Cabbage RAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
- Delivery
- SpearphishingPhishingLureClickfix
- Platforms
- WindowsmacOSLinux
Cabbage RAT, also known as CageyChameleon, is a multi-stage remote access trojan associated with the CryptoMimic intrusion set and later financially motivated North Korean social-engineering activity overlapping with UNC1069/Bluenoroff reporting. It has been used primarily against financial organizations, especially cryptocurrency and Web3 targets, as part of intrusion chains focused on credential access, digital-asset theft, and broader post-compromise control.
Historically, Cabbage RAT has been delivered through targeted social-engineering operations, including spearphishing emails and LinkedIn messages that lead victims to malicious archives containing shortcut-based launchers and staged VBScript payloads. More recent campaigns used fake online meeting lures impersonating conferencing platforms and ClickFix-style prompts that trick victims into executing commands themselves. The malware has also been observed in payload chains tailored to the victim operating system.
Early documented Windows variants were implemented in VBScript and deployed in stages commonly referred to as Cabbage RAT-A, -B, and -C. These stages performed environment checks, filtered victims, established persistence, and maintained command-and-control over HTTP-based communications. Cabbage RAT could collect host information, enumerate processes, periodically beacon to its controller, execute server-supplied VBScript, run shell commands, list directories, upload and download files, delete files, and adjust execution intervals. Operators used it interactively alongside native system utilities for reconnaissance and follow-on actions.
The malware family also demonstrated defense-evasion behavior. Observed variants checked for security products and altered execution accordingly, and later campaigns added Windows Defender exclusions. Persistence has been achieved through Startup-folder shortcuts and related staged launchers. In broader intrusion chains, Cabbage RAT has served as a delivery mechanism for additional tooling including browser information stealers, credential theft components, and other RAT modules.
Updated variants observed in 2026 expanded beyond Windows, with payloads built specifically for Windows, macOS, and Linux victims. On Windows, newer variants collected system metadata and enumerated installed browser extensions, likely to identify cryptocurrency wallet extensions and other high-value targets. Linux samples reportedly mirrored the Windows command-and-control logic and staging behavior. These developments indicate an evolution from a VBScript-centric Windows RAT into a cross-platform malware family supporting financially motivated operations against cryptocurrency ecosystems.
Cabbage RAT has been assessed as part of campaigns showing multiple overlaps with Lazarus-linked tradecraft, though definitive attribution of the malware family itself beyond the reported operator clusters remains unsettled.
Associated threat actors
3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Cabbage RAT-C was downloaded and executed... Browser Info Stealer was downloaded and executed... msoRAT was downloaded and executed.
Cabbage RAT-C was downloaded and executed... Browser Info Stealer was downloaded and executed... msoRAT was downloaded and executed.
Validin researchers identified and analyzed the full attack chain in April 2026, revealing the scale and technical complexity of the campaign’s supporting infrastructure. They found that payloads are built specifically for the victim’s operating system, whether Windows, macOS, or Linux, and that the malware used appears to be updated variants of Cabbage RAT, also known as CageyChameleon.
Techniques & procedures
22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
3 techniques
Initial Access
The majority of CryptoMimic attacks start with an email containing a link to a website or a LinkedIn message.
In most cases, the link to the website is shortened by Bitly. As soon as a user opens the link, a file is downloaded from a cloud service such as OneDrive via a server prepared by the group.
The attackers make first contact through LinkedIn and Telegram, sometimes using previously compromised accounts to appear more legitimate. They then share scheduling links via Calendly to set up meetings on fake platforms that closely copy the look and feel of Zoom, Google Meet, and Microsoft Teams.
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
On Windows machines, the ClickFix prompt instructs victims to press Win + X followed by “A” to open a terminal with administrator privileges, then paste and run a set of commands. These commands pull down two separate PowerShell scripts from attacker-controlled servers.
The attacker launched several Windows commands on the victim host via these RATs... cmd.exe, cmdkey.exe, copy.exe, find.exe, ipconfig.exe, net.exe, netstat.exe, ping.exe, systeminfo.exe, whoami.exe, wevutil.exe.
On Linux systems, victims are instructed to press Ctrl + Alt + T... and then they are prompted to paste and execute the following commands which include fetching and running an ELF downloader.
The VBScript embedded in the website is then read and executed by mshta.exe. The script subsequently downloads other scripts and finally gains functionality as a RAT.
Because the document file is password protected, the user is fooled into opening the LNK file to check the password, which initiates the attack.
The downloaded Zip file includes a document file, such as .doc or .pdf, and a LNK file. In many cases, the name of the LNK file is something like ‘Password.txt.lnk’.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
A notable change in this version is the introduction of a .lnk shortcut file placed in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring the malware runs every time the user logs in.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
A notable change in this version is the introduction of a .lnk shortcut file placed in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring the malware runs every time the user logs in.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
In many cases, the name of the LNK file is something like ‘Password.txt.lnk’.
CryptoMimic is very careful and it is extremely difficult to observe the attack under virtual environments including in a sandbox.
The downloader determines a suitable working directory via the getTmpDir function by retrieving the $TMPDIR environment variable, falling back to /tmp/, and appending a randomly generated string to construct a unique file path.
20 → Download, Base64-decode, and XOR-decrypt a secondary VBS payload, which is then executed in memory... In-Memory Executes VBScript payloads directly in memory.
Defense Impairment
1 technique
Defense Impairment
The first script downloads a VBScript file, writes it to the temporary directory, and executes it twice using wscript.exe, while also adding the C:\Users directory to Windows Defender’s exclusion list and restarting the WinDefend service to suppress any alerts.
Discovery
4 techniques
Discovery
The RAT communicates with its command-and-control (C2) server to: Exfiltrate collected host data Enumerate running processes (getProc)
The VBScript payload is an updated variant of Cabbage RAT that begins by collecting system details including the current username, hostname, operating system version, and installed browser extensions.
The VBScript payload is an updated variant of Cabbage RAT that begins by collecting system details including the current username, hostname, operating system version, and installed browser extensions.
CryptoMimic is very careful and it is extremely difficult to observe the attack under virtual environments including in a sandbox.
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
20 → Download, Base64-decode, and XOR-decrypt a secondary VBS payload, which is then executed in memory.
The RAT communicates with its command-and-control server, sending host data and awaiting coded responses: code “20” triggers a secondary encrypted payload, code “21” terminates execution, and code “22” serves as a keep-alive signal.
These initial payloads act as downloaders, retrieving additional malicious components... The second PowerShell script performs similar actions... it uses an HTTP GET request to retrieve another VBS payload.
Exfiltration
1 technique
Exfiltration
Once access is granted, the script processes the media streams and transmits them in real time using WebRTC-based streaming... via a WebSocket signaling channel.
Observables
49 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.