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Malware3 associated actors

sLoad

Tracked since Jul 7, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors3Associated
ATT&CK31Techniques
IOCs66Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
PersistenceReconnaissanceExfiltrationDefense evasion
Delivery
PhishingSpearphishingMalspamLureLanding page
Platforms
Windows

sLoad is a PowerShell-based downloader targeting Microsoft Windows, observed in email campaigns since at least May 2018. It combines extensive host reconnaissance with command-and-control functionality to select and deliver additional malware, particularly the Ramnit banking Trojan. Campaigns associated with TA554 have targeted recipients in Italy, the United Kingdom, and Canada. sLoad has also been deployed in Ukrainian phishing campaigns attributed to UAC-0050.

Delivery commonly uses localized, sometimes personalized phishing emails with invoice, package-delivery, order-notification, or official-document lures. Links or attachments lead to archives containing malicious Windows shortcuts, scripts, or macro-enabled documents. Subsequent stages use PowerShell and VBScript to retrieve and execute the downloader. Italian campaigns have also distributed sLoad through compromised PEC certified-email accounts.

sLoad establishes persistence through scheduled tasks and frequently stores encrypted PowerShell components that are decrypted and executed in memory. It extensively abuses the Windows Background Intelligent Transfer Service for payload downloads, command-and-control exchanges, and data exfiltration. Reconnaissance capabilities include enumerating processes, collecting operating-system and hardware information, identifying network resources, checking for Outlook and Citrix artifacts, and examining cached DNS entries for banking-related activity. Earlier variants capture and upload desktop screenshots. Operators can instruct infected hosts to execute additional PowerShell code, download and run executables, or update the malware.

Defense-evasion techniques include obfuscated scripts, encrypted components, analysis-tool checks, and execution chains built around legitimate Windows utilities. Version 2.0, also called Starslord, adds infection-stage tracking and anti-analysis checks that segregate suspected analyst systems and withhold genuine follow-on payloads. This version removes the earlier screenshot-upload behavior while retaining system-information exfiltration and payload delivery.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

3 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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UAC-0050

Three days after, a new campaign was launched with the same IP located in Russia ... this time deploying the sLoad malware.

via intrinsec blogintrinsec.com
TA554

Since May 2018, Proofpoint researchers have observed email campaigns using a new downloader called sLoad. sLoad is a PowerShell downloader that most frequently delivers Ramnit banker and includes noteworthy reconnaissance features.

via proofpoint threat insight blogproofpoint.com
APT38

Variant A (callsdk.online) Variant B (weekly-up.online) ... VT score 21/62 – Trojan.NukeSped 27/62 – Trojan.SLoad

via jumpsec labsjumpsec.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

31 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1566PhishingEvidence2

Il Cert-AgID ha riscontrato una nuova campagna massiva di malspam veicolata tramite PEC compromesse

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

Attached to the mail could be found a RAR archive, itself containing a ZIP archive unveiling a shortcut file (LNK).

T1566.002Spearphishing LinkEvidence1

The emails are crafted in the targeted country’s language and are often personalized to include recipients’ names and addresses in various parts of the email such as email body and subject. TA554 frequently uses package delivery or order notification lures; the emails contain URLs linking to zipped LNK files or zipped documents.

Execution

8 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

It then creates a scheduled task to run the .tmp file every 3 minutes, similar to the previous version.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Uses a Scheduled Task to execute sLoad

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence3

The response can begin with: “run=” This is followed by a URL which is downloaded and its PowerShell content executed

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

The LNK file or document macros in turn download the next stage -- typically a PowerShell script which may download the final payload or another downloader such as sLoad.

T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence3

Its purpose was to download a VBS script and a decoy PDF icon from the following folder.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

BITSAdmin Abuse: MITRE Technique T1197. The malicious PowerShell script uses BITSAdmin to download sLoad from bureaucratica[.]org/bureaux/tica.

T1204User ExecutionEvidence1

When the target opens the .lnk shortcut file, a CMD spawns a PowerShell with obfuscated commands.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence2

Once unzipped, it unveiled a text file providing a password ‘3902879’, used to decrypt a RAR archive contained with it... Inside this RAR archive could be found a 32-bit executable Remcos payload.

Persistence

4 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

It then creates a scheduled task to run the .tmp file every 3 minutes, similar to the previous version.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Uses a Scheduled Task to execute sLoad

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

BITSAdmin Abuse: MITRE Technique T1197. The malicious PowerShell script uses BITSAdmin to download sLoad from bureaucratica[.]org/bureaux/tica.

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

data can be appended to the end of a LNK file after the termination block... the link target field essentially contains a short “carving script” that finds and executes commands located after the end of the LNK file.

Privilege Escalation

3 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence2

It then creates a scheduled task to run the .tmp file every 3 minutes, similar to the previous version.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence1

Uses a Scheduled Task to execute sLoad

T1547.009Shortcut ModificationEvidence2

data can be appended to the end of a LNK file after the termination block... the link target field essentially contains a short “carving script” that finds and executes commands located after the end of the LNK file.

Stealth

10 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence4

with Starslord, the system information is encoded into Base64 data before being exfiltrated

T1027.010Command ObfuscationEvidence1

The VBS script’s purpose was to download an obfuscated and weaponized version of the SSH client PuTTY.

T1027.012LNK Icon SmugglingEvidence1

Attached to the mail could be found a RAR archive, itself containing a ZIP archive unveiling a shortcut file (LNK). Its purpose was to download a VBS script and a decoy PDF icon.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence2

Once launched, they would both download a SmokeLoader payload from the following URL, posing as a legitimate PuTTY executable.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence1

After the executable is initiated, the malware hides its tracks using CMD with the del command to delete three files, including the encoded and decoded payloads.

T1140Deobfuscate/Decode Files or InformationEvidence2

The encoded payloads were decoded into a malicious executable using certutil.

T1197BITS JobsEvidence1

BITSAdmin Abuse: MITRE Technique T1197. The malicious PowerShell script uses BITSAdmin to download sLoad from bureaucratica[.]org/bureaux/tica.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The script is able to check to see if it is being debugged or run in a test environment by looking at the names of running processes and comparing them to a list of analysis tools.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

It performs a check to see if any security processes are running on the system and exits if found

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

TimeSerial() function introduces a delay in code execution, potentially bypassing detection by sandbox environments and automated analysis tools.

Discovery

8 techniques
T1016System Network Configuration DiscoveryEvidence2

sLoad can also... check the DNS cache for specific domains (e.g., targeted banks)

T1057Process DiscoveryEvidence2

Collection of information to report to the C&C server that includes: A list of running process

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence4

The malware gathers information about the infected system including a list of running processes, the presence of Outlook, and the presence of Citrix-related files.

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence2

If any files with .ICA extension are found on the system, searched starting from the “C:\users” folder... Whether an Outlook folder is present on the system

T1135Network Share DiscoveryEvidence1

It also attempts to extract information about network shares and physical devices by using the NET VIEW command.

T1497Virtualization/Sandbox EvasionEvidence2

The script is able to check to see if it is being debugged or run in a test environment by looking at the names of running processes and comparing them to a list of analysis tools.

T1497.001System ChecksEvidence2

It performs a check to see if any security processes are running on the system and exits if found

T1497.003Time Based ChecksEvidence1

TimeSerial() function introduces a delay in code execution, potentially bypassing detection by sandbox environments and automated analysis tools.

Collection

2 techniques
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

sLoad attempts to extract .ICA files from the infected machine, with a particular focus on files in Outlook's user directory.

T1113Screen CaptureEvidence3

The ability to take screenshots... Near the end of the main loop, sLoad will upload the screenshots it took of the victim’s Desktop to the “p.php” URI.

Command and Control

2 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence1

sLoad’s network communication begins with an initial C&C beacon to path “/img.php?ch=1”... it pushes extensive information about the victim’s system to the C&C, expects and executes commands from the server

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence6

The VBS script’s purpose was to download an obfuscated and weaponized version of the SSH client PuTTY through the following Bitbucket folder.

Exfiltration

1 technique
T1048Exfiltration Over Alternative ProtocolEvidence2

the malware uses a download BITS job to exfiltrate stolen system information and receive additional payloads from the active C2 server

Indicators of compromise

Observables

66 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

11 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

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IOC matching66Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors3Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping31Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.