CookiETagRAT
- Type
- RAT
- Capabilities
- Post exploitationDLL sideloading
- Delivery
- Spearphishing
- Platforms
- Windows
CookiETagRAT is a C++ remote-access trojan used in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. It receives and executes operator commands concealed in HTTP Cookie and ETag response headers, using per-host ChaCha20-derived cryptographic material. It has been deployed in intrusions against government organizations in Central Asia. SilkParasite is assessed with medium confidence to be China-nexus activity, although it has not been conclusively attributed to a single named threat actor. CookiETagRAT was one of five previously undocumented RAT families identified in this operation and was deployed through DLL sideloading involving a legitimate signed Windows application.
Associated threat actors
1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.
CookiETagRAT IOCs include tak_deco_lib.dll, easyhook64.dll, and a filesystem XOR key.
Techniques & procedures
11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.
Initial Access
1 technique
Initial Access
Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.
Execution
2 techniques
Execution
Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.
Targets typically receive messages that include regionally tailored Office documents — sometimes inside password-protected RAR archives — which, when opened, trigger a macro that launches a malware delivery chain to deploy a RAT.
Stealth
2 techniques
Stealth
This malware is small, modular, and built specifically not to look like malware... hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.
SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.
Command and Control
6 techniques
Command and Control
CookiETagRAT (C++), which uses HTTP Cookie / ETag response headers as C2 to receive and execute commands.
Rather than using one noisy implant, the actors maintained several tools, changed their supporting files between builds, and used cloud services and normal-looking traffic to make investigation harder. | CookiETagRAT concealed commands in HTTP Cookie and ETag headers
CookiETagRAT hides its tasking in the headers instead. Commands arrive inside HTTP Cookie and ETag response headers, with results returned in the body.
It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.
Nearly every family in SilkParasite is built around plugin architecture: the implant loads additional capabilities on demand from its command-and-control server rather than shipping them all at once.
Bitdefender Labs found seven remote access tool (RAT) families in use, five of which were previously undocumented; we identified and named them: DriveSilkRAT, CookiETagRAT, NomadRAT, GoginRAT, and NodeEdgeRAT.
Observables
4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.
Recent activity
7 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.