Guerrilla
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
We found that the group turned it into a criminal enterprise and established the network since at least 2018. We identified the malware as Guerrilla and deployed by the threat actor group we named “Lemon Group”... Following reports of phones being compromised with Guerrilla malware, we purchased a phone and extracted the ROM image for forensic analysis.
Techniques & procedures
16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
In time, threat actors turned to reflashing and silent installation as techniques for malicious activities... In 2021, we were studying detections of the SMS PVA mobile botnet fueled by compromised mobile supply chain attacks when we discovered the botnet and the operations of the threat actors.
Execution
3 techniques
Execution
This injected code will decrypt a DEX file from the data section and load it into memory.
Silent plugin: When any activity needs an installation permission, it gets a list of tasks from the C&C... This plugin executes the silent installation and launches the installed app.
We found a system library called libandroid_runtime.so that was tampered to inject a snippet code into a function called println_native... this injected code will decrypt a DEX file from the data section and load it into memory.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
The most unwanted “gift” sometimes found in cheap, no-name Android devices is pre-installed malware... It’s integrated right in the device’s firmware and has system privileges.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
The implant is a tampered zygote dependency library that will load a downloader into a zygote process... every time other app processes are forked from the zygote, it would also be tampered.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
The more recent versions of the loaders use fileless techniques when downloading and injecting other payloads.
The implant is a tampered zygote dependency library that will load a downloader into a zygote process... every time other app processes are forked from the zygote, it would also be tampered.
The most unwanted “gift” sometimes found in cheap, no-name Android devices is pre-installed malware... It’s integrated right in the device’s firmware and has system privileges.
We found a system library called libandroid_runtime.so that was tampered to inject a snippet code into a function called println_native... this injected code will decrypt a DEX file from the data section and load it into memory.
Credential Access
4 techniques
Credential Access
SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms
The WhatsApp plugin is used to hijack WhatsApp sessions to send unwanted messages.
The cookie plugin hooks to Facebook-related apps... It also dumps Facebook-related cookies from the app data directory and uploads it to the C&C server.
SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
This allows Lemon Group to monitor customers that can be further infected with other apps to build on, such as focusing on only showing advertisements to app users from certain regions.
Collection
3 techniques
Collection
This plugin can also harvest other data like the Friends list, profile, email addresses, and others.
SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms
SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms
Command and Control
3 techniques
Command and Control
We identified the infrastructure of their backend, including the malicious plugins and command and control (C&C) servers... Pivoting on http response of the domain led us to identify other Lemon Group C&C domains
Proxy plugin and proxy seller: Able to setup reverse proxy from an infected phone and use the network resources of the affected mobile device in exchange for their DoveProxy business.
Following a report of mobile devices being used for a fraud campaign, we analyzed one of the devices preloaded with two different loaders capable of downloading other components... The loaded downloader (we called main plugin) can download and run other plugins.
Observables
11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
3 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.