SpiceRAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
SpiceRAT is a Windows remote-access trojan used in targeted cyberespionage activity. Cisco Talos previously associated it with the suspected China-based SneakyChef group, and it was later observed as one of several remote-access tools used in the SilkParasite campaign, a medium-confidence China-nexus activity cluster targeting government organizations in Central Asia. SilkParasite activity also targeted government, energy, and telecommunications interests in the region. Infection chains used spear-phishing messages carrying malicious Microsoft Office documents, including password-protected archives, and executed payloads through DLL sideloading with legitimate signed Windows applications. SpiceRAT has been documented establishing scheduled-task persistence and supports downloading and executing binaries and arbitrary commands. Its command-and-control infrastructure has been linked through shared domains, certificates, and hosting artifacts with infrastructure associated with other SilkParasite RATs, although this infrastructure overlap does not establish common operator control.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Hunt.io identified a cluster of five active SpiceRAT command-and-control servers in mid-March 2026 and linked them through common hostnames, TLS certificates, and a cloned RTX Corporation webpage.
The initial foothold involved two families, SpiceRAT and DriveSilkRAT... SpiceRAT is the family that was previously documented by Cisco Talos, June 2024, in reporting on SneakyChef.
Techniques & procedures
20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Resource Development
3 techniques
Resource Development
“The infrastructure used names resembling government agencies, state energy operators and telecom organizations across Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.”
“The above certificate was issued by TLC DV TLS CA” and “A domain-validated certificate impersonating a Central Asian state entity was obtained from a Chinese CA.”
“Requests to ns2.asiainfo.it[.]com on 188.190.29[.]126 returned a complete copy of RTX Corporation's homepage” and “this is a likely static, self-contained decoy.”
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
“The operation has used spear-phishing emails carrying convincing government-themed documents ... to plant remote-access malware.”
Execution
4 techniques
Execution
"SysEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore NodeEdgeRAT persistence scheduled task"; "fl_bridge BloodAlchemy persistence scheduled task"; and multiple "SpiceRAT persistence scheduled task" entries.
DriveSilkRAT ... run it through an in-memory .NET plugin system ... NodeEdgeRAT ... spanning command execution ... SpiceRAT ... equipped to download and run executable binaries and arbitrary commands.
Once opened, the document ran a macro that dropped a signed-application sideloading chain to disk.
Once opened, the document ran a macro that dropped a signed-application sideloading chain to disk and launched the first-stage payload.
Persistence
1 technique
Persistence
"SysEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore NodeEdgeRAT persistence scheduled task"; "fl_bridge BloodAlchemy persistence scheduled task"; and multiple "SpiceRAT persistence scheduled task" entries.
Privilege Escalation
1 technique
Privilege Escalation
"SysEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore NodeEdgeRAT persistence scheduled task"; "fl_bridge BloodAlchemy persistence scheduled task"; and multiple "SpiceRAT persistence scheduled task" entries.
Stealth
4 techniques
Stealth
Its newer variants resolve the Windows APIs they need dynamically by hash rather than through ordinary imports.
The cluster's domains don't just look governmental; they spoof specific ministries and state enterprises... [including] Turkmenistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs... Tojiktelecom... Turkmen energy... Uzbek administration... and even the Kyrgyz president's residence.
“The infrastructure used certificates and websites impersonating Uzbekistan’s state railway, Türkmengaz, Tojiktelecom, and Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a fake RTX Corporation homepage also observed on the servers.”
SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.
Discovery
1 technique
Discovery
Before executing, it checked whether Kaspersky’s avp.exe process was running and adapted its behavior accordingly.
Lateral Movement
1 technique
Lateral Movement
Monitor for high-numbered RDP-over-TLS ports (64350, 64330, 65535, 65111) on the ASNs most prevalent in the cluster.
Collection
1 technique
Collection
“These tools can give operators a foothold in a victim network, allowing operators to collect information and issue commands.”
Command and Control
5 techniques
Command and Control
“SpiceRAT command-and-control servers” and “These tools can give operators a foothold in a victim network, allowing operators to collect information and issue commands.”
“The cloned page is served on port 80, while SpiceRAT's command channel operates separately on port 443.”
It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.
Nearly every family in SilkParasite is built around plugin architecture: the implant loads additional capabilities on demand from its command-and-control server rather than shipping them all at once.
“SilkParasite ... used seven remote-access toolsets against Central Asian governments.”
Observables
179 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.