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Mallory
Malware1 associated actor1 associated CVE

SecurityPDF

Tracked since Aug 11, 2026 · Updated today
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 days1 mention · peak 1 in a dayToday
Vulns1Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs21Tracked
Type
Loader
Capabilities
Initial accessDefense evasion
Delivery
SpearphishingLureSeo poisoning
Platforms
Windows

SecurityPDF is a trojanized Windows PDF viewer built from the open-source MuPDF framework and used by the North Korea-linked Lazarus Group in Operation Dream Job. It serves as a loader for the Troy backdoor. When a user opens a PDF, SecurityPDF checks for a specific hidden marker. If the marker is present, it decrypts an embedded payload using XOR, writes an executable to disk, and launches it. That executable reflectively loads an embedded DLL containing Troy into memory.

SecurityPDF has been distributed through websites impersonating Enveil, supported by search-engine poisoning and recruitment-themed social engineering. The associated campaign targeted defense, aerospace, and aviation organizations, particularly in Europe and India. Its malicious functionality depends on specially prepared PDF documents rather than exploitation of a PDF-rendering vulnerability. The resulting Troy infection provides remote command execution, reconnaissance, file transfer, data exfiltration, process control, and in-memory DLL injection; these are capabilities of the delivered backdoor rather than the viewer itself.

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Associated CVEs

Associated vulnerabilities

1 CVE Mallory has correlated with this family across public research and vendor advisories. Each card links to the full Mallory page for that vulnerability.

CVE-2026-68820via uganda certExploited in the wildWindows Ancillary Function Driver for WinSock Use-After-Free Privilege EscalationToday, August 25, 2026, is the CISA KEV deadline requiring all Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies to patch CVE-2026-68820, the underlying Windows WinSock driver flaw that ShieldBreak (CVE-2026-69414) bypasses. Check Point Research this week formally attributed exploitation of CVE-2026-68820 to North Korea's Lazarus Group as part of Operation Dream Job, where the group distributed a malicious PDF viewer called SecurityPDF to aerospace and defence targets alongside fake job offer lures, using the driver flaw to escalate from initial access to full SYSTEM privileges. | Lazarus Group as part of Operation Dream Job, where the group distributed a malicious PDF viewer called SecurityPDF to aerospace and defence targets alongside fake job offer lures, using the driver flaw to escalate from initial access to full SYSTEM privileges.View vulnerability →Source ↗
Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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Lazarus

SecurityPDF , un viewer MuPDF trojanisé qui extrait et exécute new.exe via XOR 0x39, chargeant réflexivement le backdoor Troy

via cyberveillecyberveille.ch
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

2 techniques
T1588.002ToolEvidence1

Victims are instructed to download SecurityPDF, a trojanized PDF viewer, from one of several websites impersonating Enveil... Once installed, the modified viewer inspects any PDF opened through it for a hidden marker.

T1608.006SEO PoisoningEvidence2

Usurpation de la marque Enveil via des sites SEO-poisonnés ( envell[.]xyz , enveil[.]online , uxtramine[.]org ) distribuant SecurityPDF

Initial Access

3 techniques
T1189Drive-by CompromiseEvidence7

В рамках этой кампании злоумышленники использовали поддельные сайты и SEO...

T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

the group distributed a malicious PDF viewer called SecurityPDF to aerospace and defence targets alongside fake job offer lures

T1566.003Spearphishing via ServiceEvidence1

они представлялись сотрудниками компаний Lockheed Martin и Enveil и завлекли жертв фальшивыми предложениями о работе.

Execution

3 techniques
T1203Exploitation for Client ExecutionEvidence1

распространяли модифицированный PDF-ридер SecurityPDF, который предназначался для выполнения малвари, встроенной в заранее подготовленные хакерами PDF-файлы.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

распространяли модифицированный PDF-ридер SecurityPDF, который предназначался для выполнения малвари, встроенной в заранее подготовленные хакерами PDF-файлы. После открытия такие вредоносные PDF запускали новый бэкдор группировки под названием Troy.

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

These attacks involve Lazarus distributing a modified PDF viewer called SecurityPDF designed to execute malicious payloads embedded within attacker-crafted PDF files when the user opens them.

Privilege Escalation

1 technique
T1068Exploitation for Privilege EscalationEvidence1

Lazarus Group as part of Operation Dream Job, where the group distributed a malicious PDF viewer called SecurityPDF to aerospace and defence targets alongside fake job offer lures, using the driver flaw to escalate from initial access to full SYSTEM privileges.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

SecurityPDF , un viewer MuPDF trojanisé qui extrait et exécute new.exe via XOR 0x39, chargeant réflexivement le backdoor Troy .

T1036MasqueradingEvidence8

asked to download SecurityPDF from a site mimicking Enveil

T1574Hijack Execution FlowEvidence1

These attacks involve Lazarus distributing a modified PDF viewer called SecurityPDF designed to execute malicious payloads embedded within attacker-crafted PDF files when the user opens them.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

21 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

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IOC matching21Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilities1CVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.