SopraVPN
- Type
- Downloader
- Capabilities
- Initial accessDefense evasionPersistence
- Delivery
- SpearphishingLure
- Platforms
- WindowsLinux
SopraVPN is a trojanized WireGuard-based VPN client used to covertly execute commands and download additional malware on Windows and Linux systems. It is associated with UAC-0145, a Sandworm-linked threat cluster connected to Russia’s GRU. Its deployment has been observed in a fraudulent recruitment campaign targeting Ukrainian system administrators and other IT professionals since at least May 2026.
Attackers impersonate recruiters and legitimate IT companies, approaching candidates through job platforms before continuing conversations through messaging applications and staged video interviews. A purported technical assessment requires candidates to connect to a corporate network using supplied WireGuard configurations. After the connection fails, the interviewer directs the candidate to install SopraVPN, distributed through SourceForge and promoted through an imitation company website.
The modified client accepts an additional configuration option containing Base64-encoded, AES-256-GCM-encrypted command data. It derives the decryption key from the VPN configuration’s private-key value and routes decrypted PowerShell through WireGuard’s script-execution mechanism, enabling concealed arbitrary command execution. On Windows, the commands create a scheduled task that downloads a secondary payload. On Linux, the infection chain uses curl to retrieve another executable from attacker-controlled infrastructure through the VPN. The identities and capabilities of the subsequent payloads, and the campaign’s ultimate objective, have not been established.
Associated threat actors
2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
Threat actors recommend downloading a custom VPN solution named SopraVPN. CERT-UA explains that the attackers' VPN client was compiled from WireGuard source code with modifications enabling concealed command execution.
Threat actors recommend downloading a custom VPN solution named SopraVPN. CERT-UA explains that the attackers' VPN client was compiled from WireGuard source code with modifications enabling concealed command execution.
Techniques & procedures
15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Reconnaissance
2 techniques
Reconnaissance
Early exchanges take place through a job-site chat and Telegram, followed by a basic English-language screening and a Zoom meeting that appears to involve a real person.
The attackers reportedly approach candidates while impersonating IT employers. Early exchanges take place through a job-site chat and Telegram, followed by a basic English-language screening and a Zoom meeting that appears to involve a real person.
Initial Access
4 techniques
Initial Access
The application is a modified build based on WireGuard source code. CERT-UA found that the altered client accepts an extra configuration setting, SymmetricKey.
Sandworm has turned the routine job interview into a route for compromising IT workers.
additional instructions for the technical interview are sent via email, including configuration files for connecting to a 'corporate' VPN using Wireguard
The operation targets system administrators and other IT specialists after attackers study their resumes on job-search sites. It begins with a message from a supposed employer, moves into a chat... Early exchanges take place through a job-site chat and Telegram
Execution
6 techniques
Execution
On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet.
On Windows, the malicious command creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the Internet.
The key clue is a non-standard SymmetricKey option... the decrypted result is passed into WireGuard’s command-execution path used for options such as PostUp.
It uses information hidden there, together with the configuration’s private key, to decrypt embedded PowerShell code.
The Linux variant uses curl to retrieve another executable from attacker-controlled infrastructure
Candidates then receive technical-interview instructions by email, including WireGuard configuration files for Linux or Windows... the interviewer recommends a tailored VPN client called SopraVPN
Persistence
2 techniques
Persistence
On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet.
On Windows, the malicious command creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the Internet.
Privilege Escalation
2 techniques
Privilege Escalation
On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet.
On Windows, the malicious command creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the Internet.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
WireGuard’s standard Base64 decoding was replaced in the trojanized version with a custom, dynamically generated Base64 alphabet, which renders key strings unreadable with standard decoders and protects the PowerShell code from analysis.
The attackers reportedly approach candidates while impersonating IT employers.
Command and Control
1 technique
Command and Control
On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet. The Linux variant uses curl to retrieve another executable from attacker-controlled infrastructure
Observables
23 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.