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Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
4 distinct threat actors attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
These variants of the malware also contain another embedded .NET DLL, internally referred to as LibCMD from the original filename LibCMD.dll... This is a small file, whose purpose is simply to start cmd.exe and connect to stdin/stdout. The file contains a tampered PE link timestamp. It is never saved to disk; instead, it is loaded dynamically in memory as a .NET assembly and executed.
These variants of the malware also contain another embedded .NET DLL, internally referred to as LibCMD from the original filename LibCMD.dll... This is a small file, whose purpose is simply to start cmd.exe and connect to stdin/stdout. The file contains a tampered PE link timestamp. It is never saved to disk; instead, it is loaded dynamically in memory as a .NET assembly and executed.
These variants of the malware also contain another embedded .NET DLL, internally referred to as LibCMD from the original filename LibCMD.dll... This is a small file, whose purpose is simply to start cmd.exe and connect to stdin/stdout. The file contains a tampered PE link timestamp. It is never saved to disk; instead, it is loaded dynamically in memory as a .NET assembly and executed.
These variants of the malware also contain another embedded .NET DLL, internally referred to as LibCMD from the original filename LibCMD.dll... This is a small file, whose purpose is simply to start cmd.exe and connect to stdin/stdout. The file contains a tampered PE link timestamp. It is never saved to disk; instead, it is loaded dynamically in memory as a .NET assembly and executed.
2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.