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MalwareUsed by 4 actors

PHANTOMPULSE

PHANTOMPULSE is a previously undocumented Windows remote access trojan (RAT) identified by Elastic Security Labs as the final-stage payload in the REF6598 intrusion chain. The campaign targeted individuals in the financial and cryptocurrency sectors and used social engineering via LinkedIn and Telegram, followed by abuse of Obsidian community plugins. On Windows, malicious Obsidian Shell Commands execution launched PowerShell, which retrieved an intermediate in-memory loader named PHANTOMPULL; PHANTOMPULL decrypted and launched PHANTOMPULSE in memory.

PHANTOMPULSE is described as a full-featured backdoor/RAT with telemetry collection, command retrieval, command-result reporting, file upload, screenshot capture, inline keylogging with clipboard monitoring, process injection, uninstall, privilege escalation, downgrade, and self-restart functionality. It performs host reconnaissance including machine ID, CPU, GPU, RAM, OS, username, computer name, privilege level, public IP, installed applications, and AV/EDR products. Reported targeted application checks include Ledger, Trezor, Electrum, Exodus, Telegram, Discord, Signal, Outlook, Authy, FileZilla, WinSCP, and Steam.

The malware uses multiple stealth and evasion mechanisms. It implements three process-injection techniques: PhantomInject, which stomps dbghelp.dll/module-stomps a legitimate DLL instead of allocating new executable memory; DbgNexum, which uses the Windows Debug API to drive execution; and ManualMap, which manually maps DLL payloads, handles relocations/imports, wipes PE headers, and hijacks threads. It also disables AMSI, WLDP, and ETW using hardware breakpoints and a vectored exception handler targeting WldpQueryDynamicCodeTrust, AmsiScanBuffer, and EtwEventWrite. Additional evasion includes direct-syscall wrappers built from ntdll resolution via PEB/Ldr walking and SSN extraction, four XOR-based obfuscation layers for strings/configuration, and anti-sandbox checks against hashed usernames and computer names including WDAGUtilityAccount and Joe Sandbox personas.

For privilege escalation, PHANTOMPULSE uses a schuac/UACME issue #129-style UAC bypass via IElevatedFactoryServer to obtain an elevated Task Scheduler COM object. It can register a transient DotNetSvcElevateTask and relaunch via rundll32.exe if needed. For persistence, it installs scheduled tasks including DotNetSvcUpdateTask, DotNetSvcCoreTask, and DotNetSvcUserTask, with DotNetSvcCoreTask registered under \Microsoft\Windows\NetFramework\ and configured to run with HighestAvailable privileges. It also drops an embedded DLL, svcagent.dll, to locations including %ProgramData%\AssetMon\svcagent.dll, %APPDATA%\AssetMon\svcagent.dll, or %TEMP%\svcagent.dll, and includes self-healing logic to restore persistence.

A notable feature is its blockchain-based command-and-control resolution. PHANTOMPULSE queries Blockscout services for Ethereum, Base, and Optimism to retrieve the latest transaction input associated with wallet 0xc117688c530b660e15085bF3A2B664117d8672aA, hex-decodes the input, XORs it with the wallet address bytes, and accepts the result if it begins with http. Reported provider hosts include eth.blockscout[.]com, base.blockscout[.]com, and optimism.blockscout[.]com. If blockchain resolution fails, reported fallback C2 domains include panel.feea8679.net and https://panel.fefea22134[.]net. Elastic noted the resolver does not verify the sender of the latest transaction, creating a potential sinkhole opportunity.

Elastic assessed the activity and tradecraft as aligned with DPRK-linked cryptocurrency-focused clusters including Lazarus, BlueNoroff, UNC5342/Contagious Interview, and APT38, while noting this is an alignment assessment rather than definitive attribution. The malware was also described as heavily or likely AI-generated based on unusually verbose and structured debug strings and implementation style.

Known indicators directly mentioned in the content include SHA-256 99dacf9f87ba3c1248718e3c6836c8a3b8bed38ba1d8fe3b3bde8378fb77e670 for a PHANTOMPULSE final payload, and alternate reporting of SHA-256 33dacf9f854f636216e5062ca252df8e5bed652efd78b86512f5b868b11ee70f for the final Windows payload. Elastic released YARA detections under Windows.Trojan.PhantomPulse.

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THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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APT38

A newly analyzed remote access trojan called PHANTOMPULSE has drawn serious attention for its advanced approach to compromising Windows systems.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Lazarus

A newly analyzed remote access trojan called PHANTOMPULSE has drawn serious attention for its advanced approach to compromising Windows systems.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
Contagious Interview

A newly analyzed remote access trojan called PHANTOMPULSE has drawn serious attention for its advanced approach to compromising Windows systems.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
REF6598

On Windows, the commands are used to invoke a PowerShell script to drop an intermediate loader codenamed PHANTOMPULL that decrypts and launches PHANTOMPULSE in memory. PHANTOMPULSE is an artificial intelligence (AI)-generated backdoor that uses the Ethereum blockchain for resolving its command-and-control (C2) server by fetching the latest transaction associated with a hard-coded wallet address.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

37 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

...the implant uses to register a high-privilege scheduled task that relaunches it with full administrator rights... Organizations in the crypto sector are strongly advised to monitor for suspicious scheduled tasks... Scheduled Task DotNetSvcUpdateTask Primary persistence... DotNetSvcCoreTask SYSTEM persistence... DotNetSvcUserTask User persistence...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

PHANTOMPULSE installs three scheduled tasks via the COM ITaskService interface, each executing rundll32.exe "<stub_dll>",DllRegisterServer

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2
TacticExecution

On Windows, the commands are used to invoke a PowerShell script to drop an intermediate loader codenamed PHANTOMPULL that decrypts and launches PHANTOMPULSE in memory.

T1106Native APIEvidence1
TacticExecution

PHANTOMPULSE resolves ntdll functions by walking PEB→Ldr with DJB2 hashes, extracts System Service Numbers (SSNs) from each NT function's prologue, and builds private syscall stubs.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1
TacticExecution

As soon as the vault is opened in the note-taking application, the target is asked to enable "Installed community plugins" sync, effectively causing malicious code to be executed.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Shellcode is injected using a technique called PhantomInject, which stomps a legitimate Windows DLL named dbghelp.dll rather than allocating new executable memory.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

...the implant uses to register a high-privilege scheduled task that relaunches it with full administrator rights... Organizations in the crypto sector are strongly advised to monitor for suspicious scheduled tasks... Scheduled Task DotNetSvcUpdateTask Primary persistence... DotNetSvcCoreTask SYSTEM persistence... DotNetSvcUserTask User persistence...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

PHANTOMPULSE installs three scheduled tasks via the COM ITaskService interface, each executing rundll32.exe "<stub_dll>",DllRegisterServer

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Step 1/6 Write kill flag to HKCU + HKLM... Step 3/6 Remove legacy registry: NTLoad value, COM hijack keys, print monitor keys

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

PHANTOMPULSE installs three scheduled tasks via the COM ITaskService interface... DotNetSvcUpdateTask User Logon + Time 3 min ... DotNetSvcCoreTask Boot + Time 15 min ... DotNetSvcUserTask User Logon

T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence1

...the implant uses to register a high-privilege scheduled task that relaunches it with full administrator rights... Organizations in the crypto sector are strongly advised to monitor for suspicious scheduled tasks... Scheduled Task DotNetSvcUpdateTask Primary persistence... DotNetSvcCoreTask SYSTEM persistence... DotNetSvcUserTask User persistence...

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

PHANTOMPULSE installs three scheduled tasks via the COM ITaskService interface, each executing rundll32.exe "<stub_dll>",DllRegisterServer

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

According to the Elastic Security Labs report, the implant carries three separate process injection techniques... PHANTOMPULSE ships with three distinct injection methods, each designed for a different payload type.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

ManualMap handles DLL payloads with a complete PE manual mapping implementation.

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Acquires SeDebugPrivilege (via OpenProcessToken / LookupPrivilegeValueW / AdjustTokenPrivileges )

T1547Boot or Logon Autostart ExecutionEvidence1

PHANTOMPULSE installs three scheduled tasks via the COM ITaskService interface... DotNetSvcUpdateTask User Logon + Time 3 min ... DotNetSvcCoreTask Boot + Time 15 min ... DotNetSvcUserTask User Logon

T1548Abuse Elevation Control MechanismEvidence1

The UAC bypass relies on a documented technique catalogued as UACME issue #129. It exploits a Windows COM interface that hands non-admin callers an elevated instance, which the implant uses to register a high-privilege scheduled task that relaunches it with full administrator rights.

T1548.002Bypass User Account ControlEvidence1

The elevate command is a UAC bypass via the schuac technique (IElevatedFactoryServer::ServerCreateElevatedObject(CLSID_TaskScheduler))

Stealth

12 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2
TacticStealth

PHANTOMPULSE uses four XOR layers for different artifacts.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence3

According to the Elastic Security Labs report, the implant carries three separate process injection techniques... PHANTOMPULSE ships with three distinct injection methods, each designed for a different payload type.

T1055.001Dynamic-link Library InjectionEvidence1

ManualMap handles DLL payloads with a complete PE manual mapping implementation.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1
TacticStealth

Uninstall... Step 4/6 Delete stub DLLs, sleeper logs, registry PE blob, ProgramData directories Step 5/6 Delete install path and self path from disk

T1134Access Token ManipulationEvidence1

Acquires SeDebugPrivilege (via OpenProcessToken / LookupPrivilegeValueW / AdjustTokenPrivileges )

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence1
TacticStealth

For each provider, the implant issues an HTTPS GET... pulls the input field of the latest transaction, hex-decodes it, XOR-decrypts with the wallet address bytes as the key, and validates that the result begins with http.

T1218.007MsiexecEvidence1
TacticStealth

The drop command supports DLL, EXE, shellcode (APC injection), and MSI payloads.

T1218.011Rundll32Evidence1
TacticStealth

PHANTOMPULSE installs three scheduled tasks via the COM ITaskService interface, each executing rundll32.exe "<stub_dll>",DllRegisterServer

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Sleep : uniform random in [20, 40] seconds

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1
TacticStealth

The malware never writes its final stage to disk, making it far harder to detect through conventional file-based scanning.

T1574.001DLLEvidence1

Shellcode is injected using a technique called PhantomInject, which stomps a legitimate Windows DLL named dbghelp.dll rather than allocating new executable memory.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence4
TacticStealth

DLL payloads are handled through a full manual mapping routine that strips PE headers from memory, removing common forensic artifacts.

T1112Modify RegistryEvidence1

Step 1/6 Write kill flag to HKCU + HKLM... Step 3/6 Remove legacy registry: NTLoad value, COM hijack keys, print monitor keys

T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

The keylogger runs inline in the C2 loop with no dedicated thread.

Discovery

5 techniques
T1033System Owner/User DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

At startup, the implant DJB2-hashes the user name and computer name and looks each up in a precomputed table.

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

Acquires SeDebugPrivilege... then walks the process snapshot for one of seven host-process candidates

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2
TacticDiscovery

System reconnaissance (Source – Elastic)

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

Sleep : uniform random in [20, 40] seconds

T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1
TacticDiscovery

AV DetectInstalledAV matches running processes against a hardcoded list of ~25–30 AV vendor process names

Collection

3 techniques
T1056.001KeyloggingEvidence2

The keylogger runs inline in the C2 loop with no dedicated thread.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

Screenshots use GDI APIs resolved by hash. If desktop width exceeds 960 px, the image is downscaled before upload.

T1115Clipboard DataEvidence1

GetClipboardSequenceNumber Clipboard change detection OpenClipboard / GetClipboardData Clipboard reading (CF_UNICODETEXT)

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

One of the most unusual aspects of PHANTOMPULSE is how it locates its command-and-control server. Rather than using hardcoded domains or fast-flux DNS, it reads the input field of the latest transaction from a specific cryptocurrency wallet across three blockchain networks: Ethereum, Base, and Optimism.

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

For each provider, the implant issues an HTTPS GET (port 443, SSL cert errors ignored)...

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

PHANTOMPULSE decentralizes C2 lookup through three Blockscout providers: eth.blockscout[.]com (Ethereum L1) base.blockscout[.]com (Base L2) optimism.blockscout[.]com (Optimism L2)

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Once a foothold is established, an in-memory loader called PHANTOMPULL drops the PHANTOMPULSE implant onto the compromised system.

T1568Dynamic ResolutionEvidence2

PHANTOMPULSE... uses the Ethereum blockchain for resolving its command-and-control (C2) server by fetching the latest transaction associated with a hard-coded wallet address. On macOS... employing Telegram as a dead drop resolver for fallback C2 resolution.

T1573Encrypted ChannelEvidence1

For each provider, the implant issues an HTTPS GET (port 443, SSL cert errors ignored)

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1041Exfiltration Over C2 ChannelEvidence1

Five API paths are constructed at runtime... /v1/telemetry/upload/ POST image/bmp Screenshot / file upload ... /v1/telemetry/keylog/ POST text/plain Keylog data upload

Other

2 techniques
T1562.001Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence1

PHANTOMPULSE disables AMSI, the Windows Lockdown Policy code-trust check, and ETW telemetry through a single shared primitive: a hardware breakpoint planted on each API entry, intercepted by a vectored exception handler that fakes the return value without inline patching.

T1656ImpersonationEvidence1

A "novel" social engineering campaign has been observed abusing Obsidian... leveraging elaborate social engineering tactics through LinkedIn and Telegram... approaching prospective individuals under the guise of a venture capital firm and then moving the conversation to a Telegram group...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

23 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

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Network
9 tracked

IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.

Hashes
9 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

Other
5 tracked

Other indicator types observed in public reporting.

TypeValueLatest sighting
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
domain●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app3 days ago
ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

cyber security newsNews
Jun 2, 2026
PHANTOMPULSE RAT Uses Process Injection and UAC Bypass to Compromise Windows Systems

Remote access trojan used as the final-stage payload in the REF6598 attack chain. It establishes persistence, evades detection, performs process injection, uses a UAC bypass for privilege escalation, and communicates with operators via a blockchain-based C2 with fallback infrastructure.

Read more
elastic security labsNews
May 22, 2026
PHANTOMPULSE: anatomy of a hijackable blockchain-C2 RAT - Elastic Security Labs

A Windows remote access implant/final-stage payload that provides command-and-control, process injection, persistence via scheduled tasks, UAC bypass, AMSI/WLDP/ETW evasion via hardware breakpoints, keylogging, screenshot capture, system reconnaissance, and blockchain-based C2 resolution with a hardcoded fallback URL.

Read more
the hacker newsNews
Apr 16, 2026
Obsidian Plugin Abuse Delivers PHANTOMPULSE RAT in Targeted Finance, Crypto Attacks

A previously undocumented Windows remote access trojan/backdoor used in a social engineering campaign abusing Obsidian. It resolves C2 via the Ethereum blockchain and uses WinHTTP to communicate, enabling telemetry collection, command execution, file and screenshot upload, keylogging, code injection, persistence removal, and privilege escalation.

Read more
cyber security newsNews
Apr 14, 2026
Hackers Weaponize Obsidian Shell Commands Plugin to Launch Cross-Platform Malware Attacks

A previously undocumented remote access trojan/backdoor deployed on Windows that supports keylogging, screenshot capture, process injection, privilege escalation, and uses public Ethereum blockchain transaction data via Blockscout APIs to resolve C2 infrastructure.

Read more
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IOC matching23

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution4

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping37

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.