaignsCross-platform Python information stealer distributed in DeceptiveDevelopment operations involving malicious recruitment tasks and compromised software repositories. It targets credentials, wallets, password managers, and developer secrets.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Nov 10, 2026North Korean Hackers Target Drone Technology and Software Supply Chains in New Cyberespionage Campaigns | Cryptika CybersecurityCross-platform Python information stealer used in DeceptiveDevelopment's developer-compromise and software supply-chain operations. It targets credentials, wallets, password managers, and developer secrets.Read more ↗cyberveilleNews · Oct 30, 2026Rapport ESET APT Avril-Septembre 2026 : espionnage, destruction et convergence Biélorussie-Russie | CyberVeilleInformation stealer deployed in DeceptiveDevelopment's operations involving credential theft and malicious code injected into software repositories.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Oct 30, 2026North Korean Hackers Steal Developer Credentials to Inject Malware Into GitHub and Software Packages | Cryptika CybersecurityA frequently updated, cross-platform Python infostealer found at the end of several DeceptiveDevelopment infection chains. It targets browser credentials, cryptocurrency wallets, password managers, and developer secrets. The campaign uses stolen developer access to inject malicious code into trusted repositories and software packages.Read more ↗
+27 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching57Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors5Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping42Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.