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Malware2 associated actors

SopraVPN

Tracked since Aug 10, 2026 · Updated 1 month ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors2Associated
ATT&CK15Techniques
IOCs23Tracked
Type
Downloader
Capabilities
Initial accessDefense evasionPersistence
Delivery
SpearphishingLure
Platforms
WindowsLinux

SopraVPN is a trojanized WireGuard-based VPN client used to covertly execute commands and download additional malware on Windows and Linux systems. It is associated with UAC-0145, a Sandworm-linked threat cluster connected to Russia’s GRU. Its deployment has been observed in a fraudulent recruitment campaign targeting Ukrainian system administrators and other IT professionals since at least May 2026.

Attackers impersonate recruiters and legitimate IT companies, approaching candidates through job platforms before continuing conversations through messaging applications and staged video interviews. A purported technical assessment requires candidates to connect to a corporate network using supplied WireGuard configurations. After the connection fails, the interviewer directs the candidate to install SopraVPN, distributed through SourceForge and promoted through an imitation company website.

The modified client accepts an additional configuration option containing Base64-encoded, AES-256-GCM-encrypted command data. It derives the decryption key from the VPN configuration’s private-key value and routes decrypted PowerShell through WireGuard’s script-execution mechanism, enabling concealed arbitrary command execution. On Windows, the commands create a scheduled task that downloads a secondary payload. On Linux, the infection chain uses curl to retrieve another executable from attacker-controlled infrastructure through the VPN. The identities and capabilities of the subsequent payloads, and the campaign’s ultimate objective, have not been established.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

2 distinct threat actors Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Sandworm

Threat actors recommend downloading a custom VPN solution named SopraVPN. CERT-UA explains that the attackers' VPN client was compiled from WireGuard source code with modifications enabling concealed command execution.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
UAC-0145

Threat actors recommend downloading a custom VPN solution named SopraVPN. CERT-UA explains that the attackers' VPN client was compiled from WireGuard source code with modifications enabling concealed command execution.

via the hacker newsthehackernews.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

15 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Reconnaissance

2 techniques
T1589Gather Victim Identity InformationEvidence1

Early exchanges take place through a job-site chat and Telegram, followed by a basic English-language screening and a Zoom meeting that appears to involve a real person.

T1598Phishing for InformationEvidence1

The attackers reportedly approach candidates while impersonating IT employers. Early exchanges take place through a job-site chat and Telegram, followed by a basic English-language screening and a Zoom meeting that appears to involve a real person.

Initial Access

4 techniques
T1195.002Compromise Software Supply ChainEvidence1

The application is a modified build based on WireGuard source code. CERT-UA found that the altered client accepts an extra configuration setting, SymmetricKey.

T1566PhishingEvidence2

Sandworm has turned the routine job interview into a route for compromising IT workers.

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence1

additional instructions for the technical interview are sent via email, including configuration files for connecting to a 'corporate' VPN using Wireguard

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence3

The operation targets system administrators and other IT specialists after attackers study their resumes on job-search sites. It begins with a message from a supposed employer, moves into a chat... Early exchanges take place through a job-site chat and Telegram

Execution

6 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence3

On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

On Windows, the malicious command creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the Internet.

T1059Command and Scripting InterpreterEvidence2

The key clue is a non-standard SymmetricKey option... the decrypted result is passed into WireGuard’s command-execution path used for options such as PostUp.

T1059.001PowerShellEvidence5

It uses information hidden there, together with the configuration’s private key, to decrypt embedded PowerShell code.

T1059.004Unix ShellEvidence3

The Linux variant uses curl to retrieve another executable from attacker-controlled infrastructure

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence3

Candidates then receive technical-interview instructions by email, including WireGuard configuration files for Linux or Windows... the interviewer recommends a tailored VPN client called SopraVPN

Persistence

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence3

On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

On Windows, the malicious command creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the Internet.

Privilege Escalation

2 techniques
T1053Scheduled Task/JobEvidence3

On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet.

T1053.005Scheduled TaskEvidence2

On Windows, the malicious command creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the Internet.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence2

WireGuard’s standard Base64 decoding was replaced in the trojanized version with a custom, dynamically generated Base64 alphabet, which renders key strings unreadable with standard decoders and protects the PowerShell code from analysis.

T1036MasqueradingEvidence6

The attackers reportedly approach candidates while impersonating IT employers.

Command and Control

1 technique
T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence5

On Windows, that code creates a scheduled task and downloads an additional payload from the internet. The Linux variant uses curl to retrieve another executable from attacker-controlled infrastructure

Indicators of compromise

Observables

23 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Activity feed

Recent activity

4 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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cryptika blogNews · Aug 12, 2026Sandworm Fake Job Interviews Push Trojanized WireGuard VPN to Infect IT Professionals | Cryptika CybersecurityA malicious modified WireGuard-based VPN client used in Sandworm-linked fake job interview campaigns. It accepts an extra configuration setting ('SymmetricKey'), uses it with the configuration private key to decrypt embedded PowerShell, creates persistence via a scheduled task on Windows, and downloads additional payloads. On Linux, it uses curl to retrieve another executable from attacker-controlled infrastructure through the VPN.Read more ↗cyber security newsNews · Aug 12, 2026Sandworm Fake Job Interviews Push Trojanized WireGuard VPN to Infect IT ProfessionalsA trojanized VPN client delivered through fake job interviews. It is a modified WireGuard-based application that accepts an extra configuration setting ('SymmetricKey') to decrypt embedded PowerShell code, establishes persistence via a scheduled task on Windows, and downloads additional payloads; the Linux variant retrieves another executable via curl from attacker-controlled infrastructure through the VPN.Read more ↗the hacker newsNews · Aug 11, 2026Sandworm-Linked UAC-0145 Uses Fake Job Interviews to Push VPN That Can Run CommandsA weaponized WireGuard-based VPN client distributed through fake recruitment interviews targeting Ukrainian system administrators and IT specialists. It decrypts embedded PowerShell code using AES-256-GCM and executes it through WireGuard's command-execution mechanism. The Windows variant creates a scheduled task to download a secondary payload; the Linux variant downloads an executable using cURL through the VPN. The next-stage payload is unidentified. The campaign reportedly began in May 2026.Read more ↗the record mediaNews · Aug 10, 2026Russian military hackers pose as recruiters to target Ukrainian IT workers | The Record from Recorded Future NewsA malicious custom VPN application masquerading as a legitimate corporate VPN client. It was built from legitimate WireGuard open-source code but modified so malicious commands could be covertly executed on the victim’s device, with some commands encrypted and embedded in VPN configuration files.Read more ↗
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IOC matching23Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors2Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping15Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.