Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.
1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
The chain then leveraged a likely AI-generated PowerShell stage to install the Deno runtime and launch the next-stage Deno-based loader, DinDoor, followed by DenoRAT. DenoRAT ultimately functioned as a loader for NightshadeC2...
18 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
The chain then leveraged a likely AI-generated PowerShell stage to install the Deno runtime and launch the next-stage Deno-based loader, DinDoor.
DenoRAT ultimately functioned as a loader for NightshadeC2, receiving a task from the C2 that launched a Python-based in-memory loader to decrypt and execute the NightshadeC2 RAT/infostealer payload.
It then performs DLL injection [ T1055.001 ] by allocating memory in the target browser process with VirtualAllocEx , writing the DLL with WriteProcessMemory , changing protections to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ via VirtualProtectEx , and starting execution via CreateRemoteThread .
The DenoRAT stager, also known internally as, "launcher-2" is obfuscated via Obfuscator.io
It then performs DLL injection [ T1055.001 ] by allocating memory in the target browser process with VirtualAllocEx , writing the DLL with WriteProcessMemory , changing protections to PAGE_EXECUTE_READ via VirtualProtectEx , and starting execution via CreateRemoteThread .
To prepare for injection, it enumerates running processes matching the browser list below using the Windows APIs CreateToolhelp32Snapshot , Process32First , and Process32Next .
DenoRAT supports both WebSocket and HTTP polling for communication with its C2 server. In this instance, DenoRAT uses HTTP
18 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.
IPs, domains, and DNS infrastructure linked to this family.
File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.
Other indicator types observed in public reporting.
1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.
Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.
YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.