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Malware1 associated actor

NomadRAT

Tracked since Aug 19, 2026 · Updated 2 months ago
Trending this weekNot trendingOutside this week’s top 100
Mention activity · 30 daysNo mention activity in the last 30 days.
Vulns0Associated
Actors1Associated
ATT&CK14Techniques
IOCs113Tracked
Type
RAT
Capabilities
Post exploitationDefense evasionDLL sideloading
Delivery
Spearphishing
Platforms
Windows

NomadRAT is a modular C++ remote-access trojan used in the SilkParasite cyberespionage operation. It comprises a main orchestrator, a dedicated library for command-and-control communications, and plugins retrieved from the operator-controlled server by numeric identifier only when required, minimizing the initial implant footprint. SilkParasite used malicious Office-document lures, often distributed in password-protected archives through spear-phishing, and DLL sideloading of legitimate signed Windows applications to deploy its toolset; NomadRAT loader artifacts were associated with this sideloading tradecraft. The operation targeted government organizations across Central Asia, with targeting also reported in Georgia. SilkParasite was assessed as China-nexus with medium confidence, but has not been conclusively attributed to a specific threat actor.

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Threat actors

Associated threat actors

1 distinct threat actor Mallory has associated with this family across public reporting. Open in Mallory to see the full evidence chain and overlapping campaigns.

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SilkParasite

kg.tdtu[.]org shares a parent domain with mineconom.tdtu[.]org, a NomadRAT C2 indicator in the SilkParasite report.

via security affairssecurityaffairs.com
MITRE ATT&CK

Techniques & procedures

14 distinct techniques documented for this family, organized by ATT&CK tactic.

Resource Development

1 technique
T1583.001DomainsEvidence3

“The infrastructure used names resembling government agencies, state energy operators and telecom organizations across Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Kazakhstan.”

Initial Access

1 technique
T1566.001Spearphishing AttachmentEvidence3

“The operation has used spear-phishing emails carrying convincing government-themed documents ... to plant remote-access malware.”

Execution

3 techniques
T1059.005Visual BasicEvidence2

Its operators used spear-phishing emails with password-protected RAR archives, then used document macros to trigger malicious code.

T1129Shared ModulesEvidence1

downloaded plugins into memory

T1204.002Malicious FileEvidence1

Targets typically receive messages that include regionally tailored Office documents — sometimes inside password-protected RAR archives — which, when opened, trigger a macro that launches a malware delivery chain to deploy a RAT.

Stealth

3 techniques
T1036MasqueradingEvidence4

The cluster's domains don't just look governmental; they spoof specific ministries and state enterprises... [including] Turkmenistan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs... Tojiktelecom... Turkmen energy... Uzbek administration... and even the Kyrgyz president's residence.

T1036.005Match Legitimate Resource Name or LocationEvidence1

“The infrastructure used certificates and websites impersonating Uzbekistan’s state railway, Türkmengaz, Tojiktelecom, and Turkmenistan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a fake RTX Corporation homepage also observed on the servers.”

T1620Reflective Code LoadingEvidence2

SpiceRAT [uses] DLL plugins fetched from C2 and reflectively loaded; CookiETagRAT [uses] PE plugins pulled from C2, mapped in memory.

Collection

1 technique
T1005Data from Local SystemEvidence1

“These tools can give operators a foothold in a victim network, allowing operators to collect information and issue commands.”

Command and Control

5 techniques
T1071Application Layer ProtocolEvidence5

“SpiceRAT command-and-control servers” and “These tools can give operators a foothold in a victim network, allowing operators to collect information and issue commands.”

T1071.001Web ProtocolsEvidence3

“The cloned page is served on port 80, while SpiceRAT's command channel operates separately on port 443.”

T1102Web ServiceEvidence1

It runs its command channel over trusted services like Google Drive, hides inside legitimately signed applications, and keeps its footprint deliberately small.

T1105Ingress Tool TransferEvidence2

Nearly every family in SilkParasite is built around plugin architecture: the implant loads additional capabilities on demand from its command-and-control server rather than shipping them all at once.

T1219Remote Access ToolsEvidence2

“SilkParasite ... used seven remote-access toolsets against Central Asian governments.”

Indicators of compromise

Observables

113 indicators attributed across vendor reports, sandbox runs, and researcher write-ups. Values are masked here and available in full in Mallory.

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Indicator values are available in Mallory. Pivot on every hash, domain, URL, and IP, or pipe them straight into your SIEM.View all in Mallory
Activity feed

Recent activity

12 sources tracked across advisories, community write-ups, and news. New activity surfaces here as Mallory finds it.

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Mallory platform

The version that knows your environment.

This page is what’s public. Mallory adds the parts that aren’t: which of your assets match these IOCs, which detections are missing, which campaigns to expect next, and what to do in the next 30 minutes.
IOC matching113Match every observed IP, domain, and hash against your live telemetry.
Associated threat actors1Groups linked to this family, with evidence pinned to each claim.
Associated vulnerabilitiesCVEs linked to this family, with the reporting behind each link.
Detection signaturesYARA, Sigma, Snort, and vendor rules, auto-deployed to your SIEM.
MITRE ATT&CK mapping14Every documented technique, ranked by evidence weight.
Researcher chatterReddit, Mastodon, and CTI community discussion around this family.