MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Trojan.Heriplor

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Dragonfly

It was brought to my attention ... that this API hashing tool is related to Trojan.Heriplor from Symantec's Dragonfly ... report. ... Symantec's Trojan.Heriplor analysis attributes my analysis of this API hashing tool to Energetic Bear.

via sei cmuinsights.sei.cmu.edu

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

Lastly, I have reached out to the MITRE ATT&CK team to ask for an additional technique, API hashing, to be added to its framework... I've worked with the MITRE MAEC team to have API Hashing added to the Malware Behavior Catalog Matrix... listed as a Method under Anti-Static Analysis--Executable Code Obfuscation.

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

I determined that this exemplar uses manual symbol loading techniques, which are very similar to that of shellcode, to interact with the system through APIs. This process reads the Thread Environment Block (TEB) to find the pointer to Process Environment Block (PEB) structure. The PEB structure is then parsed to find the DllBase of kernel32.dll... The function then continues to parse the portable executable (PE) export data and passes the virtual protect hash...

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

37 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

37 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

sei cmuNews

Mar 25, 2019

API Hashing Tool, Imagine That | CMU Software Engineering Institute

A malware sample/toolset linked to Energetic Bear/Dragonfly that uses an API hashing technique and manual symbol resolution to dynamically resolve Windows APIs. The analyzed exemplars show network communication capability over ws2_32.dll or wininet.dll and HTTP POST traffic using custom headers such as 'X-mode: push' and 'X-mode: pop', consistent with remote access trojan behavior.

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.

Start free trial

IOC matching37

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping2

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.

Back to malware

MalwareUsed by 1 actor

Trojan.Heriplor

For your environment

Hunt this family in your stack

Mallory pivots from this family to the IOCs, detections, and named campaigns that touch your stack, and pages you when something new lands.

Start free trial

THREAT ACTORS

Groups observed using it

1 distinct threat actor attributed by public researchers. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

View more details

Dragonfly

via sei cmuinsights.sei.cmu.edu

MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

2 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Stealth

2 techniques

T1027Obfuscated Files or InformationEvidence1

T1027.007Dynamic API ResolutionEvidence1

INDICATORS OF COMPROMISE

IOCs tracked for this family

37 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Full values are available in Mallory.

View more in app

Hashes

37 tracked

File hashes (MD5, SHA-1, SHA-256) from samples and reports.

TypeValueLatest sighting

hash.sha256●●●●●●●●●●●●View more in app8 years ago

ACTIVITY FEED

Recent activity

1 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

1 SOURCESView more in app

sei cmuNews

Mar 25, 2019

API Hashing Tool, Imagine That | CMU Software Engineering Institute

What this page doesn’t show

The version that knows your environment.

Start free trial

IOC matching37

Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.

Threat actor attribution1

Named campaigns wielding this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.

Exploited vulnerabilities

CVEs this family uses for access and lateral movement.

Detection signatures

YARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.

MITRE ATT&CK mapping2

Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.

Researcher chatter

Reddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.