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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

Goodor

Tracked since Apr 11, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK8Techniques
IOCs13Tracked
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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2020-1472via ironnet blogExploited in the wildZerologonThis group avoids using custom malware, opting for commodity malware families that hinder attempts at applying attribution... • Use of commodity malware such as Goodor, DorShel, and Karagany | The chaining or combination of multiple legacy vulnerability exploits with exploitation of the newer Windows Zerologon vulnerabilityView vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Dragonfly

This group avoids using custom malware, opting for commodity malware families that hinder attempts at applying attribution... • Use of commodity malware such as Goodor, DorShel, and Karagany

via ironnet blogironnet.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

8 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

1 technique
T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The StartA function then issues a system command to run this... CreateBat demonstrates a string load... containing a ping command... The end result is a .bat file written to disk.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

This file creates an HKCU runkey that will cause the dropped payload to execute any time the user logs in.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

The chaining or combination of multiple legacy vulnerability exploits with exploitation of the newer Windows Zerologon vulnerability

T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence1

This file creates an HKCU runkey that will cause the dropped payload to execute any time the user logs in.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

The malware will also create a filename, ntdll.exe, and append it to this path.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1

The malware likely performs some sort of Base64 decoding and decryption... Decode, in turn, calls 'FromB64' and 'Decrypt.'... After stepping over the Decode function... this section will populate with the decoded and then decrypted data.

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence1

The dropped payload is a UPX-packed Windows executable. Filename: ntdll.exe

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

The GetU function pulls one of five hardcoded C2 servers and appends an identifier string to it... The malware didn’t appear to call out to the C2 server during the GetHTTP call...

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

The malware contains a large block of Base64-encoded data... After stepping over the Decode function... this section will populate with the decoded and then decrypted data... it uses the WriteFile call to write the decoded executable to this location. The StartA function then issues a system command to run this.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

13 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching13Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping8Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.