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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor

Guerrilla

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 6 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK16Techniques
IOCs11Tracked
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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lemon Group

We found that the group turned it into a criminal enterprise and established the network since at least 2018. We identified the malware as Guerrilla and deployed by the threat actor group we named “Lemon Group”... Following reports of phones being compromised with Guerrilla malware, we purchased a phone and extracted the ROM image for forensic analysis.

via trendai security blogtrendaisecurity.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

16 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1195Supply Chain CompromiseEvidence1

In time, threat actors turned to reflashing and silent installation as techniques for malicious activities... In 2021, we were studying detections of the SMS PVA mobile botnet fueled by compromised mobile supply chain attacks when we discovered the botnet and the operations of the threat actors.

Execution

3 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

This injected code will decrypt a DEX file from the data section and load it into memory.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

Silent plugin: When any activity needs an installation permission, it gets a list of tasks from the C&C... This plugin executes the silent installation and launches the installed app.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

We found a system library called libandroid_runtime.so that was tampered to inject a snippet code into a function called println_native... this injected code will decrypt a DEX file from the data section and load it into memory.

Persistence

1 technique
T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence1

The most unwanted “gift” sometimes found in cheap, no-name Android devices is pre-installed malware... It’s integrated right in the device’s firmware and has system privileges.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The implant is a tampered zygote dependency library that will load a downloader into a zygote process... every time other app processes are forked from the zygote, it would also be tampered.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

The more recent versions of the loaders use fileless techniques when downloading and injecting other payloads.

T1055Process InjectionEvidence1

The implant is a tampered zygote dependency library that will load a downloader into a zygote process... every time other app processes are forked from the zygote, it would also be tampered.

T1542Pre-OS BootEvidence1

The most unwanted “gift” sometimes found in cheap, no-name Android devices is pre-installed malware... It’s integrated right in the device’s firmware and has system privileges.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

We found a system library called libandroid_runtime.so that was tampered to inject a snippet code into a function called println_native... this injected code will decrypt a DEX file from the data section and load it into memory.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms

T1528Steal Application Access TokenEvidence1

The WhatsApp plugin is used to hijack WhatsApp sessions to send unwanted messages.

T1539Steal Web Session CookieEvidence1

The cookie plugin hooks to Facebook-related apps... It also dumps Facebook-related cookies from the app data directory and uploads it to the C&C server.

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms

Discovery

1 technique
T1518Software DiscoveryEvidence1

This allows Lemon Group to monitor customers that can be further infected with other apps to build on, such as focusing on only showing advertisements to app users from certain regions.

Collection

3 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

This plugin can also harvest other data like the Friends list, profile, email addresses, and others.

T1056Input CaptureEvidence1

SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms

T1557Adversary-in-the-MiddleEvidence1

SMS plugin: Capable of intercepting received SMS and read specific messages such as one-time passwords (OTP) from various platforms

Command and Control

3 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

We identified the infrastructure of their backend, including the malicious plugins and command and control (C&C) servers... Pivoting on http response of the domain led us to identify other Lemon Group C&C domains

T1090ProxyEvidence1

Proxy plugin and proxy seller: Able to setup reverse proxy from an infected phone and use the network resources of the affected mobile device in exchange for their DoveProxy business.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Following a report of mobile devices being used for a fraud campaign, we analyzed one of the devices preloaded with two different loaders capable of downloading other components... The loaded downloader (we called main plugin) can download and run other plugins.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

11 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching11Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping16Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.