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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
After credential harvesting is completed using systemupdate.app , Sapphire Sleet deploys a second malicious application named softwareupdate.app , whose sole purpose is to reinforce the illusion of a legitimate update workflow.
1 distinct technique documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The script invokes the legitimate macOS “softwareupdate” binary with an invalid parameter to mimic a real system process... A backdoor named “services” simultaneously installs a launch daemon called “com.google.webkit.service.plist,” named to closely mimic legitimate Apple and Google services so it persists across reboots without drawing attention.
1 indicator attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.