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Malware3 associated actors

Cabbage RAT

Tracked since Apr 14, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK22Techniques
IOCs49Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Credential theftExfiltrationPersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionReconnaissance
Delivery
SpearphishingPhishingLureClickfix
Platforms
WindowsmacOSLinux

Cabbage RAT, also known as CageyChameleon, is a multi-stage remote access trojan associated with the CryptoMimic intrusion set and later financially motivated North Korean social-engineering activity overlapping with UNC1069/Bluenoroff reporting. It has been used primarily against financial organizations, especially cryptocurrency and Web3 targets, as part of intrusion chains focused on credential access, digital-asset theft, and broader post-compromise control.

Historically, Cabbage RAT has been delivered through targeted social-engineering operations, including spearphishing emails and LinkedIn messages that lead victims to malicious archives containing shortcut-based launchers and staged VBScript payloads. More recent campaigns used fake online meeting lures impersonating conferencing platforms and ClickFix-style prompts that trick victims into executing commands themselves. The malware has also been observed in payload chains tailored to the victim operating system.

Early documented Windows variants were implemented in VBScript and deployed in stages commonly referred to as Cabbage RAT-A, -B, and -C. These stages performed environment checks, filtered victims, established persistence, and maintained command-and-control over HTTP-based communications. Cabbage RAT could collect host information, enumerate processes, periodically beacon to its controller, execute server-supplied VBScript, run shell commands, list directories, upload and download files, delete files, and adjust execution intervals. Operators used it interactively alongside native system utilities for reconnaissance and follow-on actions.

The malware family also demonstrated defense-evasion behavior. Observed variants checked for security products and altered execution accordingly, and later campaigns added Windows Defender exclusions. Persistence has been achieved through Startup-folder shortcuts and related staged launchers. In broader intrusion chains, Cabbage RAT has served as a delivery mechanism for additional tooling including browser information stealers, credential theft components, and other RAT modules.

Updated variants observed in 2026 expanded beyond Windows, with payloads built specifically for Windows, macOS, and Linux victims. On Windows, newer variants collected system metadata and enumerated installed browser extensions, likely to identify cryptocurrency wallet extensions and other high-value targets. Linux samples reportedly mirrored the Windows command-and-control logic and staging behavior. These developments indicate an evolution from a VBScript-centric Windows RAT into a cross-platform malware family supporting financially motivated operations against cryptocurrency ecosystems.

Cabbage RAT has been assessed as part of campaigns showing multiple overlaps with Lazarus-linked tradecraft, though definitive attribution of the malware family itself beyond the reported operator clusters remains unsettled.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

Cabbage RAT-C was downloaded and executed... Browser Info Stealer was downloaded and executed... msoRAT was downloaded and executed.

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
CryptoMimic

Cabbage RAT-C was downloaded and executed... Browser Info Stealer was downloaded and executed... msoRAT was downloaded and executed.

via vb2020 vblocalhostvb2020.vblocalhost.com
APT38

Validin researchers identified and analyzed the full attack chain in April 2026, revealing the scale and technical complexity of the campaign’s supporting infrastructure. They found that payloads are built specifically for the victim’s operating system, whether Windows, macOS, or Linux, and that the malware used appears to be updated variants of Cabbage RAT, also known as CageyChameleon.

via cyber security newscybersecuritynews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

22 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence1

The majority of CryptoMimic attacks start with an email containing a link to a website or a LinkedIn message.

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

In most cases, the link to the website is shortened by Bitly. As soon as a user opens the link, a file is downloaded from a cloud service such as OneDrive via a server prepared by the group.

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

The attackers make first contact through LinkedIn and Telegram, sometimes using previously compromised accounts to appear more legitimate. They then share scheduling links via Calendly to set up meetings on fake platforms that closely copy the look and feel of Zoom, Google Meet, and Microsoft Teams.

Execution

6 techniques
T1059.001PowerShellEvidence2

On Windows machines, the ClickFix prompt instructs victims to press Win + X followed by “A” to open a terminal with administrator privileges, then paste and run a set of commands. These commands pull down two separate PowerShell scripts from attacker-controlled servers.

T1059.003Windows Command ShellEvidence1

The attacker launched several Windows commands on the victim host via these RATs... cmd.exe, cmdkey.exe, copy.exe, find.exe, ipconfig.exe, net.exe, netstat.exe, ping.exe, systeminfo.exe, whoami.exe, wevutil.exe.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence1

On Linux systems, victims are instructed to press Ctrl + Alt + T... and then they are prompted to paste and execute the following commands which include fetching and running an ELF downloader.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

The VBScript embedded in the website is then read and executed by mshta.exe. The script subsequently downloads other scripts and finally gains functionality as a RAT.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence3

Because the document file is password protected, the user is fooled into opening the LNK file to check the password, which initiates the attack.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

The downloaded Zip file includes a document file, such as .doc or .pdf, and a LNK file. In many cases, the name of the LNK file is something like ‘Password.txt.lnk’.

Persistence

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

A notable change in this version is the introduction of a .lnk shortcut file placed in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring the malware runs every time the user logs in.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1547.001Registry Run Keys / Startup FolderEvidence2

A notable change in this version is the introduction of a .lnk shortcut file placed in the Windows Startup folder, ensuring the malware runs every time the user logs in.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

In many cases, the name of the LNK file is something like ‘Password.txt.lnk’.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

CryptoMimic is very careful and it is extremely difficult to observe the attack under virtual environments including in a sandbox.

T1564Hide ArtifactsEvidence1

The downloader determines a suitable working directory via the getTmpDir function by retrieving the $TMPDIR environment variable, falling back to /tmp/, and appending a randomly generated string to construct a unique file path.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

20 → Download, Base64-decode, and XOR-decrypt a secondary VBS payload, which is then executed in memory... In-Memory Executes VBScript payloads directly in memory.

Defense Impairment

1 technique
T1685Disable or Modify ToolsEvidence2

The first script downloads a VBScript file, writes it to the temporary directory, and executes it twice using wscript.exe, while also adding the C:\Users directory to Windows Defender’s exclusion list and restarting the WinDefend service to suppress any alerts.

Discovery

4 techniques
T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence1

The RAT communicates with its command-and-control (C2) server to: Exfiltrate collected host data Enumerate running processes (getProc)

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The VBScript payload is an updated variant of Cabbage RAT that begins by collecting system details including the current username, hostname, operating system version, and installed browser extensions.

T1217Browser Information DiscoveryEvidence2

The VBScript payload is an updated variant of Cabbage RAT that begins by collecting system details including the current username, hostname, operating system version, and installed browser extensions.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence1

CryptoMimic is very careful and it is extremely difficult to observe the attack under virtual environments including in a sandbox.

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

20 → Download, Base64-decode, and XOR-decrypt a secondary VBS payload, which is then executed in memory.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence2

The RAT communicates with its command-and-control server, sending host data and awaiting coded responses: code “20” triggers a secondary encrypted payload, code “21” terminates execution, and code “22” serves as a keep-alive signal.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

These initial payloads act as downloaders, retrieving additional malicious components... The second PowerShell script performs similar actions... it uses an HTTP GET request to retrieve another VBS payload.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1567Exfiltration Over Web ServiceEvidence1

Once access is granted, the script processes the media streams and transmits them in real time using WebRTC-based streaming... via a WebSocket signaling channel.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

49 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

5 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cyber security newsNews · Apr 20, 2026North Korea-Linked UNC1069 Uses Fake Zoom and Teams Meetings to Hack Crypto ProfessionalsA remote access trojan used in a North Korean social-engineering campaign targeting cryptocurrency and Web3 professionals. On Windows, an updated VBScript variant collects system details such as username, hostname, OS version, and installed browser extensions, adds persistence via a .lnk shortcut in the Startup folder, communicates with a C2 server, and can retrieve a secondary encrypted payload. The malware also appears tailored by operating system and is aimed at stealing digital assets, including by identifying cryptocurrency wallet browser extensions.Read more ↗validin blogNews · Apr 14, 2026"Hello? I can’t hear you": Investigating UNC1069’s Fake Meeting Tactics | ValidinAn updated cross-platform RAT used in UNC1069 fake meeting campaigns. It is delivered via ClickFix-style lures and OS-specific downloaders, performs system reconnaissance, exfiltrates host data, establishes persistence in some Windows variants, communicates with C2 over HTTP POST, can download and execute additional payloads, enumerate processes, and collect Chrome extensions likely to identify cryptocurrency wallets.Read more ↗vb2020 vblocalhostNews · Aug 14, 2026A staged VBScript remote access trojan delivered in multiple phases. Cabbage RAT-B profiles the victim and reports system/task information to C2, while Cabbage RAT-C provides interactive control, file and directory listing, command execution, upload/download, and information theft support.Read more ↗vb2020 vblocalhostNews · Aug 14, 2026A multi-stage VBScript remote access trojan used by CryptoMimic. Stage A fetches and executes code from C2, stage B periodically sends victim information and executes tasks from C2, and stage C is a fuller-featured RAT used to run commands, manage files, execute VBScript, and drive later-stage payload delivery.Read more ↗
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IOC matching49Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping22Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.