Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors

SpiceRAT

Tracked since May 26, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK20Techniques
IOCs179Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
PersistencePost exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

SpiceRAT is a Windows remote-access trojan used in targeted cyberespionage activity. Cisco Talos previously associated it with the suspected China-based SneakyChef group, and it was later observed as one of several remote-access tools used in the SilkParasite campaign, a medium-confidence China-nexus activity cluster targeting government organizations in Central Asia. SilkParasite activity also targeted government, energy, and telecommunications interests in the region. Infection chains used spear-phishing messages carrying malicious Microsoft Office documents, including password-protected archives, and executed payloads through DLL sideloading with legitimate signed Windows applications. SpiceRAT has been documented establishing scheduled-task persistence and supports downloading and executing binaries and arbitrary commands. Its command-and-control infrastructure has been linked through shared domains, certificates, and hosting artifacts with infrastructure associated with other SilkParasite RATs, although this infrastructure overlap does not establish common operator control.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
SilkParasite

Hunt.io identified a cluster of five active SpiceRAT command-and-control servers in mid-March 2026 and linked them through common hostnames, TLS certificates, and a cloned RTX Corporation webpage.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
SneakyChef

The initial foothold involved two families, SpiceRAT and DriveSilkRAT... SpiceRAT is the family that was previously documented by Cisco Talos, June 2024, in reporting on SneakyChef.

via bitdefender blogbitdefender.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

20 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

3 techniques
T1583.001DomainsEvidence3

“The infrastructure used names resembling government agencies, state energy operators and telecom organizations across Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.”

T1583.003Virtual Private ServerEvidence1

“The above certificate was issued by TLC DV TLS CA” and “A domain-validated certificate impersonating a Central Asian state entity was obtained from a Chinese CA.”

T1608.001Upload MalwareEvidence1

“Requests to ns2.asiainfo.it[.]com on 188.190.29[.]126 returned a complete copy of RTX Corporation's homepage” and “this is a likely static, self-contained decoy.”

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence5

“The operation has used spear-phishing emails carrying convincing government-themed documents ... to plant remote-access malware.”

Execution

4 techniques
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

"SysEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore NodeEdgeRAT persistence scheduled task"; "fl_bridge BloodAlchemy persistence scheduled task"; and multiple "SpiceRAT persistence scheduled task" entries.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

DriveSilkRAT ... run it through an in-memory .NET plugin system ... NodeEdgeRAT ... spanning command execution ... SpiceRAT ... equipped to download and run executable binaries and arbitrary commands.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

Once opened, the document ran a macro that dropped a signed-application sideloading chain to disk.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Once opened, the document ran a macro that dropped a signed-application sideloading chain to disk and launched the first-stage payload.

Persistence

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

"SysEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore NodeEdgeRAT persistence scheduled task"; "fl_bridge BloodAlchemy persistence scheduled task"; and multiple "SpiceRAT persistence scheduled task" entries.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence3

"SysEdgeUpdateTaskMachineCore NodeEdgeRAT persistence scheduled task"; "fl_bridge BloodAlchemy persistence scheduled task"; and multiple "SpiceRAT persistence scheduled task" entries.

Stealth

4 techniques
T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

Its newer variants resolve the Windows APIs they need dynamically by hash rather than through ordinary imports.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence5

The cluster's domains don't just look governmental; they spoof specific ministries and state enterprises... [including] Turkmenistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs... Tojiktelecom... Turkmen energy... Uzbek administration... and even the Kyrgyz president's residence.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

“The infrastructure used certificates and websites impersonating Uzbekistan’s state railway, Türkmengaz, Tojiktelecom, and Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a fake RTX Corporation homepage also observed on the servers.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.

Discovery

1 technique
T1518.001Security Software DiscoveryEvidence1

Before executing, it checked whether Kaspersky’s avp.exe process was running and adapted its behavior accordingly.

Lateral Movement

1 technique
T1021.001Remote Desktop ProtocolEvidence1

Monitor for high-numbered RDP-over-TLS ports (64350, 64330, 65535, 65111) on the ASNs most prevalent in the cluster.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

“These tools can give operators a foothold in a victim network, allowing operators to collect information and issue commands.”

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

“SpiceRAT command-and-control servers” and “These tools can give operators a foothold in a victim network, allowing operators to collect information and issue commands.”

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

“The cloned page is served on port 80, while SpiceRAT's command channel operates separately on port 443.”

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Nearly every family in SilkParasite is built around plugin architecture: the implant loads additional capabilities on demand from its command-and-control server rather than shipping them all at once.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

“SilkParasite ... used seven remote-access toolsets against Central Asian governments.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

179 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

13 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
security affairsNews · Sep 17, 2026SilkParasite Infrastructure Links SpiceRAT to Central Asian Targets - Security AffairsA remote-access trojan used in the long-running SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. Its C2 infrastructure used spoofed Central Asian government and state-enterprise domains, shared TLS certificates, and a recurring cloned RTX webpage fingerprint.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 17, 2026SilkParasite-Linked Malware Infrastructure Traced Back Four Years Across Central AsiaA remote-access tool used in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation to establish a foothold in victim networks, collect information, and receive operator commands. Its C2 infrastructure was linked through shared domains, certificate reuse, and cloned RTX web-page artifacts.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Sep 17, 2026SilkParasite-Linked Malware Infrastructure Traced Back Four Years Across Central Asia | Cryptika CybersecurityA remote-access malware family used in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. Its infrastructure was associated with spear-phishing lures and trusted Windows programs used to establish footholds, collect information, and issue commands in victim networks.Read more ↗gurucul threat researchNews · Sep 17, 2026SilkParasite Infrastructure: SpiceRAT Servers Tied to Energy and Government Targets Across Central Asia | Community Portal | GuruculRemote-access trojan whose command-and-control infrastructure was active against Central Asian government and energy-related entities, using infrastructure impersonating regional state and telecommunications organizations.Read more ↗
+7 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching179Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping20Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.