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Malware1 associated actor

CookiETagRAT

Tracked since Aug 19, 2026 · Updated 3 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK11Techniques
IOCs4Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Post exploitationDLL sideloading
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

CookiETagRAT is a C++ remote-access trojan used in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. It receives and executes operator commands concealed in HTTP Cookie and ETag response headers, using per-host ChaCha20-derived cryptographic material. It has been deployed in intrusions against government organizations in Central Asia. SilkParasite is assessed with medium confidence to be China-nexus activity, although it has not been conclusively attributed to a single named threat actor. CookiETagRAT was one of five previously undocumented RAT families identified in this operation and was deployed through DLL sideloading involving a legitimate signed Windows application.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilkParasite

CookiETagRAT IOCs include tak_deco_lib.dll, easyhook64.dll, and a filesystem XOR key.

via github webgithub.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

11 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence2

Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.

Execution

2 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Targets typically receive messages that include regionally tailored Office documents — sometimes inside password-protected RAR archives — which, when opened, trigger a macro that launches a malware delivery chain to deploy a RAT.

Stealth

2 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence1

This malware is small, modular, and built specifically not to look like malware... hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence1

SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.

Command and Control

6 techniques
T1001Data ObfuscationEvidence1

CookiETagRAT (C++), which uses HTTP Cookie / ETag response headers as C2 to receive and execute commands.

T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence3

Rather than using one noisy implant, the actors maintained several tools, changed their supporting files between builds, and used cloud services and normal-looking traffic to make investigation harder. | CookiETagRAT concealed commands in HTTP Cookie and ETag headers

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence1

CookiETagRAT hides its tasking in the headers instead. Commands arrive inside HTTP Cookie and ETag response headers, with results returned in the body.

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence1

Nearly every family in SilkParasite is built around plugin architecture: the implant loads additional capabilities on demand from its command-and-control server rather than shipping them all at once.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence1

Bitdefender Labs found seven remote access tool (RAT) families in use, five of which were previously undocumented; we identified and named them: DriveSilkRAT, CookiETagRAT, NomadRAT, GoginRAT, and NodeEdgeRAT.

Indicators of compromise

Observables

4 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Mallory platform

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IOC matching4Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping11Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.