Skip to main content
Mallory
Malware2 associated actors1 associated CVE

ENCFORGE

Tracked since Jul 20, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns1Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK28Techniques
IOCs8Tracked
Type
Ransomware
Capabilities
ExtortionDefense evasion
Platforms
Linux

ENCFORGE is a Go-based ransomware family designed to encrypt artificial intelligence and machine-learning assets. Associated with the JADEPUFFER threat actor, it has been deployed against Linux infrastructure following exploitation of CVE-2025-3248, an unauthenticated remote-code-execution vulnerability in Langflow. In the observed deployment chain, the operator abused an exposed Docker socket to create a privileged container, cross the container-host boundary, and execute the ransomware on the host.

The ransomware targets approximately 180 file extensions covering model checkpoints, model weights, vector indexes, embedding data, training datasets, and other machine-learning artifacts. Its targets include PyTorch and TensorFlow models, SafeTensors, ONNX, GGUF and GGML weights, FAISS indexes, and datasets in Parquet, Arrow, TFRecord, and NumPy formats. A command-line interface allows operators to extend the default targeting list and perform a trial scan before encryption; a companion key-generation tool is also referenced.

ENCFORGE uses region-based encryption with AES-256-CTR and wraps the per-run symmetric key with an embedded RSA-2048 public key. It renames encrypted files, drops ransom notes, terminates processes holding targeted files open, and supports resuming interrupted execution without re-encrypting completed files. The observed binary is packed with UPX and can delete itself after execution.

The operation focuses on encryption-based extortion and disruption of AI infrastructure. No data-exfiltration mechanism was identified in the recovered binary, and no data theft or associated leak site was observed in the documented campaign. Attribution to JADEPUFFER was supported by reuse of the extortion contact from the actor's earlier activity.

Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2025-3248via mkd cirtExploited in the wildUnauthenticated Remote Code Execution in Langflow Code ValidationJADEPUFFER's earlier agentic ransomware attack exploited the known Langflow vulnerability CVE-2025-3248 to gain access, collect credentials, move laterally, encrypt Nacos-service configuration files, delete original database tables, and leave a Bitcoin ransom note.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details →
JADEPUFFER

The same Langflow instance was subsequently targeted by the threat actor a second time using a compiled Go-based ransomware strain codenamed ENCFORGE.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
Storm-3168

The same Langflow instance was subsequently targeted by the threat actor a second time using a compiled Go-based ransomware strain codenamed ENCFORGE.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

28 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

“[It] replayed the credentials against internal databases and cache services to see what they would unlock.”

T1190Exploit Public-Facing ApplicationEvidence6

The initial JADEPUFFER operation exploited the known Langflow vulnerability CVE-2025-3248 to break in.

Execution

4 techniques
T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence1

Over five minutes and 24 seconds, the operator created and revised six Python scripts through the same Langflow RCE channel until it had a working path to the host.

T1059.006PythonEvidence10

“In only 5 minutes and 24 seconds, the agent iterated six Python scripts through the Langflow RCE channel.”

T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence6

This attack exploited the critical vulnerability CVE-2025-3248 that allows remote Python code execution due to a critical missing authentication vulnerability in Langflow's code-validation endpoint.

T1610Deploy ContainerEvidence1

This method used privileged containers, host process access, and host filesystem mounts to escape the original container boundary.

Persistence

2 techniques
T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

“[It] replayed the credentials against internal databases and cache services to see what they would unlock.”

T1543.005Container ServiceEvidence2

Container create requests with Privileged: true combined with PidMode: host or a bind mount of / are a high-confidence escape indicator.

Privilege Escalation

4 techniques
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

the AI agent exploited the same Langflow vulnerability that was used in the earlier attack and located an exposed Docker socket that it leveraged to create a privileged escape container and deploy the ENCFORGE payload.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

“[It] replayed the credentials against internal databases and cache services to see what they would unlock.”

T1543.005Container ServiceEvidence2

Container create requests with Privileged: true combined with PidMode: host or a bind mount of / are a high-confidence escape indicator.

T1611Escape to HostEvidence11

“It built a container escape mechanism to carry the binary across a namespace boundary and run it directly on the host.”

Stealth

6 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Starting with the second, the operator encoded each full script in base64 and decoded it inside an exec() call, avoiding shell-level searches for commands such as base64 -d .

T1027.002Software PackingEvidence1

“ENCFORGE is a compiled, UPX-packed Go ransomware binary.”

T1070Indicator RemovalEvidence1

drops ransom notes as README , HOW_TO_DECRYPT , and README_DECRYPT , and deletes itself after running.

T1070.004File DeletionEvidence5

Following encrypting the targeted files, ENCFORGE terminated processes holding file locks and deleted itself once the encryption was complete.

T1078Valid AccountsEvidence2

“[It] replayed the credentials against internal databases and cache services to see what they would unlock.”

T1218System Binary Proxy ExecutionEvidence3

By launching a privileged container over the mounted Docker socket, the ransomware was moved across the container boundary through the host's proc file system and executed against the host file system outside the original container's isolation using the mounted Docker socket.

Credential Access

4 techniques
T1552Unsecured CredentialsEvidence1

After gaining access and searching for cloud credentials, API tokens, and reachable internal services

T1552.005Cloud Instance Metadata APIEvidence1

“JADEPUFFER began by harvesting provider keys and cloud credentials from a single compromised host.”

T1555Credentials from Password StoresEvidence2

After gaining access, JADEPUFFER searched for credentials

T1649Steal or Forge Authentication CertificatesEvidence1

Once inside, the agent ran through the familiar reconnaissance and credential-harvest routine seen in the first campaign

Discovery

5 techniques
T1046Network Service DiscoveryEvidence1

“[It] probed internal services to check their reachability.”

T1082System Information DiscoveryEvidence1

the actor autonomously performed reconnaissance

T1083File and Directory DiscoveryEvidence5

An ENCFORGE binary was deployed in the second campaign that searched for 180 different file extensions... ENCFORGE is specifically designed to identify AI-related assets.

T1526Cloud Service DiscoveryEvidence1

After gaining access and searching for cloud credentials, API tokens, and reachable internal services

T1613Container and Resource DiscoveryEvidence6

The attacker generated multiple Python scripts using the compromised Langflow environment... the scripts were able to develop a method for exiting the container environment through the exposed Docker socket and executing the ransomware on the host machine.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence9

“[The operator] attempted to fetch the ENCFORGE binary from its command-and-control (C2) server to continue the attack.”

Impact

4 techniques
T1485Data DestructionEvidence1

Unlike conventional ransomware targets, however, encrypted AI model artifacts cannot be restored after they are wiped.

T1486Data Encrypted for ImpactEvidence16

The earlier Langflow intrusion encrypted Nacos service configuration files, leveraging MySQL's built-in AES_ENCRYPT() function. A subsequent attack used the Go-based ransomware strain ENCFORGE.

T1489Service StopEvidence6

Following encrypting the targeted files, ENCFORGE terminated processes holding file locks and deleted itself once the encryption was complete.

T1490Inhibit System RecoveryEvidence3

Anti-recovery and ransom note: ENCFORGE kills processes holding file locks before encrypting data... The binary carries live Windows anti-recovery code in this Linux build: vssadmin.exe (Volume Shadow Copy deletion) and bcdedit.exe (boot recovery disable) are literal invocations in the WipeShadowCopies and DisableRecoveryActions functions.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

8 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

View all in app →
Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

17 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

View more in app →
mkd cirtNews · Sep 28, 2026Напаѓачи поврзани со JADEPUFFER користеле компромитирани Service Principals за бришење Azure ресурси | MKD-CIRT | Национален центар за одговор на компјутерски инцидентиA Go-based ransomware variant tailored to AI infrastructure. It scans a broad range of AI-related files and macOS-specific files for encryption.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Sep 28, 2026JADEPUFFER-Linked Attackers Used Compromised Service Principals to Delete Azure ResourcesA compiled Go-based ransomware strain designed to target AI infrastructure. It scans for nearly 180 file extensions associated with model checkpoints, vector databases, training datasets, embedding indices, and macOS-focused files.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Sep 20, 2026When Ransomware Targets AI Models: Defending the AI/ML Recovery ChainA purpose-built ransomware binary targeting AI and machine-learning artifacts, including model formats, vector indexes, training datasets, LoRA fine-tune adapters, and model weights. It uses region-based hybrid encryption: AES-256-CTR per-run keys wrapped with an embedded RSA-2048 public key, and renames encrypted files with a .locked extension.Read more ↗cryptika blogNews · Sep 20, 2026When Ransomware Targets AI Models: Defending the AI/ML Recovery Chain | Cryptika CybersecurityPurpose-built ransomware that encrypts AI/ML assets. It uses hybrid AES-256-CTR and embedded RSA-2048 encryption, encrypts regions of files, and renames encrypted files with a .locked extension. It was deployed by JADEPUFFER to destroy and extort organizations' model checkpoints, datasets, vector stores, and related ML artifacts without data exfiltration.Read more ↗
+13 more in the timeline. Sign up to see them
Is this in your environment?See whether this family's indicators match your telemetry and which of your assets are exposed to the CVEs associated with it.
Check your exposure
Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching8Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping28Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.