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Malware1 associated actor

ISMInjector

Tracked since Mar 17, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK7Techniques
IOCs3Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
PersistenceDefense evasionProcess injection
Platforms
Windows

ISMInjector is a Windows-based .NET malware loader used by the Iranian-linked cyberespionage group OilRig, also known as APT34 and Helix Kitten, to deploy the ISMAgent backdoor. It was introduced in 2017 in operations targeting Israeli IT vendors, financial institutions, and Middle Eastern government entities.

ISMInjector uses packing to evade signature-based detection and invokes .NET Assembly.Load during unpacking to load its embedded ISMAgent component into memory. It also abuses the Windows certutil utility to decode a payload, creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence, and uses process hollowing to inject its payload into a newly created legitimate .NET assembly-registration process.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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OilRig

(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

via mitre attack structuredgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

7 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence.(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence.(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

“Sandworm Team leveraged Scheduled Tasks through a Group Policy Object (GPO) to execute CaddyWiper at a predetermined time.” / “APT29 used scheduler and schtasks to create new tasks on remote host as part of their lateral movement… updating an existing legitimate task to execute their tools and then returned the scheduled task to its original configuration.”

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence7

[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) creates scheduled tasks to establish persistence.(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence5

[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) hollows out a newly created process RegASM.exe and injects its payload into the hollowed process.(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

Stealth

5 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence8

[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) is obfuscated with the off-the-shelf SmartAssembly .NET obfuscator created by red-gate.com.(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

T1055.012Process HollowingEvidence5

[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) hollows out a newly created process RegASM.exe and injects its payload into the hollowed process.(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence9

[ISMInjector](https://attack.mitre.org/software/S0189) uses the <code>certutil</code> command to decode a payload file.(Citation: OilRig New Delivery Oct 2017)

T1218.010Regsvr32Evidence6

The content repeatedly states that certutil was used to decode base64 content, for example 'APT28 macro uses the command certutil -decode', 'Higaisa used certutil to decode Base64 binaries at runtime', and 'menuPass has used certutil in a macro to decode base64-encoded content.'

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

The .NET framework has built-in functionality to dynamically load memory-only modules through the Assembly.Load(byte[]) function... [to] keep their payloads off disk.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

3 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching3Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping7Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.